With a new command and control program, the US will improve Guam’s formidable weapon defenses to better integrate its disorganized defenses against several emerging threats caused by US air and missile protection kill chains.  ,
Newsweek reports , that , Northrop Grumman ‘s , new productive Integrated Battle Command System test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico showcased its ability to employ sensor data properly to acquire, track, engage and intercept a lengthy- range cruise missile surrogate.  ,
The US Department of Defense approved the IBCS last year, and it is genius to create a control system that connects sensors that were n’t originally intended to function together. This system integrates weapons like Soldier missiles, F-35 aircraft, and Giraffe search radars into a system of sensors that resemble radars for any sniper.
In Guam, the IBCS is on its way. This tactical move will combine the island’s formidable weapon and weather threats, strengthening its resilience against nuclear missiles, hypersonic weaponry, and drone threats.  ,
Asia Times published an article about the US’s detailed plan to strengthen Guam’s missile defenses against possible Chinese and North Korean missile attacks in August 2023. Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD), Typhon, and Patriot systems are included in the proposed layered missile defense system called Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense ( EIAMD).
The Aegis Ashore program is expected to be the center of EIAMD, but its precise configuration in Guam is yet to be determined, which highlights the continuing strategic planning.
Additionally, Asia Times reported in May 2023 , that the US planned to improve Guam’s weapon defenses by providing AN/TPY- 6 radar for incorporated air and missile defense, tied to a fragmented Aegis Ashore on the periphery. The US is thinking about constructing the Aegis Ashore ability as an extension of Anderson Air Force Base or as an underwater service.
US forces stationed in Guam are threatened by China and North Korea’s possession of missiles like the DF-26 and Hwasong-15, which have the potential to put them in affect range.
In addition to that, China and North Korea have fast weapons designed to pierce any upcoming or upcoming US missile defense techniques.  ,
In November 2022, Asia Times reported , that a new air- launched ballistic missile ( ALBM ) had been spotted on China’s Xian H- 6K bomber, which could potentially target US bases and forces in the Pacific. These missiles are thought to be a direct result of the sonic CM-401 missile and have an increased standoff range for the H- 6K proper bomber. The H6- K heat release can drastically improve the missile’s range and terminal performance, adding 3, 500 kilometers to the missile’s 260- kilometer range at speeds of Mach 6.  ,
In September 2020, China , released a video , that appeared to be a warning to the US military stationed in Guam. A H6- K bomber was filmed in the video launching a missile at a location that resembled Anderson Air Base.
Further, Asia Times reported this month  that North Korea had tested a new intermediate-range solid-fuel missile, the Hwasong- 16B. The country’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test. He pledged to increase North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to combat nations the North Koreans consider to be their enemies, especially the US, South Korea, and Japan, and believes this missile to be an essential component of the nation’s nuclear deterrence.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea have acknowledged that North Korea is improving its missile technology, but they have accused the nation of overstating its missile flight capabilities. Whether North Korea’s advanced technology is sufficient to ensure that the warheads of its hypersonic solid-fuel and intercontinental ballistic missiles can withstand the challenging circumstances of atmospheric re-entry is undetermined.
Nevertheless, should North Korea develop long- range hypersonic missiles, Guam would most likely be in its sights. Pyongyang has threatened the US territory before , with missile strikes.  ,
Aside from missiles, cruise missile- launched swarming drones can also pose a threat to Guam, overwhelming the island’s missile defenses with their sheer number.  ,  ,
In March 2024, Asia Times reported , that a group of scientists in China had reportedly developed a new type of drone that could be split into several smaller drones, each with a specific role such as surveillance, tracking, command and even attack. If weaponized, these drones, after being packed into a cluster warhead, could autonomously search for and destroy targets with precision and range.  ,
Guam is confronted with a significant challenge in terms of air and missile defense, according to Asia Times. The current jumbled air and missile defense systems may not be sufficient to shield against advanced technologies like drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons.
A saturation attack on Guam that involves a lot of missiles and drones requires an integrated sensor system that includes areas like space and cyberspace.
The kill chains behind Guam’s disjointed missile defenses may still be vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, despite the IBCS being a significant step in integrating them against various threats. Kill chains are the processes, systems, physical sensors, datalinks, platforms, and weapons involved in finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging targets and assessing battle damage.
In October 2023, Asia Times , stated that the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) had discussed a new” Multi- Domain Precision Warfare” ( MDPW) concept, which aims to quickly identify vulnerabilities in the US operational system and kill chains and then launch precision kinetic and non- kinetic strikes on those weaknesses.  ,
Further, Heather Penney notes , in a July 2023 Air &, Space Forces Magazine article , that US kill chains are inflexible and lack diversity in sharing information among different components. Penney makes the point that a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be averted by the loss of elements or disruptions in communication due to the fixed connections between the components and the centralized decision-making approach characteristic of US operations.