The surprise attack by Hamas on Israel has revealed the limitations of space-based surveillance, challenging the viability of current heavenly watch intelligence-gathering technologies, and highlighting the need for a more integrated strategy that better synchronizes artificial intelligence ( AI ) with human guidance and insight.
According to Defense One, the recent Hamas attack on Israel has brought attention to the need for ongoing orbital coverage because space-based sensors are not a” cure-all” for US intelligence requirements.
According to the report, while the US Pentagon and the Space Development Agency have started constructing the” Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture” network of military satellites in Low Earth Orbit( LEO ), Hamas’ ability to avoid detection will likely encourage countries to expand the capabilities and coverage of their space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance( ISR ) systems, including those that use radiofrequency sensing.
Defense One points out that authorities are still looking into why the attack preparations went unrecognized while looking for more information on Iran’s probable involvement in the assault, even though the US National Reconnaissance Office ( NRO) is working with another intelligence agencies to ensure that US observatories are competent and relevant and that it remains confident in its ability to detect challenges around the world.
According to the report, Hamas appears to have shared information using” old-school techniques ,” such as in-person communications. Defense One points out that if the target can prevent signals or movements that can be quickly picked up and analyzed from space or digital sensors, it is possible to avoid using ISR techniques that use technology to remote-monitored adversaries.
The report also recommends that the US evaluate data, such as human intellect, social media posts, and bodily movements, using more AI-enabled techniques.
ISR based in place has a number of benefits over other intelligence-gathering systems. As they are less likely to experience wonder military strikes and less susceptible to significant military disputes, Asia Times noted in September 2023 that countries with space-based monitoring have a lower chance of war by different nations.
Spy satellites offer real-time information and pictures that enable quick identification of cautious and potentially dangerous activities and movements. They are also cost-effective for tracking boats and aircraft in rural areas because they provide correct tracking and identification of potential targets.
Israel is well aware of these benefits and has developed strong space-based ISR skills. Israel takes a rational approach to place power, focusing on knowledge and functional capabilities while pursuing local dominance in specialized fields like Earth observation, LEO launch capability, and communications, according to Deganit Paikowsky and other authors in the 2015 book Handbook of Space Security.
Israel’s security philosophy, according to Paikowsky and others, is based on three principles: punishment, first warning, and decisive victory. They emphasize the importance of aiming to prevent war and ensure timely intelligence.
They also say that Israel’s place programme, which appears to offer a scientific answer to its military issue, is crucial for observing foe territory from space. Additionally, they point out that satellite-derived knowledge is regarded as a powerful strategic balancer, fostering state clarity and reducing uncertainty, which lowers the possibility of surprise.
Israel has a lot of freedom over its brains capacity, despite Paikowsky and others’ claims that it depends on US political and economic support. The authors contend that this strengthens Israel’s influence, reputation, and capacity for decision-making. They also mention Israel’s ability to create and establish ISR satellites like the Ofek line along those lines.
However, the new Hamas attacks shocked and surprised the international community because Israel has long been regarded as having one of the most advanced ISR capabilities in the world. Israel hasn’t been caught off guard for such a massive assault since 1973.
Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley note that Israel’s inability to prevent the Hamas problems can be attributed to a lack of monitoring of Arab attackers’ communication channels, an excessive reliance on remote-controlled border security products, the concentration of important commanders within an exposed border center, and their acceptance of claims by Gazan military leaders that they were not preparing for battle in an article published this month in the New York Times.
Bergman and Kingsley contend that the Jewish security leaders misunderstood the danger Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza. According to reports, Hamas avoided two fights in the previous year and gave the impression that they were de-escalating by putting an end to a period of frontier fighting in an agreement that Qatar brokered next month.
Additionally, they claim that Israel’s remote-controlled border security structure gave the wrong impression of security by indicating that it could be remotely destroyed. They emphasize that Hamas attacked the biological towers that sent and received signals from the system using drones.
Bergman and Kingsley even claim that the majority of older officers were killed, injured, or taken prisoner when the bottom was overrun because important commanders were concentrated there. They claim that the loss of important officers, combined with drone strike-related contact issues, prevented a planned response.
In an essay published this month for The Conversation, Javed Ali criticizes Jewish organizational and proper flaws. He specifically points out that Israel lacks a centralized intelligence analysis agency like the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence( DNI ), which may have led to an imperfect approach to intelligence collection and analysis.
Ali also points out that while the US and Israel have extensive knowledge cooperation, Washington’s focus on China and Russia may have given Israel less of an emphasis.
Another significant conflict hotspots, such as the Taiwan Strait, may learn valuable lessons from these functional, organisational, and strategic errors in intelligence-gathering.
John Culver notes that if China were planning to invade Taiwan, there should be trustworthy pre-invasion measures in an article published in October 2022 for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In the lead-up to any war, China will raise its creation of important weapons like missiles, anti-aircraft systems, air to air weapons, and long-range rockets for beach attacks, according to Culver.
He also mentions immediate signs of impending issue, such as the implementation of tighter cross-border capital controls, a freeze on international economic resources within China, and the quick bankruptcy and repatriation of Taiwanese assets held abroad.
According to Culver, China’s leaders would likely physiologically prepare their people for the costs of war, such as austerity, tens of thousands of combat fatalities, and human casualties from US and Taiwanese-launched attacks. He notes that, just as they did about four months prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US intelligence community would probably release some of this information officially if they witnessed it.
Six to twelve months prior to the invasion, the People’s Liberation Army( PLA) would adopt a PLA-wide stop-loss, halting the demilitarization of enlisted personnel and officers, according to Culver.
In addition, he claims, the PLA would increase its ability to regroup, replenish, and restore ships, submarines, aircraft away from military facilities that the US or Taiwan had probably bomb. He also plans to stop most routine training and maintenance on big equipment.
Additionally, he claims that the PLA Eastern and Southern Theater Commands would get preparation measures that are often seen in simple exercises, such as setting up field hospitals close to embarkation points and airfields, holding open blood drives, and sending out wireless command posts to assist vehicle preparation at human ports.
The Chinese Communist Party ( CCP) would seek to mobilize the nation at least three to four months prior to any planned combat, according to the PLA, which would also indicate that it is preparing to invade by canceling leave and interfering with routine flights. Culver also notes that in order to prepare for war, municipal military-civilization committees would probably try to seize control of commercial ships, travel shipss, plane, trains, and trucks.