Steve Bannon, no longer in Donald Trump’s inner circle, but no less politically savvy for it, remarked recently,” If we aren’t careful, it]Ukraine ] will turn into Trump’s Vietnam. That’s what happened to Richard Nixon. He ended up owning the war and it went over as his war, no Lyndon Johnson’s”.
Bannon reacted to President Trump’s handling of his Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, with ending the Ukraine conflict in 100 days … 99 days afterwards than candidate Trump had bragged. To Bannon, that is an ominous pause that will only increase the likelihood of the US getting sucked deeper into a conflict he believes is unwinnable and isn’t in the country’s national attention.
I agree. Failure to act swiftly on a ceasefire, and failure to make a clean break with the neocon Ukraine/Russia strategy candidate Trump promised brings back into play the tired old peace-through-strength fantasies and magical sanctions ( “ruble to rubble” ) of the Biden administration, strategies that failed for Johnson in Vietnam with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, for George W Bush with the January 2007 surge in US forces in Iraq, and for Barack Obama with the 2010 surge in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon’s popular phrase is “escalate to de-escalate”. The issue is that de-escalation rarely occurs. You didn’t fine-tune battle. Military game theory Herman Kahn realized the tough way that you didn’t “game” it the way Robert McNamara, the defence minister of the Vietnam War, did. The monster did encircle you.
How do war stop? In particular, how will this battle close? Carl von Clausewitz, a general and military theory in Prussia, sees war as a tool of coverage and lists three main ways in which it ends:
1. One or both flanks abandon their policy goals.
If President Trump had made it clear to Vladimir Putin and the universe that the United States and its NATO partners have abandoned the east NATO expansion and that Ukraine will never become a NATO member, he might have succeeded in doing so. The shoe had
therefore have jumped on the other end, making Putin the inculpable figure for any more warfare.
2. When one or both sides reach the point where they are unable to carry out effective attacks, a stalemate forms, which leads to ceasefire negotiations.
3. Due to the fall in open and/or military confidence, one side loses the ability or ability to fight.
The Korean War is an example of a conflict that ended in response to the second incident. It started on June 25, 1950, when North Korean army crossed the 38th horizontal where Korea was divided after World War II. After significant shifts of the front lines occurred in the intervening time, a deadlock started at the 38th parallel when it all began.
On the caveat that no nuclear weapons were to be used, both parties had reached their pinnacle points. Truce negotiations broke off on July 27, 1951, but it took two more years of continuous fighting and two more years before the armistice was declared.
A new US president ( Dwight Eisenhower took office in January 1953 ) and a new Soviet leader ( Joseph Stalin died in March 1953 ) had no intention of resolving the conflict. No peace agreement between the two Koreas and the other fighting events has been signed up as of yet, despite the ceasefire being in place.
Some people believe that the conflict in Ukraine can be modeled after the results of the Korean War. I disagree. There is no standoff and no turning point for Russia, contrary to what some NATO tones would have us feel. Without the underlying political issues that initially caused war, no armistice in the heart of Europe will have any lasting impact.
A war’s finish, according to Clausewitz’s second circumstance, is appropriate to Ukraine. The traditional law, widely, is the conclusion of World War I.
The German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff launched a number of massive offensives on the Western Front ( March 21 – July 18, 1918 ) aimed at breaking Allied ( French, British ) lines before the arrival of significant American reinforcements after nearly four years of attrition warfare with little movement of the frontlines after initial German territorial gains in 1914.
Troops no longer needed on the Eastern top after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the battle, were deployed to the American insurgencies, and advances were achieved. But 70 meters apart from Paris, the attack ground to a halt. German troops ‘ potential had culminated.
An Allied counter-offensive started in August 1918 (” Hundred Days Offensive” ), reinforced by over a million fresh American troops, which pushed German forces back. Both factors had suffered over 500, 000 deaths.
But German labor deposits were now exhausted. By September, Ludendorff told the Kaiser that an truce had to be sought. On October 4, a newly appointed Chancellor Prince Max von Baden ( October 3, 1918 ) wrote to US President Woodrow Wilson asking for armistice terms based on his Fourteen Points.
