One cunning aircraft, long-range weapon, and cratered airport at a time are being used by China to overthrow US air dominance in the Pacific.
A senior US official stated this month that China is rapidly developing its capability to issue US air superiority in the Pacific, especially within the carefully important First Island Chain.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command ( INDOPACOM), testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee. He alleged that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force ( PLAAF ) is producing more fighter jets than the US at a ratio of 1.2 to 1.
Paparo cited China’s fast-growing warrior ships, advanced long-range air-to-air rockets, and sweeping development across all warfighting domains as “high scars” for its capability to refuse US air supremacy along the First Island Chain.
The US must maintain heat supremacy along the First Island Chain, which extends from Japan to the Philippines.
Paparo warned that the US risks falling on without reliable investments in long-range flames, incorporated air and missile threats, and advanced command and control techniques, saying that total control of the air would not be enjoyed by either side. He warned against using ceeding weather superiority.
In a report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) in March 2024, Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer point out that while China’s fighter production capacity is impressive, it still trails the US in terms of aircraft numbers, with the US still benefiting from a significant increase in fifth-generation aircraft, particularly the F-22 and F-35.
Jones and Palmer do, however, point out that China is bridging the output gap with the US. They point out that China is reported to produce 100 fifth-generation J-20 soldiers periodically, tripling the production of additional aircraft types, including the J-10C and J-16, which indicates a high output level. Jones and Palmer attribute China’s great warrior output to its consolidated, whole-of-government strategy to defense manufacturing.
Tyler Rogoway mentions that China’s new PL-17 is most likely a very long-range air-to-air missile with an estimated 300-kilometer range in a December 2023 article for The War Zone ( TWZ ).
Rogoway points out that the PL-17 may be targeted at ground-based radar or satellites, as well as airborne early warning and control ( AEW&, C ) aircraft. He mentions that China’s J-16 or J-20 combatants may be unable to carry the PL-17 directly due to its size.
According to Aquilino, the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report ( CMPR ) states that the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation make up the Indo-Pacific’s largest air force, with 3, 150 aircraft, including 1, 900 fighters, an increase of 400 in the last three years.
Aquilino warns that China could quickly surpass the US in full airpower if trends continue, bolstering its position on land and sea.
In an article from the April 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs content, Matthew Revels mentions that the Army had probably large air assets over Taiwan in order to achieve localized, military air superiority rather than fighting to establish proper air dominance.
Beyond the large number of fighter jets, China’s weapon capabilities present a greater threat to US airstrikes there.
In a December 2024 article for the American Foreign Policy Council, Eamon Passey mentions that the PLA Rocket Force ( PLRF ) has a significant hardware advantage over the US when it comes to conventional missiles.
Passey notes that China has developed a large number of ballistic and cruise missiles, which are frequently more numerous and powerful than their American counterparts. He claims that while the US invests in fast weapons systems, it is less successful in developing and deploying them because of the difficulty and high costs involved in integrating those weapons into US military systems.
Passey points out that China may invest a lot of money in its missile skills, primarily because there are no restrictions on arms control agreements. He also makes note of the fact that the PLARF runs an broad, intelligent missile system that has quickly developed into a single command structure.
China’s anti-intervention strategy in local conflicts depends heavily on the PLARF. In a 2021 Military Review content, Christopher Mihal mentions that China currently has 2,200 conventional ballistic missiles and ample anti-ship missiles to attack every US area fighter in the South China Sea with enough power to defeat each ship’s weapon defenses.
Additionally, Kelly Grieco and other authors mention in a Stimson Center report from December 2024 that the PLARF is expected to launch coordinated missile attacks to destroy US aircraft on the ground and crater runways to render them unusable.
These missile capabilities pose a threat to the US’s forward-deploying air force, which is still highly vulnerable as a result of poor base fortifications, according to Greico.
In a worst-case scenario, according to Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton, the majority of US aircraft losses will occur on the ground because its Pacific airbases lack hardened aircraft shelters ( HAS ) and individual aircraft shelters ( IAS ).
They mention that US operational concepts pretended primarily that its aircraft would operate from forward airfields without being contested and that minor threats to those facilities would vanish once hostilities were over.
They claim that this thinking disregards China’s expanding ability to launch missiles, aircraft, and special forces against those troubled facilities. According to Shugart and Walton, dispersal by itself is ineffective because China has enough firepower to warrant dispersal.
In the event of a Chinese assault on Taiwan, a quick US response would be essential for deterrence and defense.
In a June 2023 RAND report, Timothy Heath and other authors mention that Taiwan is least likely to lose in the first 90 days following an invasion, with that period being the minimum requirement for the US to mobilize enough forces for military intervention.
In contrast, Bonny Lin and other authors mention in an August 2024 CSIS report that China can launch major combat operations against Taiwan for six months as part of a larger blockade, with the option of starting with additional missile and air attacks if Taiwan continues to resist.
Lin and others claim that those more frequent attacks are also intended to stop Taiwan from rebuilding damaged equipment and deploying additional weapons systems. The next air-surfing battle could be over before its aircraft even start to take off if the US doesn’t act quickly.