Manila is at the middle of a political wind where shifting alliances and great-power rationality could make or break its regional interests due to the Philippines ‘ high-stakes bargain of offering to reduce US medium-range missiles in trade for China’s restraint in contested waterways.
In response to last month’s reports from various media sources, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. had suggested a quid pro quo arrangement with China to get rid of the US Typhon missile system if China stopped its anger in the South China Sea.
Marcos Jr, responding to Chinese requirements for the projectile system’s removal, highlighted China’s weapon features, emphasizing that China’s army far surpasses the Philippines ‘.
He claimed that he would give the Mod missiles to the US if China stopped its territorial claims, harassment of Asian fishermen, and sea battles, including ramming, water cannoning, and laser-targeting Philippine vessels.
Prior to mutual training, the Philippines will receive training with the US Typhon weapon system. A new squad from the Philippine Army Artillery Regiment will be trained in the program during the course of the training.
In 2024, the US conducted joint martial exercises, but the Typhon program has remained in the Philippines as a result of rising tensions with China. The technique, which was recently relocated to an unknown location, includes Tomahawk and Standard Missile-6 weapons that can strike pieces of island China.
China has criticized its appearance and accused the Philippines of promoting local unrest and waging an arms race. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro dismissed China’s complaints, calling them meddling in regional affairs.
The Philippines must balance asserting its sovereignty with maintaining its alliance with the US, with Marcos Jr’s striking position. It’s uncertain whether China will take a constructive approach to Marcos ‘ present.
The Philippines is at the centre of a two-level political game, one that involves territorial disputes with China and the other that is affected by internal social rivalries, due to the endless deployment of the US Typhon missile system.
China views the rollout as a weakening walk in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, while the US views it as part of its missile walls isolation approach against China.
However, the Marcos-Duterte conflict threatens to destroy the Philippines ‘ pro-US tilt. China reportedly supports the Trump political clan, which was supported by Vice President Sara Duterte and former president Rodrigo Duterte, to weaken Marcos Jr.’s administration, potentially jeopardizing upcoming US military exercises there.
For solid statements may only serve to mask fears of US abandonment under the following Trump administration, despite Marcos Jr’s latest strong rhetoric against China.
Given that the Philippines perhaps lose US$ 500 million in military help, Asian defence officials and experts in international policy are eagerly awaiting the Trump administration’s place on China. Their positions range from a more assertive protection, a wait-and-see strategy, and diversifying collaborations to a negative view of the US selling the Philippines to China.
The Trump government’s attempt to delay US international support for 90 days, pending a review to decide whether such initiatives make the US safer, stronger, and rich, presents a significant challenge for continued US aid to the Philippines.
The Philippines ‘ poor economic performance raises questions about whether it can finance expensive military equipment like multi-role fighters ( MRF ) or submarines, which have been on its wish list for decades, or even fulfill its ambitious plans to purchase the US Typhon missile system.
The Philippines ‘ justification for declaring its intentions to purchase Typhon may be to increase its strategic value to Trump-affiliated players in the US defense-industrial base, keeping the Philippines on the US’ radar. However, the US typically restricts the sale of the multimillion-dollar-per-unit Tomahawk and Standard Missile-6 to higher-tier allies such as the UK, Japan and Australia.
It is also doubtful that the Philippines ‘ alternative defense partners, such as Japan and Australia, have the diplomatic, economic and military clout, much less the willingness, to confront China over the Philippines ‘ South China Sea claims.
While US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has assured the Philippines of its “ironclad” support of the US-Philippines 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT), the statement sounds more like boilerplate to calm Philippine fears while maintaining the US’s non-committal attitude about publicly supporting the latter’s South China Sea position.
In a commentary for the Cato Institute in December 2021, Doug Bradlow asserts that the Philippines is irrelevant when it comes to the US’s defense and that its attempts to evade US security guarantees are of little use to US strategic interests.
In contrast to Bradlow’s assertions, Raymond Powell in the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) argues for continued US military support for the Philippines, which is a treaty ally and a key component of US efforts to contain China in the First Island Chain.
Bradlow points out that while US military access to Philippine bases is always beneficial, no Philippine president would permit the use of the nation’s territory for US military operations against China, aside from in the event of an improbable attack on the Philippine archipelago.
According to Bradlow, the Philippines would become a permanent adversary of China’s geographical proximity. He also mentions the Philippines ‘ political unreliability and its military prowess as reasons to support US forces.
Donald Trump’s softer words toward China in his first term may suggest that he has become more pragmatic and focused on upholding US supremacy while avoiding a conflict with the rival superpower.
Andrew Byers and J Tyler make reference to the Trump administration’s transactional and pragmatic stance in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed journal Survival that the US might start to” cooperation spiral” with China by reducing its military and weapons presence in the Philippines and allowing the China Coast Guard (CCG) to reduce operations near disputed Philippine territory in the South China Sea.
Andreas Kluth mentions in an opinion piece for Bloomberg that Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Trump all have an imperialistic streak driven by “might make right” logic rather than conflicting ideologies.
According to Kluth, if the US, China, and Russia disagree on how to divide the world into spheres of influence, as they did at the 1945 Yalta Conference, it will undoubtedly lead to war and end smaller nations like the Philippines that are caught in the middle.
In a world like this, the US might decide to sell out the Philippines once it realizes that expanding its sphere of influence to China’s doorstep is not worth a major conflict, especially not over the Philippines, which, despite sharing some democratic values, is arguably of little strategic value to US interests.
Should that happen, the Philippines could revert to its Duterte administration-era appeasement stance toward China at the expense of its territorial integrity, writes Jenny Balboa for East Asia Forum.
According to Balboa, such a scenario could sever Marcos Jr.’s political fortunes and dynasty. She mentions that Marcos Jr.’s goal is to persuade Trump that both Trump and the Philippines would benefit from supporting the Philippines and standing up for China.