A crucial component of South Korea’s marine modernization strategy to advance standard deterrent against North Korea and other regional threats has been completed.
The Korean ROKS Jeongjo the Great battleship was commissioned in November at the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries factory in Ulsan, according to The War Zone’s report this quarter.
The ship, the first among three KDX-II I Batch 2 destroyers to be delivered, showcases the sophisticated Korean Vertical Launch System ( KVLS-II ) for ballistic missiles, indicating South Korea’s increasing focus on missile defense.
The destroyer measures 558 feet in length, displaces around 12, 000 tons and is equipped with the latest Foundation 9 Aegis fight program, which enhances its tracking, hit and anti-submarine war capabilities.
The KVLS-II is a major upgrade, allowing for the implementation of larger weapons, including the Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM ) and possibly ballistic weapons, which are essential for countering North Korean challenges.
The development comes as a result of South Korea’s decision to lift its missile collection limits in 2021, which will enable it to increase its missile arsenal.
Naval News reported in March 2024 that South Korea had initiated the development of a new ship-launched ballistic missile, known as the” Ship-to-surface Ballistic Missile” or Hyunmoo-IV-2, following approval by the Defense Program Promotion Committee.
The Agency for Defense Development ( ADD)-managed program will skip the research phase and move to system development, with detailed design work anticipated to be finished by 2028, according to the Naval News report.
The missile, designed for precision attacks on major enemy targets over long distances, will be integrated into KVLS-II and deployed on three types of Republic of Korea Navy ( ROKN) ships: the KDX-II I Batch-II Aegis destroyers, the future Korean Next-Generation Destroyer ( KDDX ) and the future Arsenal ship.
In April 2023, Asia Times reported that South Korea had introduced plans for an “arsenal ship”, a missile-equipped vehicle for land-attack activities targeting important goals like command centers, transportation hubs, air defense deployments and military facilities.
The ROKN plans to purchase three vessels by the end of the 2020s as a result of Daewoo Shipbuilding &, Marine Engineering ( DSME) as the company’s joint firepower ship concept.
In the event of an imminent missile threat, each vessel is designed to carry 80 missiles for preemptive strikes against North Korean military installations. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration ( DAPA ) will invest US$ 467 million between 2024 and 2036 to develop a new ship-to-surface ballistic missile for these ships.
The ships ‘ development may align with , South Korea’s” Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation ( KMPR )” strategy as outlined in its 2022 Defense White Paper. The only way to deter North Korea is to threaten the Kim dynasty and its nuclear arsenal, according to KMPR, which is based on the idea that since it is not deterred by military action or economic sanctions.
The plan emphasizes deterrence by denying and punishing both, and hopes to cast doubt on North Korean leaders regarding the success of an attack and the possibility of severe retaliation. It includes a damage-limitation aspect, intending to minimize the impact of any North Korean nuclear attack. It is intended for preventive action, recommending quick strikes on nuclear targets if a North Korean attack appears on the horizon.
However, South Korea’s ballistic missile-carrying warships may be vulnerable to a multitude of North Korean asymmetric threats, which include submarines, special operations forces, fast attack craft swarms, naval mines, drone swarms, suicide attacks and anti-ship missiles.
Despite having no nuclear weapons, South Korea may have a limited ability to threaten North Korea, which may limit its conventional deterrence posture.
In an article published in the peer-reviewed International Security journal in January 2021, Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim claim that South Korea must face significant difficulties in keeping a credible conventional deterrence posture in order to combat North Korea’s nuclear threat.
To counter this, Bowers and Hiim mention that South Korea has developed an independent counterforce and countervalue strategy that relies heavily on advanced conventional capabilities, such as high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated missile defense systems and sophisticated ISR ( intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ) technologies.
However, Bowers and Hiim point out that this strategy presents several dilemmas. They claim that South Korea must quickly identify, track, and neutralize North Korean missile threats, which is extremely difficult given North Korea’s extensive use of hardened underground facilities and mobile missile launchers.
Additionally, they note that South Korea’s strategy must continually adapt to North Korea’s advancements in survivability and penetration capabilities, giving rise to high financial and technological demands. They claim that this strategy causes crisis instability strategically, and that counterforce threats could prompt North Korea to launch a first strike in a crisis.
Countervalue threats directed at North Korea’s leaders may encourage centralized or unauthorized nuclear use, further destabilizing the area. Additionally, South Korea may have to reevaluate its strategic approach to its long-time rival North Korea as a second Trump administration is under way.
During his first presidency, US President-elect Donald Trump favored re-engagement with North Korea, meeting Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018, and pledged to halt US-South Korea military exercises at the possible expense of downgrading Seoul’s deterrence capabilities.  ,
Further, Trump’s transition team is discussing the possibility of direct talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, with re-engagement apparently being the second Trump administration’s goal, though no final decision, dates or timetables have been confirmed. Trump may also choose to put Middle Eastern conflicts and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine before the Korean Peninsula.
Trump may also ask South Korea to pay more in cash for the service it provides. The first Trump Administration demanded$ 5 billion to help pay for the costs of hosting 28,500 US troops stationed on South Korean soil. A second Trump administration could bring on this demand, which would increase Seoul’s potential high new defense costs.
The incoming Trump administration will most likely carry on its previous hawkish stance toward China. The previous position demanded the creation of a 350-ship US Navy, large-scale arms shipments to Taiwan, and the promotion of anti-China blocs like the Quad. It also advocated for withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty.
These indicate potential differences between the US and South Korean approaches to China. Because China is Pyongyang’s primary economic and diplomatic lifeline, South Korea believes its relationship with China is crucial in shaping its decisions.