Nearly all was taken by surprise as a result of the Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk province.
Perhaps not the Russians stationed on the frontier, who apparently tried to warn of a buildup of Russian troops, but the rest of us who closely follow the conflict did not believe the Russian army, which is currently under increasing pressure in the Donetsk oblast farther west, had the manpower and equipment to start this operation.
It has already made progress, expanding some 30 meters in some directions and making a 40 kilometers-wide obvious inside Russia. The Institute for the Study of War claims that an area of 800 square km has been seized so far, making this the largest reduction of northern Russian country since April 1944.
What has the Russians done and what might come next?
First, they have had good operational security ( opsec). Consider the US Discord leaks from last year that revealed Ukraine’s unpleasant forces’ battle order for the summer of 2023? Well, this time that has n’t happened. Before the US ended up applauding the walk, even America first sceptical about the Ukrainians ‘ attack on Russia.
Better opsec means a less determined adversary, as was the case when Ukraine’s direct brigades crossed the border early on August 6.
Next, and perhaps most importantly, they picked a poorly defended stretch of the frontier to strike, near the Russian city of Sudzha, almost 200km north of the closest infantry in Kharkiv, and 350km from the main front.
On the main frontline, Russia has managed to generate a persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) capability, using drones and pairing them with guided missiles and bombs to make it very hard for the Ukrainians to move without being targeted. Due to this, it has become challenging to large forces and action the necessary steps to attain a breakthrough. Here, Russian threats and push numbers are also powerful.
However, Ukraine has gotten the job done by shifting the attack point to a comparatively open border and creating the conditions for a practical breakthrough. The automated brigades are rolling once more in Kursk, causing chaos and confusion as they cross over the Russian border and lover out.
It has been a remarkable walk. They have used strong surveillance groups to produce chaos and confusion ahead of the main thrusts, in addition to concentrating elements of six brigades without being attacked, many of whom have northern tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.
Crucially, they have also managed to establish and maintain an air defense and digital war “bubble” over their advancing causes. Russian fast planes and helicopters ca n’t be operated close to Ukrainian forces due to the air defense bubble, and electronic warfare blocks the frequency ranges needed for Russia to use its drone-based ISR.
The Ukrainians have also adapted tactically: They have been successfully using first-person-view ( FPV ) drones against helicopters for the first time. Russia’s invasion helicopters were important in breaking up the 2023 summer unpleasant, so this move may have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to utilize helicopters near the frontlines.
The Ukrainians have also hit ground targets in Russia with their own fast jets in the role of close air support.
The cumulative effect of this coordinated arms distribution is that Russian commanders dispatching to relieve Kursk have stated how challenging it will be to quickly dislodge the Ukrainian army.
The damage done
According to a” top Ukrainian official,” the operation aims to “destabilize the situation in Russia,” stretch the positions of the enemy, and inflict the biggest losses. The unnamed official continued, stating that the attack “greatly raised our morale, the morale of the Ukrainian army, state, and society.”
The morale boost is well apparent. However, it’s unclear whether the Kursk operation will help Ukraine’s beleaguered defenders there given that Russia has recently increased its influence there.
Either way, this kind of successfully executed operation does n’t just happen. It will have been carefully planned for months. And that timeline might help to define its ultimate strategic goal.
Months ago, Donald Trump was odds-on to become the next US president. He has stated that he will stop aid in an effort to impose sanctions on Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, it’s possible that the strategic goal is to seize Russian territory and use it as a springboard for upcoming negotiations.
Significantly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has congratulated the armed forces for increasing the size of Ukraine’s “exchange fund”.
They’ll either stay or leave.
According to reports, Ukrainian troops have been reportedly using mechanical diggers to construct trenches inside Russia, which could indicate plans to try to defend at least some of the seized territory.
Meanwhile, the Russians are doing similar things to stabilize the lines. This will be their short-term objective, followed by the diminution of the Ukrainian forces ‘ penetration and the reduction of the pocket caused by the incursion.
But this will take time. The most likely course of action is that Russia’s numerical advantage will begin to tell, absent another Ukrainian surprise, an unlikely Russian military disaster, or a political deal.
Then Kiev will have to make a decision: to send its troops back to Ukraine or to lay defensive lines on Russian territory further west. It would be preferable to do this sooner rather than later because it is notoriously difficult to withdraw while in contact with the enemy.
They could try to hold what they have, but this relies on strengthening and maintaining the salient and runs the risk of being badly mutilated by the Russians over time. Finally, there might be a quick solution, such as a Russian withdrawal from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which, for example, could provide desperately needed energy this winter.
Ukraine’s Kursk offensive is high risk and high stakes. So far, the operation has been successful, but its eventual outcome – rather than events a week in – will determine its wider importance.
In any case, Ukraine has shown the West that it can fly inside Russia using Ukrainian aircraft and aircraft without significant escalation. Additionally, it might lead to another round of Russian mobilization, which raises the Kremlin’s political risk.
And one thing that neither side will forget is how simple it was for Ukraine to embarrass Putin by crossing the weakly guarded Russian border.
At the Institute for Digital Security and Behaviour ( IDSB), University of Bath, Patrick Bury is a reader in politics, languages, and international studies.
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