In the next stage in its quid pro quo aid to Russia during the Ukraine conflict, North Korea might increase its tank production.
Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, was reportedly in a big tank production facility, stressing the need to modernize the nation’s armored forces using internally developed tanks and self-propelled artillery.
Kim toured the unnamed factory with senior officials, including Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Yong Hwan, to review production progress and ongoing research into key technologies, according to state media outlet Korean Central News Agency (KCNA ).
He praised developments in team comfort, engine efficiency, electronic warfare, and firepower, citing them as proof that there is still work being done to create high-performance, Korean-style tank.
Kim demanded a proper rethink of equipped warfare and directed the expansion of large-scale production capacities, efforts he deemed necessary to achieve the ruling party’s” next revolution in armoured force.”
North Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-Weon suggested the facility might be in Kusong, North Pyongan province, and probably connected to the models that were exhibited at a 2023 martial show, despite the location being unknown by KCNA.
Kim’s visit to the factory underscores North Korea’s wider effort to strengthen both its regular and strategic weapons arsenals, which is in line with its military modernization goals as Russia’s cooperation intensifies.
While North Vietnamese vehicles are far superior to the contemporary equipped ships of the US and South Korea, Pyongyang may view tank creation as a means of supporting Russia’s troops in Ukraine.
Although unconfirmed, the location and nature of the factory visit indicate that this production drive may be geared toward upcoming exports to Russia.
If so, it would extend its support beyond munitions, ballistic missiles, and troop deployments to tanks, strengthening its quid pro quo arrangement in exchange for cash, technology transfers, and political backing.
In accordance with Newsweek’s April 2025 report, North Korea made an estimated US$ 20 billion from its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, primarily from sales of weapons, with a smaller sum for providing troops and technical personnel. Additionally, according to Asia Times, Russian assistance may have significantly advanced North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) and nuclear ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN ) programs.
Beyond transactional reasons, North Korea may have a strategic interest in diversifying partnerships and reducing its reliance on China as evidence of its support for Russia.
In a February 2025 War on the Rocks article, Choong-Koo Lee claims that China’s renewed dialogue with South Korea and Japan, coordination on sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear program, and resumed military discussions with the US might have dismayed the Kim regime, bringing it closer to Russia.
Russia, whose armored forces have been severely reduced by over three years of high-intensity combat in Ukraine, might benefit from North Korea’s tank production capacity.
In an article for the Polish Institute of International Affairs ( PISM) in June 2023, Marcin Piotrowski points out that North Korea has produced T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union and has maintained active production lines with at least 2, 000 units.
Piotrowski points out that North Korea is a reliable source of spare parts and compatible shells for 115mm and 125mm guns despite Russia’s discontinuation of production of the T-62 and continuing to draw on this model from Soviet-era reserves.
These tanks use ammunition and parts that are compatible with Russian stockpiles, despite being outmoded by modern standards. The value of this assistance is further increased by Russia’s staggering tank losses and limited production capacity.
Between February 2022 and May 2025, Russia lost 3, 960 tanks, according to the Open-Source Intelligence ( OSINT ) organization Oryx. By the time the war was over, according to Veaceslav Epureanu, who wrote for Insider in February 2025, that Russia had exhausted the remainder of its 7,342 tanks, estimated from the Soviet Union, in open storage by December 2024.
Epureanu also noted that Russia had 1, 897 T-62s in storage in 2022, but that only 1, 082 were still in good or satisfactory condition by 2024. Despite its age, his data indicates that the T-62 continues to be Russia’s most popular tank in open storage.
David Axe points out that T-62s are more prevalent and less difficult to repair than more contemporary models like the T-72, T-80, and T-90 in a Forbes article from July 2024.
He contends that relying on T-62s may be Russia’s only viable short-term solution to maintain its armored strength even though Russia’s factories can only produce 500 to 600 new tanks annually, which is a rate too low to account for attrition.
However, this approach has its limitations. In a January 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis ( CEPA ), Pavel Luzin suggests that 2025 might be the last year that Russia can rely on Soviet-era reserves.
He points to equipment degradation, reliance on foreign components, shortages of skilled workers, inflation, and a weak ruble as major obstacles that are preventing Russia from moving toward newly produced equipment.
In a report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS) in February 2025, Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad estimate that while Russia managed to refurbish around 1,500 tanks in 2024, the remaining units are likely in poor condition and would require more extensive restoration efforts. According to Clavalier and Gjerstad, the current attrition rate makes it more difficult for Russia to replace lost on the battlefield.
Even if North Korea can supply Russia with more T-62s or other similar models, their potential on-the-m battlefield impact may be minimal. In a January 2025 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Peter Suciu points out that the T-62 is highly susceptible to contemporary threats like drones, mines, and anti-tank missiles, and is being deployed primarily because Russia lacks better options.
Russia might be able to reconstitute its armored forces in large numbers thanks to North Korean tank production. In a report from the Robert Lansing Institute in March 2025, the Institute predicted that it would take Russia ten years to restock its inventory of tanks, jets, and armored vehicles and regain its readiness for large-scale offensive operations against NATO.
In this context, North Korea’s vintage tanks may be more about securing time for Russia’s defense industry than it is about battlefield advantage. The Western-dominated international order would be a stopgap caused by mutual need and shared opposition to the tank transfer.