Japan’s defence strategy has significantly changed as a result of its hasty acquisition of US-made Tomahawk weapons. A closer examination of the factors influencing this choice is necessary in light of dangers from China and North Korea.
Following a Pentagon conference between Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, it was announced this month that Japan had accelerate its planned learning of US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles by one time.
Over the course of 2026 and 2027, Japan intended to buy 400 Tomahawk Block V rockets at a rate of 200 per financial time. The older Tomahawk Block IV, which will be purchased in the financial times 2025 to 2026, will replace some of Japan’s weapon buying as a result of rising weapon risks from China and North Korea. By 2027, Japan intends to equip all eight of its Aegis ships with Tomahawks.
The long-serving boat weapon, which went into service in 1983, is currently being used by the Tomahawk Block IV. Its 1,600-kilometer range, ability to fire from ships and boats, hours of loitering, and datalink enable it to alter course as needed.
The Tomahawk Block V, on the other hand, has improved communication and navigation methods, you attack moving targets at sea, and a combined multi-effects weapon to attack more varied area targets.
Congress has not yet approved the expedited learning, despite Kihara’s claim that the US has expressed support for it.
By adding counterstrike capabilities, Japan hopes to improve its security capabilities through the acquisition of Tomahawk rockets.
This action follows a thorough examination of Japan’s 2023 defense white paper, which was outlined in & nbsp. The paper discusses a number of difficulties, ranging from North Korea’s missile launches to Chinese aircraft actions.
During a conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden gave his approval to the new legislation, which signaled the basic strengthening of Japan’s security capabilities in the face of an increasingly deteriorating security environment.
Security experts have also requested that the Japanese Ministry of Defense give a thorough common reason in response to the determination to hasten weapon learning. Such a move might clarify the tactical justification for Japan’s shifting defense priorities given the complexity of the political situation and the rapidly evolving defense needs.
Japan’s determination to speed up its Tomahawk weapon procurement for counterstrike capabilities has been influenced by the missile capabilities of China and North Korea and the strengthening of their strategic ties.
Bruce Klinger notes in a statement from the Heritage Foundation dated November 2022 that North Korea is testing numerous missiles with the intention of obtaining unspoken support for its violation of UN commitments. According to Klinger, the nation now routinely launches missiles and relies on UN Security Council obstructionism from China and Russia to accomplish this.
Pyongyang aims to pressure the allies into curtailing potential activities by portraying its military actions as appropriate responses to resumed US-South Korean military maneuvers, as Klinger emphasized.
Regarding nuclear weapons, Klinger claims that by the year 2017 North Korea was thought to have produced between 30 and 60 radioactive weapons, or sufficient fissile material for such weapons. Additionally, he claims that North Korea may develop an additional seven to twelve warheads each year.
According to him, North Korea may possess 200 atomic weapons by 2027. Six nuclear assessments have been carried out by the government. Pyongyang has finished getting ready for a sixth nuclear evaluation, according to declarations from Washington and Seoul.
According to Klinger, North Korea is capable of dropping nuclear weapons on target in South Korea, Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and the US mainland. According to him, it is currently creating a new generation of sophisticated portable missiles that are harder to find, target, and correct.
Additionally, Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz note in an andnbsp report from April 2022 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies( CSIS ) and nnpspe that North Korea is becoming more open to taking risks in missile testing in order to strengthen its missile program because it has a favorable environment for missile tests while the US is preoccupied with the conflict in Ukraine. They also say that China and Russia are strengthening their proper alliance.
According to Cha and Katz, North Korea conducts tests in order to demonstrate military advancement and uphold fidelity within the government, as well as due to its inner circumstances and financial circumstances.
They also point out that because North Korea can buy the materials and components it needs from the international market, it no longer requires little outside assistance for its nuclear program. Additionally, they claim that because the necessary skills are less costly than those required for the US to support itself, North Korea has an edge in achieving an unpleasant victory.
Five Chinese missiles that touched down in Taiwan during military training in August 2022 served as further evidence of China’s weapon threat to Japan.
Jaganath Sankaran notes that China’s weapon capabilities are designed to reduce the expulsion of US and allied military power, concentrating heavily on crucial air and naval bases, in an article published in the peer-reviewed Asian Security journal in June 2020.
Sankaran points out that the only two stand within the unrefueled fight diameter of the Taiwan Strait for US soldiers are Japan’s Kadena and Futenma air foundations. He claims that while these bases are ideal for taking off and operating larger aircraft, they lack large defensive air shelters, which could compromise the US air power projection.
In addition to Kadena and Futenma, Sankaaran says that Chinese missile strikes could target different US bases like Misawa, Iwakuni, and Yokota in the event of a conflict in Taiwan.
Additionally, China and North Korea might cooperate to sever US partnerships in Northeast Asia. Andnbsp, Oriana Skylar Mastro and Sungmin Cho highlight the potential threat posed by North Korea’s missile capabilities as a key factor influencing Japan and South Koreas’ diplomatic approach to China in an article published in February 2022 by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies( FSI ).
According to Mastro and Cho, the increased risk of North Korean missile strikes encourages Japan and South Korea to evade alienating China in an effort to contain Pyongyang. According to them, Japan and South Korea are motivated to maintain cordial relations with China in order to keep Pyongyang in check, weakening the relationships between the US and its partners in Tokyo and Seoul as both countries seek to avoid upsetting China. This is because they are threatened by the increased risk of missile attacks from North Korea, & nbsp.
According to Mastro and Cho, North Korea’s missile capabilities are assisting in achieving this goal by more successfully posing a threat to Japan and South Korea and raising concerns among their citizens about the effectiveness of US extended punishment and missile defense.
Japan has made significant efforts to define crucial operating principles, though it is unclear how it will use its counterstrike capabilities.
James Schoff and other authors note that Japanese leaders have made a distinction between enemy base strike capability, missile prevention / interdiction capacity, & nbsp, standoff missile defense capabilities, counterattack, pre-emptive strike, rocket defense, and comprehensive air-and-missile defense in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for Regional Peace.
Schoff and others point out that these operational concepts were developed with specific restrictions in mind, stating that Japan can only take the” minimum measures unavoidably necessary” when” no other measures” of self-defense are available in the face of an” imminent illegal invasion.”
Additionally, it may be difficult for the US and Japan to maintain their long-standing empire. Yohsuke Aoki notes in a CSIS article from July 2023 that the US-Japan alliance will benefit from the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities because joint operations will improve and enhance deterrence, but for various reasons, they have not incorporated the Joint Operation Command( OPCON ) into their alliance.
Aoki points out that it is challenging to combine OPCON due to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and strategic objectives that are distinct from those in the US. However, he claims that creating a joint operation coordination center could enhance the command-and-control ( C2 ) relationship between the two nations.
In addition, he suggests that Japan set up a permanent joint headquarters for its Self-Defense Forces( SDF ), that the US think about redistributing the warfighting commands in the Indo-Pacific, and that bilateral talks be held to objectively assess the benefits and drawbacks of an identical C2 structure.