After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.
Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.
What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.
The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.
Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.
The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.
Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.
The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.
The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.
The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.
Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.
Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.
This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.
The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.
Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.
Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.
Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.
Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.
Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.
In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.
The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.
Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).
The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.
Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.
Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.
Emil Avdaliani , is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani