The Russian activity in the Kursk region of Russia began in late July with many days of airstrikes before Kiev’s floor forces immediately advanced some miles into Russian territory on August 6, 2024.
Since therefore, according to various information, they have established an expanded hold of as much as 1, 000 square kilometers. Numerous pieces of Russian products have been destroyed, and Russian forces have suffered significant deaths as a result.
The Kremlin has deployed troops in the area, but it has so far failed to stop the Ukrainian progress from Russian land. Now, according to as yet unconfirmed but credible reports, Putin has appointed Alexei Dyumin to head up what it calls its” counter-terrorist” response to the Ukrainian incursion. In a number of methods, this is important.
First, there is the staff aspect. Dyumin is Putin’s past companion, but also served as deputy mind of the GRU military intelligence services, assistant defense minister and, until the end of May 2024, as governor of the Tula region, north of Moscow.
He was therefore appointed to the State Council as director. The president of Russia is a member of this system, which brings together all the regional governors in Russia. The choice of Dyumin, who is clearly outside the conventional martial order, is a sign of Putin’s lack of faith in his military leaders to accomplish his objectives.
Hence, Dyumin’s handling of this crisis may possibly promote or put an end to his ascendancy in the Russian social elite. If he is effective, it might make him a strong candidate to take over from Vladimir Putin.
Putin’s phrasing, referring to Ukraine’s function as a offense requiring a” counter-terrorist” reaction, is also important. It suggests that he is still reluctant to acknowledge that he has scuttled Russia against its cousin.
Instead, the counter-terrorist procedure now live in Russia sits next to what Putin has called the” specific military activity” being conducted in Ukraine.
Both help conceal the true nature of the issue Trump is currently facing. On the one hand, the Belarusian leader has to deal with an extremely expensive conflict in Ukraine. Moscow has had little choice but to stick to an ugly and difficult-to-manage ally with China, Iran, and North Korea due to the conflict’s fundamental changes to the global political landscape.
On the other hand, it further undermines the belief that Putin and his top martial figures are capable of safeguarding Russian national security. The fact that they could get as much as they have for as long as they did is an obvious failure even if they are finally able to contain and repel the Russian forces that are, for now, firmly rooted remarkably deep inside Russia.
Blame the West
Additionally, it is important to point out that Putin has doubled down on one of his strongest reasons for his anger against Ukraine, saying that the West is to blame for this.
Another implication that Putin’s war involves much more than Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO and the EU, is apparently that the claim that” the West is fighting us with the palms of the Ukrainians.” It serves as a useful guideline for what can be anticipated from Moscow in the long run when negotiating with Kiev about a possible end to the war.
What Moscow wants out of those is a strengthening of Ukraine and the West, as well as a relative strengthening of its own place, especially in the event of a potential conflict with NATO.
This will also be critical for Putin internally, including in terms of his reputation, which we know to be very crucial to him. Any like favorable outcome could increase Russia’s standing in any Chinese-led ally that threatens to defy US and its allies.
The risk is even raised considerably by Ukraine’s European allies as a result of Russia’s ongoing portrayal of the discord as one between Russia and the West. It has the potential to give Russia the chance to assert that NATO as a whole, or individual NATO members, have become co-belligerents and are therefore legitimate targets for Russian escalation of the conflict.
Moscow will undoubtedly view the UK’s repeated assertion that the UK can, with the exception of long-range Storm Shadow missiles, be using Ukrainian forces in its operation in the Kursk region as a case in point of Western powers acting as belligerents against his country.
Russia has repeatedly argued this argument over the past two and a half years, but it has never responded to any of its threats of escalation. It is unlikely to do so right now. On the one hand, it would require Putin to acknowledge a state of war – first with Ukraine, and then, by extension, with the West.
On the other hand, it is very likely that NATO will retaliate in terms of Article 5, which calls for member state collective defense, which will undoubtedly lead to a full-fledged military conflict.
Neither is in Putin’s interest. And the latter could not possibly accomplish for Russia what Putin might hope to accomplish through negotiations, especially if he enters them from a position of strength.
The Russian president is likely to lose this opportunity as a result of Ukraine’s actions in the Kursk region, which will likely favor Kiev even further ahead of any upcoming discussions. For that reason alone, the current Ukrainian offensive merits continued support from the West and calling Putin’s bluff.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
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