An Israeli air-launched ballistic missile ( ALBM ) has just been tested in India, reflecting a move away from Russia as its primary supplier of expensive weapons and the potential use of a counterforce strategy against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Many media outlets reported this month that India had safely launched the bullet from a Su- 30 MKI fighter jet during the test of the Crystal Maze 2 ALBM. This test was conducted in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, under the control of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command.
The Crystal Maze 2, developed by Israel and known as ROCKS, is designed for precise attacks against expensive target up to 250 meters apart. It has the ability to reach air defense system-protected areas and can work properly in GPS-defeated environments, providing options for blast fragmentation warheads.
These tests underscore India’s operating preparation and dedication to self- sufficient in security production, with many of these weapons planned to be procured under the” Make in India” program.
India’s corporate military capabilities are strengthened by the effective integration and demonstration of these cutting-edge missile systems, underlining the country’s commitment to enhancing its defense sector and reducing its dependence on imported goods.
Following an extensive drone and missile attack by Iran in response to Israel’s attack on its consulate in Damascus, Syria, which allegedly served as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ( IRGC ) and Hezbollah, Israel may have used ROCKS in its retaliation strike against Iran this month.
ROCKS is a next-generation lengthy standoff air-to-surface missile, according to Israeli defence company Rafael. It is designed to reach highly accurate, fixed, and relocatable targets with identify accuracy above ground, under, and strongly guarded targets in GPS-denied areas. ROCK may be equipped with a fire or penetration warhead.
ROCKS expands on the bright bombs and cruise missiles from Rafael and SPICE. Its many assistance systems, such as an electrical- visual person, INS/GPS and anti- radiation homing maintain all- weather capability.
Before release, the captain allocates a goal to the weapon and loads data such as target kind, coordinates, impact angle, azimuth, geographical image data and wire delays.
With a circular error possible ( CEP ) of just 3 meters, ROCKS uses INS/GPS guidance for its midcourse navigation trajectory, with its terminal phase using terrain matching or anti-radiation technology that locks onto target radar signals to avoid GPS jamming scenarios and reduce target location errors.
India’s decision to supply an ALBM, a geopolitical weapon, reflects its desire to cut itself off from Russian weapons, whose performance has been questioned by the Ukraine conflict.
This quarter, Politico reported that India’s hands payments from Russia have been declining, with the Ukraine war being a significant factor in the lower. Politico notes that while Russian weapons made up 76 % of India’s arms purchases from 2009 to 2013, that has now dropped to 36 % in the last five years.
The source claims that India no longer views Russia as a source of big-ticket items, despite continuing to purchase spare parts from Russia for in-use Russian technology.
It makes reference to Russia’s bad use of its widely praised Kinzhal fast weapon, which was intercepted by Patriot weapons during the fight, and its effectiveness in the Ukraine war.
Additionally, the report mentions that its Black Sea Fleet vessels have been sunk by drones and cruise missiles, and that top-of-the-line aviation like Sukhoi soldiers have been quickly shot down by drones and sail weapons.
According to the report, India’s reliance on Russia as its main arms supplier has even acted as a significant disincentives by providing subpar MiG- 29K fighters to India and unmet defense contracts.
Politico notes that while India may wean itself off Russian arms immediately, it is diversifying its security partners, engaging countries such as the US, France, Germany, South Korea and Israel, while recalibrating its relations with Russia to prevent American secondary sanctions.
In an article for the Center for Air Power Studies in December 2018, Rohit Kaura points out that the evolution of air defenses has made it necessary for bombers to avoid being able to use surface-to-air missiles ( SAM ) and interceptor aircraft in discussing the role of ALBMs in India’s military doctrine.
Kaura points out that ALBMs keep bombers as a viable second-hit option because they are extremely difficult to intercept after launch, ensuring counterstrike capabilities.
He also points out that terminal-phase interception is the only viable defense because ALBMs prevent adversaries from having lower altitude boost phase intercept opportunities when launched from bombers from various locations.
Kaura points out that the Indian Air Force ( IAF ) could use its strike aircraft to attack positions far away from enemy air defenses without having to enter enemy airspace to be effective in times of high alert.
He points out that once an ALBM-armed aircraft is grounded, the national leadership can be assured of retaliation capabilities, with aerial refueling enabling them to remain airborne for a day.
Kaura mentions that ALBMs increase the survival of land-based nuclear forces until India can develop reliable submarine-launched ballistic missiles ( SLBM ) and nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) as the best method of nuclear deterrence.
He makes the observation that ground-based systems lack the ability to retarget ALBMs before launch. Additionally, he claims that ALBM-armed aircraft can be used as a second-strike weapon to attack targets hit by a first strike or to attack targets that are countervalue or counterforce.
Countervalue targeting refers to using nuclear weapons to attack an enemy’s cities or economic infrastructure. This is thought to significantly lessen the likelihood of a first strike because it is associated with the idea of mutually assured destruction ( MAD ).
In contrast, counterforce targeting aims to eliminate an adversary’s military infrastructure in a limited nuclear war. However, counterforce targeting is associated with first- strike capabilities, bringing the possibility of nuclear escalation.
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang point out in a 2018 article in the peer-reviewed International Security Journal that India may have been in a position of strategic paralysis because Pakistan has adopted a” no first use” nuclear doctrine and has the option of using tactical nuclear weapons against India’s conventional forces.
Clary and Narang take note that some Indian policymakers are drawn to developing counterforce capabilities in an effort to thwart Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in India.
They encourage Pakistan to unleash its nuclear arsenal before losing it, even though they note that a counterforce strategy is in line with India’s extensive retaliation doctrine.
Moreover, they point out the questionable odds of a successful Indian counterforce strike on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, mentioning challenges in identifying and intercepting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
They claim that Pakistan would likely react to India’s use of counterforce capabilities if it adopted even a limited counterforce nuclear strategy.