For years, Sino- American competition for influence over Bangladesh has been a tough- driving pressure in South Asia’s geopolitics. As a cousin of India and a coastal state of the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh has often been embroiled in the conflict, and consequently, both Beijing and New Delhi have sought to expand their control over the country, often at the other’s expense.
Since the late 1950s, Bangladesh, known as East Pakistan between 1947 and 1971, has been a geopolitical battleground between the dragon ( China ) and the elephant ( India ). East Pakistan was in the Foreign circle at the time that Pakistan and China forged close relationships.
But, after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the country’s international policy was based on the maxim “friendship to all, malice towards none”, and adopted a no- aligned, non- aggressive and positively natural foreign policy. So, the nation has successfully balancing and maneuvering their strategic competition with both India and China while maintaining rational and cooperative relations with both.
Despite this, many American analysts concerns-for-india-us-3722347.html”>have expressed concern about the potential integration of Bangladesh into China’s sphere of influence. However, this is a total interpretation of Dhaka’s foreign policy, so it is necessary to respond to this claim from a balanced and objective perspective.
Second, under customary international law, Bangladesh is a sovereign, independent state, and as a result, it is fully able to conduct its international politics without interference.
Bangladesh has complete freedom of action over its foreign policy, both legally and morally, as long as its actions do n’t violate any of the UN’s ( UN) Charter’s provisions. No other state has the legal authority to obstruct negotiations between Bangladesh and any other country, including China, and Bangladesh has the right to do so.
Although Bangladesh has complete freedom to pursue its foreign policy, it is apparent that India may make an effort to increase its security and therefore feel a certain way about China’s involvement in its immediate vicinity. However, New Delhi may know that Dhaka’s collaboration with Beijing is not directed against any other condition, including India.
Bangladesh’s partnership with China aims to meet its own development needs, and it is solely concerned with its inside development. The Indians should keep in mind that Dhaka has consistently demonstrated its civility to New Delhi while taking into account India’s safety concerns.
For instance, Dhaka has interdicted north Indian rebel leaders to India, extradited them to India, and resisted putting the strong seaport project in Sonadia Island, which is supported by China, into operation.
American analysts frequently classify certain Chinese initiatives and projects as potential risks to Indian interests. These include the possibility of providing US$ 5 billion in Chinese loans, Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, the development of a Chinese-financed underwater center in southwestern Bangladesh, and the upcoming Sino-Bangladesh military training.
When you examine these tasks and activities closely, it becomes clear that none of them are directed at India or interfere with American security or other interests.
First, Bangladesh wants to borrow$ 5 billion ( at an interest rate of 1 % ) from China to pay for its expenses and the purchase of raw materials. American passions are unaffected in any way by this. Because China is the only state that will lend to Bangladesh at for a low interest rate, Dhaka is requesting this product from Beijing.
Dhaka would have been happy to accept India’s credit if it had been willing to lend a$ 5 billion loan to Bangladesh at a 1 % interest rate. Some researchers may worry that Bangladesh is falling into a “debt trap” in China, but another foreign experts contend that Dhaka has a wealth of knowledge and minimal risk of default.
Next, some Indian experts worry that China is developing network in Bangladesh close to the Siliguri Corridor to defame India. These problems, too, are false. It should be remembered that Bangladesh is an” India- locked” position and among 64 Bengal towns, 30 share edges with India.
Bangladesh, it is undoubtedly entitled to all of its border districts to have equipment projects, and it has the right to choose which state to invest in them. Additionally, none of the jobs China is implementing in Bangladesh’s border towns are focused on the defense.
Additionally, China does not have the right to stop soldiers or military technology on Bangladeshi place, and upon the completion of these projects, these infrastructures may become controlled by Bangladeshis, not the Chinese.
Additionally, there is no treaty signed between Bangladesh and China regarding Chinese troops ‘ use of Bangladeshi territory during combat. Accordingly, in case of a war between China and India, China would not be able to use these infrastructures.
In addition, Bangladesh has shown goodwill toward India by providing the country with transit and transshipment facilities because the Siliguri Corridor does not allow India to access its northeastern territories in sufficient numbers.
Other Indian analysts are concerned about China’s$ 1 billion investment in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. It should be noted, however, that the Indian- implemented Teesta Barrage Project has created a serious water crisis in Bangladesh, and Dhaka’s efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically has met with failure.
However, the river has a significant economic impact for five northern Bangladeshi districts that have 22 electoral constituencies and have more than 10 million residents. Therefore, the restoration of the river is a significant internal political issue that affects the careers of numerous local politicians. This project, in no sense whatsoever, represents a threat to Indian interests.
Third, China has been Bangladesh’s largest source of military equipment since the late 1970s, primarily because of the low cost, ease of maintenance and relative efficiency of Chinese weapons. This, in itself, does not pose any threat to India.
Bangladesh also imports weapons from a number of other states including Russia, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Serbia, and is currently looking to further diversify its sources of arms. Bangladesh has also stated that it wants to purchase some military equipment from India.
Fourth, China has contributed money to the construction of Cox’s Bazar’s first submarine base, the BNS Sheikh Hasina, which will have the capacity to house six submarines and eight warships. Bangladesh has purchased two Ming-class submarines from China and is likely to purchase more naval vessels from the nation, so China has provided funding for the project.
The Bangladeshi government’s” Forces Goal 2030″ includes the transformation of the Bangladesh Navy into a ‘3D force, as well as the construction of the base and the acquisition of submarines. This is crucial to ensuring Bangladesh’s maritime security, and it is again no threat to India because of both Bangladesh’s hostile intentions toward any of its neighbors and India’s significantly larger submarine fleet.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army- Navy ( PLA- N ) will not be able to enter the base, despite China having funded the construction of the base. Moreover, Bangladesh opted for Chinese submarines because of their low price. Bangladesh reportedly had negotiated with India and Russia for the acquisition of submarines before engaging in negotiations with China.
Interestingly, India did not sell submarines to Bangladesh but later sold a Kilo- class submarine to Myanmar. Therefore, Bangladesh’s purchase of Chinese submarines and China’s financing of a Bangladeshi submarine base are purely commercial transactions unrelated to India.
Finally, the potential Sino-Bangladesh joint military exercise is a logical extension of the two states ‘ already-existing defense partnership and does not pose any real threat to India. It is its sovereign prerogative to conduct similar exercises with China and regularly participates in joint military exercises with India, the US, and the UK.
Last but not least, the Indian media has implied that Bangladesh’s positions on Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea is a result of Chinese coercion. Nothing is further from the truth, however.
It is illogical to suggest that Bangladesh does the same owing to Chinese coercion since Tibet itself recognizes Tibet as a part of China and adheres to the” One China” policy. Bangladesh does not have a significant stake in the disputed region in terms of the disputes in the South China Sea. Accordingly, its Indo- Pacific Outlook suggests ensuring peace and prosperity throughout the region.
Dhaka’s foreign policy is examined carefully and objectively to determine whether it intends to achieve its goals of maximizing its internal development through foreign policy initiatives while preserving its sovereignty and independence from external influences.
Dhaka, as always, has no intention or interest in provoking any other state, not least one that is close to India. Instead of embracing the dragon and the elephant, Bangladesh is open to developing and maintaining positive relationships with both.
Md Himel Rahman is a freelance analyst with a focus on international and strategic affairs based in Dhaka. His articles have been published in The Interpreter, The Diplomat, South Asian Voices, The Geopolitics, Eurasia Review, The Daily Star, The Daily Observer, Dhaka Tribune, and other platforms.