Russian troops crossed the border into Kursk state on August 6, 2024, marking the first war of Soviet territory by foreign army since World War II. Russian television viewers and users of social media have been greeted with pictures of burned-out homes and captured Russian military in the days that followed.
The Russian military unexpectedly responded to the assault, and they have since been battling to remove the Ukrainians from Soviet soil. However, over 120, 000 Russian citizens fled the issue zone.
The development challenges Russia’s defense as well as the Kremlin’s claim that everything is going according to plan, that success is within Russia’s reach, and that President Vladimir Putin is able to shield the Soviet people from foreign dangers.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has devolved into a terrible and disheartening war of attrition. Each aspect is having a hard time finding the funds, weapons, and men needed to keep operations going along a 600-mile entrance.
The outcome of the war does depend on the willingness of the Russian and Ukrainian publics to pay the financial costs and make the necessary sacrifices in light of the relatively impasse in which fighting is raging. The Soviet leaders– and the public – may be shocked by Ukraine’s war of Kursk out of their confidence and sabotage the status quo.
An confident Kremlin
Russian authorities advertising has been oddly contradictory throughout the conflict. State ideologues make the claim that Russia is engaged in a philosophical conflict with the West on one hand. Defense investing has more than doubled in this state of increased war-footing, and military training has been implemented in all classrooms.
Most Russians are also being told that career you continue as usual at the same time. Moscow claims to be conducting a” special military activity” and that its war is not a war. Russians who declare a war run the risk of being imprisoned for disseminating fake information.
Also, there has been no standard participation of all draft-age young males– unlike in Ukraine. A limited participation to attract 300, 000 in September 2022 caused some people unrest.
Instead, the army relies on good monthly bonuses of up to US$ 20,000 to entice trainees from underprivileged areas.
Gauging public opinion
But, what is the Russian government’s approach toward the battle?
Putin’s approval rating, as measured by the government-aligned Levada center, went up from 60 % to over 80 % after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022– just as it did after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Beyond that pure “rally’ round the flag” result, yet, the Russian government has not shown any excellent passion for the war. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, polls have consistently found that about one-quarter of Russians express support for the war, about 15 %-20 % are opposed and the remaining majority are somewhat indifferent.
The majority of Russians agree with the government’s claim that the West is to blame and that Russia must not lose the war, even if they do n’t agree with the government’s decision to invade Ukraine.
The most recent Levada poll in July found that 58 % of Russian respondents wanted to start negotiations with Ukraine, compared to 34 % who wanted to keep the war in the untold form.
When asked in June what feelings they had about the military actions in Ukraine, 48 % expressed pride in Russia, and only 33 % chose anxiety and 10 % anger. In that June poll, 65 % blamed the West for starting the war, 11 % blamed Ukraine, and only 6 % blamed Russia.
But knowing what ordinary Russians certainly think is never easy. People are afraid of giving the “wrong” reply to experts for fear of reprisals. And even before the battle, polls in Russia had reduced response rates, a problem common to advanced democracies. Although Levada claims a response rate of 25 %, the true price could be much lower.
The separate Public Sociology Laboratory sent young experts to spend a month in three distant Russian regions to observe the effects of the war in the local group to better assess the state of public opinion.
Some observable indications of the conflict can be found in the small village of Cheremushkin in the Sverdlovsk oblast. One priest promoted nationalist, pro-war advertising, but apathy was the norm.
This is in line with the research of journalists who interview regular Russians and track obscene social media chat rooms, like the Latvian journalist Kristaps Adrejosons. According to Adrejosons, the general attitude in the Soviet people is one of indifference and consent.
The majority of Western media outlets have relocated to Russia because it is just too risky for American journalists to attempt to cover the war. However, Francesca Ebel of The Washington Post traveled to Kirov in the Steppes in July 2024 while Maria Butina, the native Duma deputy, was there for her.
Formal minders were always present, despite the restrictions on Ebel’s reporting, but Ebel discovered that the war has only limited local support and was primarily geared toward participants helping the soldiers and their families.
The position of Putinomics
The perception of the state of the economy in Russia is undoubtedly influenced by the opinion of the populace. The Russian state has gone to great lengths to keep living standards and a sense of financial security.
Contrary to what was predicted that Western sanctions would bring about the Russian economy’s collapse, GDP increased by 3.6 % in 2023 and real incomes increased by 5.4 %. Indeed, real wages have risen 14 % since the invasion, and unemployment is down to 2.6 %.
Russia continues to run a trade surplus from oil exports:$ 120 billion in 2023 and$ 41 billion in the first half of 2024. This money is currently entangling itself in Russia, causing a surge in usage and real estate.
However, increased spending on arms purchasing has fueled progress in Russia’s rust-belt business cities, as security factory workers spend their wages on consumer goods and services – a textbook example of “military Keynesianism“.
Most Russian volunteers who have signed agreements to fight in Ukraine are from Russia’s less developed regions, where their families spend their military salaries and the$ 90,000 cash payment in the event of a combat death. It is estimated that Russia has suffered over 400, 000 fatalities, dead and wounded combined.
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation just released a gloomy outlook for 2025, with GDP growth remaining at 1 % as a result of labour shortages, a lack of funding, and the cost increase associated with avoiding Western sanctions.
However, there is only a slim possibility that people turmoil may result from this economic downturn. Living standards show no sign of collapsing, and in any case, position suppression is a powerful barrier to organized protest.
Marching to a new melody
When it comes to understanding public opinion, autocratic regimes with harsh repression and relentless state propaganda are faced with a dilemma: they ca n’t be sure what the public actually believes.
In response, authoritarian leaders may feel vulnerable because they are concerned that an unanticipated event could lead to a mass mobilization, which will manifest in a genuine, hidden sense of distrust. This is probably the reason the Kremlin has avoided large mobilization of draft-age men while injecting money into the economy to keep living standards.
However, challenges to the Kremlin do occur. When rogue soldiers from the Wagner Group marched on Moscow, apparently supported by some Russians in the cities they passed, the Russian state experienced a fear a tiny over a year ago, in June 2023.
After its head was killed in an airplane explosion, Putin faced down that problem by incorporating Collins into the state equipment. Putin now has to deal with a new issue: how to maintain his battle plan in the presence of another army marching alongside Ukrainians on Russian land.
At Wesleyan University, Peter Rutland is a professor of state.
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