This is the second of a three-part series. Read Part 1 here.
Chinese writings discuss a two-phased approach to military crises: prevention and management (“handling”). The actions that China contemplates in the former are different from those in the latter. This section assesses China’s approach to both phases.
The 2020 Science of Military Strategy defines crisis prevention as “the targeted preparations taken in advance to prevent the occurrence of military crises.” It lays out a sophisticated breakdown of requirements to prevent such crises: the need to “plan from the overall perspective” (that is, shape dynamics while remaining focused on Chinese core interests) and monitor developments to “prevent potential crises from approaching or reaching the ignition point.”
The prevention phase, plainly, is active, so much so that it talks about the need to “pre-manage crises.” Pre-management involves conducting good foreign policy, notably with other major powers. It also involves implementing measures and mechanisms to enhance interagency coordination to ensure “quick and effective” handling. It calls for mechanisms “with countries with potential and actual conflicts of interest.”
Finally, Chinese writings talk about “action measures” or “targeted preventive dynamic measures,” such as forecasting or early warning, to:
- “reduce the suddenness and unexpectedness of crises,”
- formulate “multiple plans for flexible response” and, even,
- conduct “actual combat drills.”
The goals of prevention are to stop crises from developing and to prepare if they do develop – hence, the call for China to “seize the opportunity and strive for strategic initiative” during that phase.
Relatedly, central to Chinese thinking (and in line with the highly organized sequence of recommended actions) is the idea of controllability – that is, that military crises, conflicts, and even wars can and should be controlled.
This is the crux of China’s “war control” strategy, which the 2015 Science of Military Strategy explains as follows: “The objective of war control is to prevent the occurrence of war and, once war is inevitable, it is necessary to control its horizontal and vertical escalation and do the most to reduce the negative consequences or to gain a major victory at minor cost.”
Chinese scholars echo this idea. Lin Yi, for example, states that the “generation and development of a military crisis is controllable; it can be prevented through prediction and monitoring.”
Xu Zhou concurs, stressing that the “occurrence and development of a military crisis is controllable, and the escalation of the crisis can be avoided as long as it is handled properly.
Controllability is thus central to both prevention and handling.
Crisis handling
According to the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, the goal of crisis handling is to “control and guide” the developments of a crisis “in a direction that is beneficial.”
The white paper states that handling requires “active management” and generally a quick and effective response (that is, the ability to make quick decisions, take quick actions and quickly prepare for emergencies).
While stressing that political and diplomatic means are preferred to manage crises, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy stresses that military forces are essential “to make substantive achievements,” especially “in actual struggles.” It highlights that deterrence is front and center when dealing with military crises, and if this proves ineffective, combat operations are in order to “further deter” and prevent escalation or stop a developing war.
This is consistent with Xi Jinping’s concept of the “peaceful employment of military forces” (i.e., the use of force to prevent escalation).
Thus, while China envisions combat drills in the prevention phase, it contemplates combat operations – military engagement – in the handling phase. To make good on the role it wants the military to play, China has of late strengthened its deterrence posture considerably by:
- pressing on with modernization,
- integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities and
- enhancing and consolidating its nonconventional capabilities in cyberspace, outer space, and electronic warfare within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force.
It has also built the world’s “most active and diverse ballistic missile development program” and adopted what some have labeled a “projectile-centric strategy,” which is based on the delivery of precision-strike munitions via individual projectiles (taking advantage of China’s geography) rather than platform-based strike forces.
Some analysts have characterized China’s strategy as one of ‘first strike,’ which may include preemptive use. The PLA is now much more capable of carrying out a preemptive first strike thanks to its modernization
Significantly, the US Department of Defense’s 2021 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China described China’s military strategy as one that “entails seizing the initiative, paralyzing the adversary’s operational system and laying the groundwork for war termination.”
Unsurprisingly, then, some analysts have characterized China’s strategy as one of “first strike,” which may include preemptive use. The PLA is now much more capable of carrying out a preemptive first strike thanks to its modernization.
This position, too, reflects China’s view that military crises and escalation can be controlled if proper principles and guidelines are followed. China does not seem to see a need to “know its enemies.” Laird’s characterization in his 2017 study that Chinese analysts think of crises and escalation as an “engineering problem” is still valid.
Chinese writings now even suggest that technology may enhance the potential for control. As Alison Kaufman explains on page 157 of Modernizing Deterrence, published earlier this year, the “heavy emphasis on technology … suggests that as the PLA’s technological prowess improves, its planners may become increasingly confident in their ability to control escalation.”
That said, Chinese analysts (and leaders) also highlight the virtues of restraint and recommend caution with military power. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy, for instance, identifies four “handling methods” for military crises.
Two of the methods describe an assertive Chinese role: one where Beijing should “lead the crisis” by “seizing the opportunities and conditions created by the crisis situation” and turning them to China’s advantage, and another, less ambitious method where Beijing should “affect the crisis” by influencing its development while preventing escalation.
