Both superpowers are competing to outsmart helicopter swarms, which are poised to transform the world of war, in a high-stakes battle between the US and China.
This quarter, The War Zone reported that China’s directed-energy counter-drone initiatives are advancing, with many high-power micro systems showcased at the Zhuhai Airshow 2024.
Among the shows were three large smart ground-based high-power microwave-directed power weapons, designed mainly to destroy drones.
The War Zone report mentions these systems, developed by China South Industries Group Corporation ( CSGC ) and Norinco, include a microwave system mounted on an 8×8 light armored vehicle and another on a Shacman SX2400/2500-series 8×8 truck. It points out that these systems have radars and rectangular arrays for monitoring and tracking of targets.
The Zhuhai Airshow occurrence underscored the rising global demand for counter-drone features, driven by the increasing use of the arms in military problems, somewhat in Ukraine.
Although the capabilities of these new systems are still unsure, according to The War Zone report, their creation and use reflect China’s proper strategy to combat flying threats.
The US Army’s 170 effective drone kills were documented in a report from The War Zone this month, underscoring how crucial it is to combat uncrewed underwater threats.
According to the US’s report on the War Zone, Coyote interceptors have been stationed at 36 unspecified locations outside of the country, including those that fall under US Central Command ( CENTCOM), US Africa Command ( AFRICOM), and US European Command ( EUCOM).
The report says that the Coyote Block 2, produced by US defense contractor Raytheon, uses a high-explosive warhead and is part of the Low, Slow, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System ( LIDS ), which includes mobile and fixed-site components.
By 2029, the US Army intends to increase its army with up to 6,700 fresh Coyote ships and more launchers and radars.
According to The War Zone, Block 3 variants with non-kinetic loads are being developed by the US Army, along with other anti-drone systems, including directed energy arms and digital warfare systems.
The inclusion of LIDS into wider air and missile defense networks demonstrates this folded approach’s focus on evolving device threats.
Directed-energy weapons ( DEW ) such as high-power microwaves ( HPM) and small drone interceptors present distinct advantages and challenges in countering drone swarms.
DEWs like HPMs have the ability to launch various drones at once with the help of their fast-paced, precise targeting and potentially limitless ammunition. They can deal with threats that are beyond the scope of normal projectiles and have minimal collateral damage.
But, they face important limitations in terms of energy requirements and environmental conditions. Continual operation demands considerable energy supplies, which can be impossible in rural areas or high-intensity engagements.
Small drone ships bring versatility and adaptability, especially in cluttered or industrial settings. They can manoeuvre to close-range drones, which allows for defense maneuvering in tight, complex environments. They can also be quickly deployed and operate independently, making them flexible and adaptable.
However, their strength is limited by power life, while engaging big, fast-moving swarms you immediately fuel interceptor stocks.
In high-intensity cases, ships may struggle to keep pace with big, organized flocks, particularly against increasingly complex attack drones, positioning DEWs like HPMs as possibly more effective against high-volume attacks.
The possible decisive effect of drone swarms over Taiwan Strait could give the US and China substantial motivation to develop anti-drone technologies. In a Business Insider post from October 2024, Tom Porter discusses the crucial role aircraft crowds would perform in a fight like the growing risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Porter says that China, a leading aircraft manufacturer, could deploy large fleets of autonomous underwater and marine drones to destroy Taiwan’s defenses and manual precision missile strikes.
He points out that the US and Taiwan, now lagging in aircraft features, are working to boost their threats through activities like the US’s” Hellscape” program, which aims to fill the Taiwan Strait with robotic submarines, surface ships and aerial drones.
To counter China’s numerical and technological drone superiority, Porter calls on Taiwan and the US to improve their production and air defense systems. He emphasizes the need for Taiwan and the US to develop autonomous drones and electronic warfare capabilities to combat the threat from Chinese drones.
Experts are divided on whether drones have a strategic impact on warfare despite the fact that the Ukraine war has become a hallmark of its ongoing use of small, disposable drones. This has significant implications for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
On the one hand, Dominika Kunertova says in a September 2024 Center for Security Studies report that large and small drones have shown remarkable adaptability in tactical applications, making high-intensity, cost-effective aerial support widely accessible.
Kunertova details how inexpensive, commercially available drones have empowered Ukrainian forces by enhancing real-time battlefield awareness and enabling innovative, low-cost attack strategies.
She points out how small drones, such as quadcopters and loitering munitions, have proven valuable for reconnaissance and precision strikes, often operating as disposable assets.
She mentions the development of AI-enabled autonomous drones as a step toward full-spectrum drone warfare and argues that integrating these systems into military strategies would require ethical, operational, and policy issues.
According to Kunertova, this evolution signals a shift toward algorithmic warfare, with Ukraine serving as a testing ground for future drone-based conflict dynamics.
On the other hand, Stacie Pettyjohn argues in a February 2024 Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) report that drones in the Ukraine war represent an “evolution” rather than a “revolution” in warfare.
According to Pettyjohn, drones have not yet brought about the transformative change that characterizes a military revolution, despite having altered the battlefield and introducing new tactical capabilities and capabilities. She argues that the majority of drones used in Ukraine were hand-piloted, underpowered, and lacked significant networking capabilities, limiting their impact to local effects.
She mentions that the Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly innovating and adapting, quickly emulating each other’s technological advancements, which severely limits either side’s ability to take home a significant advantage.
Additionally, she claims that due to the widespread use of commercial and dual-use technologies, new drone developments have quickly become available to both sides.
Pettyjohn points out that drones in Ukraine are primarily used as intelligence platforms and artillery spotters, supplementing conventional artillery but lacking in their ability to replace mass artillery fire.
She claims that drones may change military strategies and organizations as they become more autonomous and integrated with other weapons. She contends that their contribution to the military has n’t yet been a radical change in comparison to the current ones.