In response to China’s aggressive actions in the East China Sea, Japan is upgrading its maritime capabilities with the development of Uncrewed Surface Vessels ( USV), a strategic shift in both defense technology and the US-Japan alliance.
This month, the Indo-Pacific Defense Forum ( IPDF) reported that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ( JMSDF) is advancing its maritime capabilities by prioritizing the implementation of USVs, seen as a significant enhancement in intelligence, surveillance and combat support.
According to IPDF, this proper move is in response to China’s repeated attacks in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japanese control. For example, the origin mentions that Chinese ships entered Japanese waterways for a report 64 hours during a significant incident in June 2024.
The importance of enhancing sea site recognition capabilities in the South China Sea, across the Taiwan Strait, and in the Sea of Japan was highlighted to IPDF by Stephen Nagy, a professor of international relations at Japan’s International Christian University.
He emphasized the need for antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures to avert China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA-N)’s ( PLA-N) potential blockades.
Japan’s 2024 defence white papers, according to IPDF, highlights the significance of USVs in strengthening national defense. These vessels are safer and more cost-effective than crewed vessels, and they can work independently. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of USV partnership with the US Navy in terms of scientific innovation.
IPDF records that Japan’s collaboration with JMU Defense Systems has delivered a USV for testing on the JMSDF’s latest Mogami-class ship. According to the report, the ship is intended to be the mother ship of uncrewed underground and mine-disposal vessels.
However, IPDF mentions that Japan is allocating over US$ 160 million for research and development in 2024 to move to combat-support USVs worthy of risk monitoring and intelligence-gathering with advanced underwater navigation technology.
USVs may enable Japan harmony its defense with China, which has gradually shifted both in terms of quality and quantity.
Kojiro Tanikawa noted in a July 2024 Japan News content that despite China increasing its warship numbers and expanding its functions in recent years, there are still only about 50 JMSDF fight boats.
For a amounts gap may place Japan at a risk. The proverb “quantity has a value all its own” is correct in naval battle, according to Sam Tangredi in a January 2023 Proceedings article. Historical research reveals that in 25 of the 28 marine wars, the area with the larger fleet prevailed.
Tangredi points out that even when opposing ships share the same technology, the larger ships typically prevails because adversaries ‘ scientific benefits are temporary and immediately countered.
He points out that technological superiority frequently outweighs a substantial fleet size and the ability to replenish losses in battles between near-peer naval forces.
Tangredi points to historical examples that demonstrate the crucial role of mass in naval strategy, questioning whether superior strategy, technology, or training can make up for a numerical disadvantage.
He challenges the notion that smaller, technologically advanced fleets can outsmart larger ones, highlighting the tendency of history to favor the winner in naval combat.
In line with that, Toshi Yoshihara mentions that the JMSDF wo n’t be significantly larger than it is at the time of writing in a June 2020 CIMSEC article.
Yoshihara claims that Japan still has a respectable 45 % tonnage advantage over China. Still, he says that advantage might be short-lived as China puts more carriers, cruisers and destroyers in service.
For firepower, Yoshihara points out that in 2020 China had 75 % more vertical launch systems (VLS ) than Japan and that China’s anti-ship cruise missiles considerably outrange those of Japan.
Despite the proven effectiveness of Ukrainian USVs in the Black Sea against Russian targets, Tanikawa claims that Japan has been slow to adopt USVs as a stopgap measure to address the numbers and firepower gap. He adds that USVs are not used in Japanese attacks.
Japan can use USVs as a force multiplier to counteract China’s numerical advantage, but they can also do more than just increase maritime domain awareness, anti-mine countermeasures, and antisubmarine warfare.
Kyle Cregg discusses the” Every Ship a Surface Action Group ( SAG )” concept in a March 2023 CIMSEC article, which is a distributed future force architecture that is surrounded by numerous Large Unmanned Surface Vessels ( LUSV ) with VLS-equipped and optionally manned ships.
He thinks that combining manned and unmanned teams will result in stronger SAGs than a single manned ship or an independent manned SAG, allowing for quick up-gunning of conventional naval platforms and amphibious assault ships.
According to Cregg, the” Every Ship a SAG” concept will lessen the demands for maintenance and repair as well as the difficulties of sailing through contested and dangerous waters. He adds that the idea bridges a more autonomous USV-forward future with the capabilities of today.
Cregg acknowledges difficulties in putting the” Every Ship a SAG” concept into practice, such as LUSV project budget and management issues, munitions manufacturing shortfalls, and integrating various effort streams to field more and more capable and autonomous LUSVs.
Japan’s USV program could be a focal point for enhancing already close US-Japan naval cooperation. In September 2023, the JS Kumano frigate, the USS Oakland, USV Ranger and USV Mariner conducted a bilateral naval exercise in Sagami Bay. The exercise provided the US and Japan with a chance to boost their USV research and development efforts.
Additionally, Vincent Wroble mentions in an article from the June 2021 Proceedings that the US should be able to build USVs in allied shipyards like those in Japan and South Korea as a result of the US’s shrinking naval shipbuilding base.
Wroble discusses the benefits and drawbacks of that strategy, arguing that allowing USV construction abroad lowers costs and benefits from Japan and South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding capabilities.
He asserts, however, that maintaining basing rights for USVs would be of the essence because maintenance ca n’t be done at sea, and that the idea of constructing USVs in allies might face stiff opposition from large US shipbuilders and conservatives in the US government.