The ongoing Thai election, which will take place on a battlefield of extravagant promises, is plagued by the ghost of previous elections.
May the country now return to a system of robust political democracy that was undermined by the 2006 and 2014 defense coups if the military-proxy parties are removed from power? Or will it trigger a new iteration of Thailand’s bad cycle, which alternates between military dictatorships and frequently elected governments?
Many voters who had previously supported Peua Thai, the party of the polarizing Shinawatra clan, suppressed their inner emotions in 2019 and, & nbsp, wanted an end to the” color wars” between their so-called” red shirt” supporters and” yellow shirt ,” conservatives, cast their ballots with their heads held high.
They were drawn to the military proxy event Palang Pracharat and its nominee for prime minister, coup leader Prayut Chan-ocha, as well as the security payments his party now promised.
On the surface, divided elections appear to be less prominent in 2023. Election campaigning is now dominated by the economy following the return of the & nbsp, Lese Majeste & amp; law, and The & NbSp; banning and / or discussion of monarchical reform.
The deep collective memory of Peua Thai as the party of economic growth and wealth redistribution places it in a good position to return to government given the difficult years of the Covid – 19 pandemic-induced downturn over 2020 – 2022.
Peua Thai’s chances of winning the election are more improved by the chaos on the conservative side. Prime Minister Prayut is a worn-out, clumsy bird who despises the internet and isn’t interested in debating. Worst of all, should he be re-elected as prime minister due to an a & nbsp, 2022 court decision, and if so, his term is only two years.
Prayut formed a new party vehicle for himself after there was an apparent & nbsp, split & ndrp within the government, and he left Palang Pracharat to his former partner and army factional comrade, Prawit Wongsuwon, who is now vying for the position of prime minister.
Despite its rhetoric about an election” landslide ,” there are many reasons why it is far too early to hand the election to Peua Thai. It is challenging to foresee who will be in power and, more importantly, the coming Thai prime minister, due to these things.
Since the 2019 election, the election process has changed, returning to a two-ballot system of split votes for local districts and party-list candidates. This is anticipated to benefit larger parties while harming smaller ones, particularly the democratic Move Forward, which will take the place of the break-out event from the 2019 election Future Forward that was outlawed in contentious conditions in 2020.
Thai surveys are frequently uncertain, and Peua Thai’s noticeable support may not be as strong as they first appear.
An important factor is the appointed Senate of 250 members, which under the 2017 constitution has their final opportunity to choose who will serve as prime minister in the 750-seat legislative parliament.
Some have indicated that they will trust the voice of the people, despite the fact that their intentions are basically unclear. More significantly, the division among the conservatives may prevent senators from voting as a second alliance.
There is also the complex issue of partnerships. The clear distinction between the so-called & nbsp,” democratic” and” authoritarian” sides of Thai politics that was present after the 2019 election may dissolve because none of Peua Thai’s leaders have ruled out joining forces with Palang Prachrat.
Many other fusion permutations and combinations are made possible as a result of this more liquid mix. As these configurations become more certain, choosing a major minister does require negotiating. Bhumjai Thai and other smaller events have the potential to rule.
At this point in the campaign, many events have more than one nominee for prime minister. Paethongtarn Shinawatra is a Peua Thai member with royal charisma who is flanked by two more senior and more seasoned contenders, making her an uncertain choice.
Some unknowns include the palace’s function and the potential for last-minute” big surprises” like the 2019 announcement and subsequent rejection of Princess Ubol Ratana, the elder sister of King Vajiralongkorn, as a candidate for prime minister.
The last revolution, whether military or criminal, may have already been sown if Peua Thai makes a comeback.
Similar to in 2014, when former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s poorly thought-out plan to purchase rice from farmers at prices well above market prices was framed as reckless economic irresponsibility, Peua Thai may offer the pretext for intervention with its populist promises, such as a & nbsp, 10, 000 baht cash bonus and n & m,( US$ 300 ) into an online wallet for all adults.
The potential for Thaksin & nbsp to return to Thailand and / or the streets could enrage conservatives once more. Thai politics are as ambiguous as ever because of the body politic’s great social and regional disparities.
Greg Raymond teaches as a senior teacher at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.
This document, which was originally published by the East Asia Forum, has been republished with a Creative Commons license.