Japan’s vague but shifting stance on Taiwan

Tensions are rising in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, many developed nations have become concerned about China’s military growth.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has increased anxiety that China, with its military dominance, will unilaterally attempt to change the status quo in Taiwan.

In June 2022, the Leaders’ Communique issued at the G7 Summit included a statement to “underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait problems. ” This is the 2nd consecutive year that Taiwan has been described.

Among G7 members, The japanese and the United States stick out as having strong stances toward protecting Taiwan. At the Apr 2021 Japan-US Leaders’ Summit, the  joint statement   reiterated “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ and urged ‘the peaceful quality of cross-Strait problems. ”

It had been the first time that Taiwan was mentioned in a Japan-US joint leaders’ statement since 1969.

Japan’s position on Taiwan has been ambiguous for many years. This is actually the result of complex internal politics rather than tactical ambiguity.

Taiwan is a sensitive concern in Japan’s relations with both the United States plus China. Within the judgment Liberal Democratic Celebration, pro-Taiwan and pro-China factions are fiercely opposed.

Since Japan’s participation inside a potential conflict over Taiwan is affected by the Japanese constitution — which has strictly constrained the use of military drive overseas — Japan’s involvement has become a point of contention among conservative and reformist forces.

The “Taiwan Clause” included in the 1969 Japan-US Joint Statement intended that if a turmoil occurred over Taiwan, the Japanese government might guarantee the application of US military personnel stationed in The japanese.

In exchange for the United States’ guarantee to return Okinawa, Japan expressed its place that a conflict over Taiwan was not shut off from its domestic safety.

The addition of the phrase that “the maintenance of peacefulness and security in the Taiwan area seemed to be a most important factor for your security of Japan” was a last-minute appearance thought up by the Japanese government, seeking to avoid excessively provoking China.

Whilst upholding the lawful force of the Taiwan Clause, Japan offers tried to deal with the Taiwan problem politically with China. In the Joint Communique from the Government of The japanese and the Republic associated with China in 1972, China stated that will “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese place. ”

A helicopter flies a Taiwanese flag within Taoyuan, Taiwan. Photo: Ceng Shou Yi / NurPhoto or Getty Images

Japan displayed “understanding” and “respect” and showed Cina political compromise by stating that it “firmly maintains its endure under Article almost eight of the Potsdam Proclamation”, which referenced the particular return of Taiwan to China.

At the time japan government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, “China” meant the Republic of China. Nevertheless , the Japanese government has used the term to refer to the People’s Republic of Tiongkok since 1949.

The Japanese government’s position was that it well known the “One China” policy and aimed for a peaceful resolution of any future separation of The far east and Taiwan, but reserved the option to utilize the US-Japan Security Treaty if turmoil erupted. The considering the Japanese government at that time has formed the basis of government views up until today.

Japan has continued to adopt a politically ambiguous position on whether an issue over Taiwan is included in the application of the particular US-Japan Security Treaty.

Within September 1997, the guidelines underpinning Japan-US safety cooperation were reconsidered and legal preparations were made to allow the Japan Self-Defense Force to support the US military in the event of “situations in areas surrounding Japan that have important influence on Japan security. ”

But the government at the time avoided clarifying if the Taiwan Strait had been included in the “areas surrounding Japan. ”

In the 2010s, as Chinese army dominance gained momentum, former prime minister Shinzo Abe replied strategically to the circumstance. But when Abe exceeded a range of peace and security laws within 2015, he has been cautious in his feedback concerning a possible discord over Taiwan.

The purpose of Abe’s serenity and security laws was to enable the partial exercise associated with collective self-defense, which had been difficult to participate in under previous interpretations of the Japanese constitution.

Then-Japanese Primary Minister Shinzo Abe looks at Japanese naval ships during a fleet review off Sagami Bay, Kanagawa prefecture, on October eighteen, 2015. Photo: AFP / Jiji Push

Even debates in the National Diet had avoided commenting on situations where it would be possible to exercise collective self-defense. The government at the time repeatedly said that it will determine such situations concretely and on the case-by-case basis if a military attack occurred.

Against the backdrop of US-China stress, and with growing Chinese language military intimidation, the Japanese government shifted the position of ambiguity and started to explain that it would take part in the defense associated with Taiwan.

As the Japanese public became increasingly concerned about the threat posed simply by China, the Japanese federal government came to believe that a positive stance on the Taiwan issue would be supported by public opinion.

Abe joined up with an online symposium kept in Taiwan in December 2021, where he mentioned that “a Taiwan crisis is a The japanese crisis; it is also a crisis for the Japan-US alliance. ”

Because the Japan-China relationship offers continued to awesome, pro-China groups within Japan have lost their influence, while requires Japan to send a definite message regarding the protection of Taiwan have grown to be stronger.

The particular tone of the issue in Japan is constantly on the evolve. Yet, unlike Abe’s remark, a Taiwan crisis will never necessarily lead to a crisis for Japan directly. Joint strategic plans to prepare for turmoil over Taiwan are now being advanced at the functional level, but furthermore important are the choices at the government level.

If an issue occurs in the Taiwan Strait, it is the Western government which will determine whether to commit to supporting the US army or to engage in combined strategies with the US military by working out collective self-defense.

The authorization of the Diet is also essential to facilitate these choices. As to whether The japanese should bear the risk of getting tangled upward in a war along with China to defend Taiwan, the government does not yet have the support from the Japanese people.

Tourists look upon as a Chinese army helicopter flies previous Pingtan island, certainly one of mainland China’s closest points to Taiwan, in Fujian province on August four, ahead of massive military drills off Taiwan. Photo: Twitter or JIJI

It is highly most likely that any discord over Taiwan might be a hybrid war that combines tactics like guerrilla espionage plus cyber-attacks. Unless the particular Chinese military directly attacks the US military bases in Okinawa or the Sakishima Islands, the grey part of the present circumstances has so far staved away from war.

Japanese politicians will ultimately be pressured to make the difficult decision associated with determining at exactly what stage the situation should be thought about an “emergency. ”

The Japanese authorities should not soften its position in favor of the peaceful resolution towards the Taiwan problem via diplomacy. But simultaneously, as a conflict over Taiwan — the worst possible situation — becomes a lot more realistic, public controversy about the extent the military response will be necessary.

Masaya Inoue is certainly Professor of Political Science in the Teachers of Law on Keio University.

This post appears in the most current edition of  East Asia Forum Quarterly , ‘ Japan’s proper choices ’, Vol 14, No 3.