On September 17, encrypted pagers that Hezbollah and its supporters in Lebanon and Syria used simultaneously exploded.  ,  ,
The Lebanon and Egyptian connections in Lebanon and Syria relied heavily on the pagers. It has now been completely destroyed, killing eight Hezbollah and Iranians connected to them, including Iran’s adviser to Lebanon, who was also hurt. At least 2, 800 were also hurt.
We may likely find out more about how some pagers exploded in the coming days. Video of some of the pagers exploding and of hospitals crowded with patients ( See below ) are currently available. Hezbollah has blamed Israel for the activity, according to media reports.
It will be hard for Hezbollah to launch organized missile attacks on Israel because they have done so late as late as the last few days due to the lack of communication on public cellular phones. That does not mean they wo n’t try, of course, but the shutdown of their communications system is a definite setback.  ,  ,
If Israel launched the attack, which has not been confirmed, it would indicate that Israel is ( 1 ) retaliating against Hezbollah attacks and ( 2 ) trying to halt Lebanon’s military operations if Israel launches an attack as many projects will soon occur.
Particulars of exactly how this achievement was accomplished , are still under wraps. According to media reports, the pagers reportedly exploded as a result of overheating their lithium batteries.  , This means that while the pagers sent and received encrypted communications, their operating systems were never stable.
One of our audience has a fear that the pagers were altered and filled with explosives while they were being transported. When reviewing the most recent movies, it appears as though the products have detonated.
This suggests that the procedure against Hezbollah was carried out over a period of time, with expert knowledge and exposure to pagers ‘ locations or checkpoints.
Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas explosive producer, died in Gaza City in 1996 when his mobile phone exploded while he was speaking to his father in the West Bank on a regular basis. It was a qualified death by the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security services. If this is a duplicate effectiveness on a large size, it would be exceptional.
Text and speech can be used to encrypted pages, or wording only.  , Many of them, perhaps US models, are made in Asia.  , China offers a number of types.
It is likely that Hezbollah’s pagers were double voice-text products, meaning they were bigger than little text pagers and resembled walkie-talkies. To assist voice communications and extend the range of operations, these devices may have a larger lithium battery.
One assumes, so, that it was possible to harm the pagers with malware that could bypass heat settings inside the pagers and” make” the chargers.
Lithium-ion chargers are prone to blast. Surprisingly, devices have gone off perhaps on airplanes. Heat is one way to ignite a battery, although there are other techniques.
But more is involved.  , It is clear that while the pagers were encrypted, their indicators could still be tracked, meaning that it was possible to identify the Hezbollah workers and those cooperating with them, particularly Iranians, who were part of the network.  ,
It is likely even pagers belonging to Hezbollah-linked jihadists and their officials were targeted. There are no information, as yet, of residents such as initial firefighters experiencing exploding pagers.
The US and Israeli assault on Iran’s uranium enhancement centrifuges in 2010 was the most recent instance of this kind of attack that we are aware of.
The centrifuges ‘ devices sped up too quickly, leading to their breaking down and the disintegration of their spinning carbon-carbon rotors, according to the Stuxnet computer worm.  , So far as is known, there were no deaths in the Stuxnet strike.  ,
A pager is safer to use than a cell phone by nature because it is basically a television and is not connected to social media or the internet.
Pagers, however, require repeat stations, which allow an attack to electronically collect intelligence from signals and, in the most recent instance, supposedly to change the software on working pagers.  ,
The Hezbollah network’s coverage of Lebanon and Syria suggests that it was a sizable and extensive system. Who provided the pagers and what communications manufacturers assisted Hezbollah in developing the system, and what they were.
Stephen Bryen is Asia Times ‘ top journalist. He also served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s team director and its deputy secretary of defense for policy.  ,
This , article , was initially published on his , Weapons and Strategy , Substack, and is republished with authority.