The other two methods emphasize restraint. One discusses “stopping the crisis” to “leave greater leeway and opportunities for crisis management,” and the other mentions “setting aside the crisis” because resolution is not within reach or could endanger core interests.
Relatedly, Chinese writings underscore the importance of domestic and international support for a chosen course of action – suggesting that, without support for assertive action, China should opt for restraint.
Besides, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy talks about an “appropriate use” of military power and insists that the military “must always obey and serve political needs.” This is evidence that Beijing also worries about and wants to avoid unwanted escalation.
Chinese scholars concur that strategic interests must always guide military objectives. As Du Yang notes, “the crisis cannot be guided only from a purely military point of view but must obey the political purpose and the overall strategic situation.”
China does not believe – and never has believed – that nuclear escalation would be controlled in a crisis or armed conflict
There is one important military dimension where China has long exercised caution: nuclear weapons. China does not believe – and never has believed – that nuclear escalation would be controlled in a crisis or armed conflict.
In this spirit, its nuclear tradition has been based on the limited utility of nuclear weapons, which supports a strategy of assured retaliation, and not on integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy or pursuing nuclear warfighting.
China’s thinking has been that these weapons serve only to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack. This is why Beijing has claimed that it has a “self-defense nuclear strategy” and why it has maintained tight control over its arsenal, never delegating authority over nuclear strategy to the PLA.
For a long time, China’s nuclear strategy was based on statements made by Chinese leaders and internal doctrinal publications. References to China’s “self-defense nuclear strategy” first appeared in the 2006 white paper China’s National Defense.
Moreover, China has only developed a small nuclear force (“minimum deterrence”) and refused to engage in arms races while pledging never to be the first to use nuclear weapons (“no first use”). Whether China’s recent rapid nuclear modernization (which the United States has called a “crash build-up”) will bring about change is an open question.
Beijing has remained silent, and in unofficial dialogues Chinese scholars argue that China’s nuclear policy and posture have not changed and will not change.
They say that Beijing’s no first use policy is alive and well, and that modernization is, and always has been, exclusively focused on ensuring the survivability, safety, security and reliability of the Chinese arsenal, which, according to them, needs to keep pace with US military developments and deployments. They add that China does not seek nuclear parity with the United States (or Russia).
Yet even before the recent buildup, there were mounting questions about a possible change in Chinese nuclear policy and posture. In 2015, Beijing renamed the unit in control of Chinese nuclear forces (from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force) and upgraded it to full-service status.
At the inauguration ceremony, Xi explained that the force should possess “both nuclear and conventional” capabilities and be prepared to conduct “comprehensive deterrence and warfighting” operations.
While the requirement to possess nuclear and conventional capabilities is not new, the emphasis on “comprehensive deterrence and warfighting” suggests a more expansive nuclear role, especially given Xi’s expectation that the force should enhance its ability for “strategic balancing.”
Speculation abounds about what that new role will be, with analysts suggesting that China might mate its nuclear warheads with its missiles, increase the PLA Rocket Force’s alert status or adopt a launch-on-warning posture.
Some also say that Beijing might want to use its growing nuclear arsenal to prevent third-party intervention in a regional conflict, such as over Taiwan.
Regardless, what transpires is that crisis handling, from China’s perspective, is both about managing a bad situation (i.e., preventing its evolution from bad to worse) and strategizing to secure or even advance Chinese national interests whenever possible, notably with military deterrence and, if necessary, the use of force.
There is evidence that Beijing equates crisis handling with crisis management and even crisis resolution. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy stresses the importance of maintaining communication between all parties involved, despite the difficulty of pinpointing each party’s actual intentions. It insists that “military crisis handling is essentially the art of compromise,” adding that “without compromise, there is no resolution of military crises.”
But the document is also quick to argue – in the very next sentence – that the best compromise is found through “fierce gaming.” It further highlights that “in handling military crises, attention must be paid to fighting machines in crisis, gaining profit from harm and striving to create more favorable national interests on the basis of compromise.”
This approach permeates Chinese thinking. Xu Zhou, for instance, argues that a crisis contains both “the roots of failure” (because a bad situation has emerged and needs to be managed) and “the seeds of success” (because managing that situation involves avoiding the worst and, if possible, coming out on top).
Zhai Kun echoes this, saying that China “should not only deal with crises but also look for opportunities in crises and chaos to turn crises into opportunities.”
In sum, China is interested in preventing and managing crises, but it is also as much, if not more, focused on gaining the upper hand over its competitors in the process.
Next: Concluding Part 3: Implications for US crisis management
David Santoro PhD is President and CEO of the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum, where he specializes in strategic deterrence, nonproliferation and the geopolitics of Asia and Europe.
This three-part report is a slightly abridged version of chapter 1 of the new book China’s Military Decision-Makiing in Times of Crisis and Conflict, edited by Roy D Kamphausen and published by the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Seattle-based non-profit institution. Republished with kind permission. Download the entire volume free.