Israel’s government made the decision to acknowledge the loss of its eight and a half-month war in Gaza, and it was also the failure of the objective set out by the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who declared he would kill the militant group following the Hamas attack on October 7.
On June 19 the spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF), Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, told Channel 13 News that the aim of eradicating Gaza’s leadership was unattainable.
This is just another example of Hamas being destroyed and making people vanish. Hamas is an plan, Hamas is a celebration. People who believes we can end Hamas is bad because it is rooted in the people’s hearts.
At one level, the IDF director was only restating what experts had cautioned only after Hamas’s dying of 1, 143 individuals, including 767 citizens, and its violence of about 250 others. An all- out defense assault, from the air and on the ground, would permit Hamas to manifest itself as the protector of Gaza’s civilians, yet as Israel killed several thousands of them.
But, at another level, this entrance was the Jewish government’s concern to Netanyahu.
Netanyahu had snapped three days earlier at a cabinet meeting that” to achieve the goal of destroying Hamas’s capabilities I’ve had to make decisions that were n’t always accepted by the military leadership.”
The IDF was essentially telling the excellent minister that Hamas ‘ program A of annihilation was ineffective. What is strategy B, then?
In Hagari’s words:” If the government does n’t find an alternative” Hamas” will remain in Gaza”.
Netanyahu’s eternal combat
The prime minister’s office refused to give way to the martial, responding to Hagari’s meeting by doubling down on having “defined as one of the war objectives the death of Hamas’s defense and governance skills”.
In a military surrender, the IDF issued another speech – that it was committed to stated war targets, including destroying Hamas’s controlling and military capabilities. Hagari, according to this speech, had only spoken about “eradicating Hamas as an ideology and an idea”.
But the leaders, and Netanyahu, knew that the warning bell could not be unrung – especially as, just ten days before, past IDF chief Benny Gantz had fired his personal photo at the prime minister.
One of the three members of the war cabinet, Gantz, gave Netanyahu a three-week ultimatum on May 18. He claimed in a televised address that the prime minister had put his personal and political goals before the state of Israel’s existential needs, allowing “hard-right zealots” to put the nation in danger.
Instead of focusing on Hamas ‘ “destruction,” Gantz made six strategic demands: placing a priority on the release of hostages and appointing a new political leadership in Gaza.
Netanyahu rejected all the demands, including a timeline for a course toward a state of Palestine and Israel’s return to normal contact with Arab nations. On June 9, Gantz left the war cabinet. A week later, the prime minister dissolved the body.
No strategy ( A or B)
This has only prolonged Netanyahu’s dilemma. He will be in political and legal jeopardy unless Hamas ceases to exist on the day a ceasefire is announced for Gaza.
In Israel, early elections are likely to follow, and he is far behind Gantz and the National Unity Party in terms of polling. He might be facing bribery charges, which the war has effectively suspended.
But there is prospect neither of his promised destruction of Hamas nor that Gaza’s civilians, – facing death, starvation and deprivation each day – will rise up against the leadership.
In a rare enforcement of a “red line,” the US examined any plans for an extensive ground assault on Rafah. Netanyahu has made ambiguous statements about a redeployment of the army in an effort to deter pressure, while still using bombs against Hamas and civilians.
What does Netanyahu do to ward off the pressure from both inside and outside of Israel, with no plan B? He plays for time. In the past week, Netanyahu has said he supports only a “partial” hostage deal with Hamas, so Israel could resume fighting after women, the elderly, and sick were released.
He has chosen to engage in a discussion with the US regarding the supply of American weapons for Israel’s conflict. Additionally, he has threatened to intensify the fighting with Hezbollah along the northern Lebanese border.
None of these is a plan B for Gaza. They are Netanyahu’s personal plan A. Use a daily distraction or diversion to divert attention away from the media’s attention on the ceasefire talks, the carnage in Gaza, or the failure to “destroy” Hamas.
The IDF’s warning and Gantz’s departure from the war cabinet serve as a signal that the military is weary of an open-ended assault with no political vision.
But when will that weariness lead to a decisive rejection of Netanyahu’s approach? For now, given that the defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has not indicated he will make a break – and given the pressure from hard- right ministers to ethnically cleanse Gaza in a long- term occupation – that question, like Netanyahu’s options, has no answer.
Scott Lucas is a professor of international politics at University College Dublin’s Clinton Institute.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.