By later October/early November, Baden’s desire for ceasefire conditions had de facto morphed into seeking terms for surrender. The homefront had collapsed, and continued fighting on the Western before was out of the problem now that the sailors of the High Seas Fleet’s rebellion on October 29 was joined by military ‘ revolts and fraternization with socialist and communist revolutionaries in most major European cities, including Berlin’s money.
The only thing left to do was to bring the armistice line and establish the defense will until a peaceful resolution is reached. Kaiser Wilhelm II renounced and fled to Holland on November 9. Baden resigned and handed Friedrich Ebert, the socialist head in the political chamber, the chancellorship. The Empire was no more.
The Allied delegation led by Supreme Commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch were set to impose the harshest conditions at the armistice talks in a railroad car in the Compiegne Forest: German forces would withdraw from all occupied territories ( and Alsace-Lorraine ), the Rhineland would fall under Allied military rule, and German forces would be disarmed throughout.
In Clausewitz’s words, reduction of the will to fight had subjected Germany fully to the will of the victor. The Armistice ended at 11 am on November 11 and the artillery ceased to exist.
In the ensuing Treaty of Versailles ( 1919 ), the harshest conditions were imposed on Germany. It was the bad course of action. Another world war broke out between the same functions within 20 years, with unprecedented murder.
The situation in Ukraine and the possible end of the war that have striking similarities and training from World War I. The Russian troops’ attempted summer counteroffensive of June through November 2023 reached its pinnacle way through.
Russian forces in the southern ( Zaporozhe ) and central ( Donetsk ) sections of the front line had created extensive defensive infrastructure, including ditches, trenches, artillery positions, and landmines. Russian development was painfully slow, great in fatalities, and technology was lost. And Russia, at all times, maintained weather superiority. By mid-September, progress had slowed to a turtle’s rate. By mid-November, unpleasant businesses petered out.
Since December 2023/early January 2024, Ukrainian troops, having lost some of their best modules, have been on the defense. In addition, the rigorous retention campaign waged by the Russian troops is putting a lot of strain on both people and machines. Large steamroller-style, Russian divisions at full power move forwards against Ukrainian under-strength people.
There are becoming more and more instances of fighting confidence dropping at the firm and brigade levels. As literally millions of Ukrainian men in their military service years have emigrated to points west, to Poland, and other Eastern European nations, but primarily to Germany, the unemployment rate is high ( 100, 000 since 2022 ), and fresh recruits are becoming ever more difficult to find.
While Russian “reports” see much higher Russian fatalities than Ukrainian, those reviews are most definitely fake. The Russians are not conducting highly portable difficult operations, but rely heavily on large artillery and air assault, therefore do somewhat small-unit army attacks.
Certain, they have deaths, but it’s a stretch to believe they are larger than the Ukrainians. Bottom line: By 4:1, Russian workforce reserves outnumber Russian ones.
This image does not yet reflect the European troops ‘ ability to fight in October/November 1918. However, it is moving in that direction, and any important Russian advance was quickly lead to a rout.
In these instances, Trump must first make it clear to Putin that Ukraine will never be offered NATO account. This is a prerequisite for him to get the negotiator. Putin’s main motivation is to also consider that. As Trump has suggested, threatening force through additional sanctions is a failure and was not even the Russian side’s point of view.
Over the truce collection and conditions, there is a major negotiation going on. It is incorrect to assume that the line of combat contact is the proper one, as in the case of the Asian stalemate. Putin can continue to grind it out and accomplish his social objectives. Trump and NATO could.
When martial beat is near, and in accordance with Clausewitzean theory, Ukraine will most likely cede control of the entire Donetsk and Luhansk operational regions, as well as the now under Russian rule, to the Kherson and Zaporozhe oblasts, and leave the Kursk notable in Russia.
A later peace agreement that can last will need to be embedded in a wider new European security architecture like the one that was possible at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, which was not executed and rather gave way to the continuous expansion of NATO eastward, the main reason for the Ukraine battle disaster.
Uwe Parpart is editor-in-chief of Asia Times.