With Fumio Kishida, the country’s prime minister, visiting Washington this year, there are rumors that Japan may soon sign the AUKUS stability pact between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Asian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has dismissed the suggestion, saying that this is not something that may occur quickly. He added that any assistance had, for today, be on a task- by- project basis.
What part of the alliance might Japan probably play? And what are the possible problems?
Partner on the’ Pillar II’ levels
Japan has grown extremely uncomfortable with China’s confidence in the Indo- Pacific area, including “wolf hero” diplomacy, numerous cyber attacks and harassment of different countries ‘ ships and aircraft. Additionally, China and Japan are currently at odds with one another over territories in the East China Sea.
It’s hardly surprising, then, that Japan has doubled down on its empire with the US and security relations with other like- thinking countries. It was a first supporter of AUKUS, and it saw the alliance as a positive step toward local security that would counter China’s heavy-handed influence.
Japan has been the subject of conversation for a while about the possible third partner of the deal. Although the US, UK, and Australia have all stated that they are interested in working with Japan, it is unlikely that a formal proposal to become a so-called” Foundation I” partner will be forthcoming.
The US is transferring nuclear submarine engine technology to Australia for Pillar I of the relationship. In the meantime, the US will run a circular underwater force in Western Australia, until Australia is supplied with restored, next- hand US Navy Virgina Class submarines, expected in the middle- 2030s.
But, as Rahm Emanuel, the US embassy to Japan, wrote last week, Japan is about to become the group’s first” Pillar II” companion. This stage focuses on the sharing of technology related to artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, fast weapons and precision guided weapons.
Japan has developed technical prowess that are in high demand in AUKUS, both within and outside of Pillar II.
These include radioactive research and technology, which could be important as the AUKUS partners work to increase the number, size, and frequency of nuclear-propulsion submarine production. Japan’s experience does not actually include nuclear technology of the highest level, but its civil nuclear power capability puts it at the forefront of potential engagement candidates.
But, Japan does not have its own strong diesel-electric and air-dependent engine underwater production lines, which does not make its involvement in AUKUS Pillar I that significant. Unlike Australia, which has a much shorter beach to travel, its ships can spend the majority of their prospective missions submerged and undetected.
However, Japan has strong skills and critical expertise in the areas covered by the Pillar II level of cooperation. And Japan is keen to ensure that those abilities and skills are developed and advanced to a high standard. Because of this, it has a key role in Pillar II’s national interests.
Complications to AUKUS expansion
There is a complicating factor, though. AUKUS is still a very new partnership. In other words, it struggles to translate good will and its high level of political support in all three countries into tangible benefits. This includes ensuring that member technology transfers can be made between the members through the creation and implementation of procedural mechanisms.
It’s challenging to arrange between three nations that share the same language and are very culturally similar. Japan is increasingly recognized as a trusted partner in western alliances, but it still has a very distinct culture and a deeply ingrained history of militarization.
Additionally, Japan has a reputation for being prone to espionage and cyberattacks. Although recent legislation could address these shortcomings, it has been perceived as a relatively lax approach to security, secrecy, and maintaining trusted and watertight networks despite more than 70 years of leaning on the US as its defense guarantor.
The AUKUS nations have experienced a lot of domestic security difficulties and leaks, but they also see themselves as having benefited from mistakes made in a way that Japan has not yet learned.
My most recent book, Revealing Secrets, co-authored with Clare Birgin, also makes reference to the renowned intergenerational top secret collaboration that links Australia with the US and UK as part of the Five Eyes collaboration ( along with New Zealand and Canada ).
This has not been done to the same degree, scope, or duration with any other international partners. This intimate, familial collaboration is handled delicately in these nations, but it is not widely understood by outsiders, and cannot be easily replicated. Nobody at AUKUS wants to alter the circumstances that led to such steadfast and reliable ties.
Beyond the three core AUKUS members, there is a reluctance to expand until the technology sharing concept is proven to work. Due to the fact that all three members are rambunctious democracies that will hold multiple elections throughout the project’s lifetime, it continues to be a fragile endeavor.
And the direction of the alliance will be strengthened by the next couple of elections, particularly the upcoming one in the US in November.
A delicate balancing act
However, there is a real desire to persuade Japan to join the US and Australia as a reliable partner. This is demonstrated by the trilateral ties they have, as well as the quadrilateral ties they have with India ( known as the Quad ). Japan is also boosting its ties with the Philippines, South Korea and the United Kingdom.
Thus, it is a delicate balancing act to encourage Japan’s involvement in international security arrangements while keeping in mind that the nation still has a constitution that requires it to maintain a strict defensive and generally acceptable military posture. ( It is, however, more willing now to acquire offensive military capabilities. )
China will disapprove of such initiatives. But this is n’t happening in a vacuum. Without the dramatic rise in China’s military spending, its persistent cyberattacks, and its “gray zone” operations in the area, the AUKUS alliance would not be politically feasible.
Overall, it seems like Japan’s inclusion in a number of obscure AUKUS components seems like the next natural step in response to these rising challenges.
The Australian National University’s Strategic and Defense Studies Center is led by John Blaxland, a professor.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.