The , Kursk , underwater crisis on August 12, 2000, was the worst defense shame of Vladimir Putin’s first years as chairman of Russia, with all 118 sailors killed when an spontaneous explosion sank the nuclear-powered vehicle.
Putin is now facing yet another military humiliation due to Ukraine’s brave choice to invade the region ( and the location of a famous World War Two battle ) almost exactly 24 years later.
Given that it is not yet known what those goals are, it is too early to say whether Ukraine’s Kursk war may achieve them strategically. However, it is already clear that the Russian army has been dealt a significant blow by this conquest, along with two other attacks on Russian airfields and ammunition stores located hundreds of kilometers away from the Russian front line.
It has been difficult to make accurate judgments about which side of the conflict has the advantage since Russia attempted its complete war on February 24 2022 and then immediately pulled back to the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine, which it had now largely controlled since 2014. Because the Russian war ended up being a battle with numerous front-line positions and no clear indicators of success or failure afterward.
Ukraine’s first test was its ability to survive as an independent, sovereign state, which the nation masterfully passed in 2022 and has n’t shown any evidence of failing since. But, after first victory in pushing Soviet forces back during the fall of 2022, Ukraine’s battle in 2023 failed to restore much more place.
And finally, in the spring of 2024, Russia began its own fresh rude seeking to reclaim land it had lost the previous time and, most likely, to wear down the confidence of Ukraine’s military and – critically – its culture.
Bit by bit, mile by mile, Russia’s larger military troops have been pushing Ukraine’s smaller ones back, albeit at a higher price in terms of casualties. Russia reportedly had a full invasion of eastern Ukraine in February 2022 with an army of 150, 000 soldiers, but it is now thought to have more than 500, 000 troops there even after the US Congress voted to increase military aid there in April.
However, this is not just a land war with a long front line. Ukraine has been making significant progress in the Black Sea around Russian-occupied Crimea, sinking enough Russian vessels and destroying enough ammunition to obstruct the Russian navy’s retreat east to Novorossiysk, despite losing ground in the northern region of that front line very slowly.
This made it possible for Ukraine to resume its grain exports through the Black Sea in 2023 and 2024, which are essential to the nation’s economy and help lower global food prices.
Ukraine has spent much of this year trying to attack and weaken Russia’s supply lines and logistical stores while being faced with shortages of both manpower and weapons and are constrained by the American and German governments ‘ restrictions on how the most advanced weapons can be used. Although those attacks were successful, they failed to force the Russians to retreat.
Ukraine is now trying to weaken Russia’s relentless but slow-moving land offensive by weakening its grip on Crimea, weakening its supply chains, and opening the western side of the Black Sea for grain exports.
Despite what must have required a long period of planning and positioning armored forces, the most impressive aspect of the Kursk invasion was how Ukrainian forces managed to completely catch the Russians off guard.
This success disproves the conventional notion that the Ukrainian military is corrupt and prone to leaks. As at many previous points in this war, Ukraine’s forces look a lot more professional and well-organized than do their Russian opponents.
It is still unclear how strong a force has been sent across the border because the Kursk invasion amounted to surprise even to American and European allies. The incursion is more sophisticated and larger than initially believed, so the initial conceits that this must be some sort of small special forces raid have been disproven.
This Kursk incursion had seized more territory ( an estimated 350 square kilometers ) in three days than Russia’s attritional offensive in the northern Donbass toward Kharkiv had managed in more than three months as of August 9 ( roughly ).
Whether Ukraine’s forces will continue to defend this new territory for a while, in which case they will need to establish defenses and supply lines, will determine much.
Russia’s balance has already been shifted by this surprise invasion, as we can see already. It has also shown how exposed Russia will always be to attacks from a nimble, well-equipped, well-organized opponent. When it shares a long land border with the nation it is occupying, the imperialist occupier is always vulnerable to counterattacks.
The Kursk operation has already succeeded in a potential goal, diverting Russian forces ‘ attention from the main frontline battle, based on the cost of casualties and lost equipment.
This leaves room for speculating about potential surprises, perhaps in the southern region of the frontline, where the large Dnipro River has already served as a defense against Ukrainian incursions, or even along the northern border.
In addition to reversing the perception that pro-Russian propagandists have been creating of how a weak, outnumbered Ukrainian force was facing slow but inevitable defeat, Ukraine has so far succeeded in doing so based on how this new Battle of Kursk plays out.
For the time being, it is Russia that looks to be facing fast and inevitably repeated humiliations. The lesson is simple: it never pays to underestimate Ukraine.
Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist,  , Bill Emmott , is currently chairman of the , Japan Society of the UK, the , International Institute for Strategic Studies , and the , International Trade Institute.
This is the English original of an article originally published in Italian in La Stampa , and in English on the Substack , Bill Emmott’s Global View. It is republished here with kind permission.