In a battle for all-domain field dominance, China is sharpening its digital warfare blades against the US Navy, aiming at crucial sensors and radars to destroy the Americans ‘ high-tech fight networks.
A comprehensive list of US marine targets, including scanners and sensors, has been made available by the South China Morning Post this month, according to a report from the South China Morning Post.
This “kill list,” according to SCMP, was revealed in the most recent issue of Defense Industry Conversion in China and highlights the PLA’s plan to disrupt the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability ( CEC ) system, which is a crucial component of the fleet’s air defense and early warning network.
According to SCMP, Mo Jiaqian, an electric countermeasures specialist with the PLA’s 92728 System, authored the document and outlined how the CEC’s rely on mobile communication links makes it vulnerable to digital interference. According to SCMP, the AN/SPY-1 phased array detector on Aegis boats and the E-2C Hawkeye first warning aircraft are important targets covered in the document.
According to SCMP, the PLA intends to disrupt operations and use these flaws to access the US military community. It mentions that this development highlights China’s growing scientific conflict with the US, with China using its superior electronic gadgets for military programs. The document says the US has responded with sanctions on Chinese businesses, mistakenly accelerating China’s military-civilian connectivity.
The growing convergence of digital and cyber warfare is demonstrated by the interfering with cellular conversation links and utilizing them to gain access to adversary networks.
The US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) notes in an August 2019 report that the convergence of electronic warfare and cyberspace operations is a sign of a shift in military doctrine because both fields aim to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum.
While the review notes that cyber activities and electronic warfare are generally different, technological advances have blurred their boundaries, enabling cross-functional capabilities. It makes note of the fact that digital warfare uses electric energy to intercept, intercept, and manipulate communications while traditional cyberspace operations use software to disrupt or control interconnected systems.
According to the report, current operations are increasingly viewing cyberspace operations and digital warfare as complementing one another, such as using radio frequencies to encircle adversary networks. For instance, it mentions that the US EC-130H Compass Call plane, originally designed to jam army communications, then transmits malicious code to mobile devices.
This multi-domain approach to attacking networks underscores the development of multi-domain operation ( MDO ) “kill chains “—the process of detecting, identifying, and engaging military targets. These stores could signal a new arms race between the US and China.
In the 2020 text, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, Christian Brose argues that the evolving contest to create remove stores marks a tectonic shift in military strategy. Contrary to traditional arms races that focused on hardware like battleships or nuclear weapons, according to Brodeur, this one centers on cognitive superiority and decision-making speed.
He mentions that the US and China are working together to develop advanced sensors that can accelerate and automate the kill chain. According to Brose, the goal is to close the kill chain more quickly than the adversary without compromising their ability to do the same.
Brose contends that this arms race is not just about getting weapons; it also involves regulating the flow of information, transforming human intent into battlefield action at an unprecedented rate.
In line with the multi-domain kill chain arms race, Asia Times reported in February 2024 that the US Department of Defense had accomplished a significant milestone with the launch of the cutting-edge initiative aimed at improving military interoperability and AI integration across all war domains.
This development represents a significant step in the US DoD’s effort to outlast technologically advanced adversaries like China. The CJADC2 system connects sensors from all armed forces branches into a unified network, enabling faster and more accurate decision-making. The US fiscal 2024 budget allocates USD 1.4 billion for CJADC2, underscoring its transformative potential. The system’s AI-driven capabilities enable rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of battlefield information, allowing for swift identification and targeting of threats.
This evolution builds on the older Joint All-Domain Command and Control ( JADC2 ) concept, emphasizing interoperability with allies and partners. The initiative aims to develop a highly competitive information-fluent force capable of sway networks and launch precise strikes from various locations.
In response to the US CJADC2 concept, Asia Times reported in April 2024 that China developed its Multi-Domain Precision Warfare ( MDPW) concept to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US operational systems.
China’s MDPW strategy leverages a comprehensive C4ISR network to coordinate precise strikes across various domains, including cyber and space, to disrupt and dismantle the US military’s command and control infrastructure, thereby gaining a strategic advantage.
However, these MDO concepts might become the latest military intellectual boondoggle, promising much while based on faulty assumptions.
In a January 2024 War on the Rocks article, Davis Ellison and Tim Swejis argue that MDO, while innovative, faces significant challenges in practical implementation. They point out that the lack of a clear theory of success, technological immaturity, and vague threat descriptions are the main criticisms.
They point out that MDO frequently relies on optimistic assumptions about technological prowess, such as assured connectivity and quick data processing, which are not yet fully realized. Additionally, they mention that the concept’s broad and occasionally ambiguous language creates confusion and inconsistentness between various military branches and allies.
According to Ellison and Swejis, the lack of specific adversary identification makes it harder to create effective MDO strategies. They also point out that MDO’s emphasis on accuracy and speed may overlook the complexity of actual combat, where attrition and the haze of war continue to be a significant factor.
They also question MDO’s integration within existing political and military structures, with concerns about inter-service rivalry and the feasibility of whole-of-government approaches.
In the end, Ellison and Swejis warn that MDO runs the risk of becoming yet another overhyped military concept that doesn’t fulfill its promises, potentially diverting attention and resources from more pressing strategic and operational issues.