The first troops from France have been formally dispatched to Ukraine. They , have been deployed in support of the Ukrainian 54th Independent Mechanized Brigade in Slavyansk. The French soldiers are drawn from France’s 3rd Infantry Regiment, which is one of the main elements of France’s Foreign Legion ( Légion étrangère ).
Russians and Ukrainians were a significant number of members of the Foreign Legion in 2022. They were allowed to leave the Legion and, in the case of the Ukrainians, returning to Ukraine to meet Russian troops. The Russians ‘ return home is unknown.
Now, French soldiers oversee the Legion, but only a select few members are from other countries. Under the curren , anonymat , ( being anonymous ) a volunteer who joins the Legion can decide whether to keep his given name or adopt a new one. Soldiers serve for three year words, after which they can inquire for French citizen. Without a waiting time, a legionary can become a citizen of France if he is injured. The Foreign Legion does not have any female members.
Around 100 people made up the first group of European soldiers. About 1,500 members of the French Foreign Legion are scheduled to arrive in Ukraine only in time for their first round.
These troops are being placed directly in a heated fight zone to assist Ukrainians in thwarting Russian advances in the Donbass. The second 100 are ordnance and surveillance professionals.
Emanuel Macron, the president of France, has threatened to send French soldiers to Ukraine for decades. Outside of Poland and the Baltic States, he has found little to no or little assistance from NATO nations. Supposedly, the US opposes sending NATO troops to Ukraine as officials in the absence of any other reasons.
Does France’s decision to send troops from its 3rd Infantry Regiment cross the Russian Red Line regarding NATO’s presence in Ukraine? Does the Russians see this as initiating a wider conflict beyond Ukraine’s edges?
France itself does not have many forces to put on Ukraine’s battlelines, if the French authorities want to do so. According to reports, today France cannot support an overseas deployment of a full division and , wo n’t have this capability until 2027 at the earliest.
The decision to send Foreign Legionnaires is, itself, a unique European settlement. France is no deploying its household troops and, besides the small number of officials, the males sent are never French citizens.
France’s choice has two meanings, beyond the clear one of possibly triggering a pan- Western battle.
First of all, it makes it easier for Macron to deploy troops to Ukraine and to act tough without facing many domestic opposition. Because there are no recruitment orders or other upcoming recruitment measures, the French army is not sending any soldiers. This obviously reduces the possible fury of Macron’s social competitors.
The second reason is Macron’s indignation at seeing French army, nearly all from the Army, getting kicked out of Sahelian Africa and replaced by Russians. The uprising and trend in Africa and a significant tilt toward Russia, either directly or indirectly, have shattered the European government’s grip on Francophone Africa and its wealth. now evidently under Vladimir Putin’s primary control.
This “humiliation” is felt in the Élysée Palace and especially by Macron who, his critics say, has lost France’s control and harmed France’s outside mine and business objectives.
A special blow is in Niger, an , significant supplier of uranium , to France. Nuclear power plants provide 70 % of France’s electric energy. Uranium prices are rising and products are tightening all over the world. With Russia and Kazakhstan, along with Niger, on the top of the heap in terms of supplying plutonium for nuclear reactor, France has a house financial security issue. The US decision , to embargo Russian uranium , ( but perhaps not honestly, in the next few years ) the Russians had deal a major blow to France and the United States by cutting off items.
Macron should hope that his troop deployments to Ukraine wo n’t result in a Russian embargo on sales to France given the risk of losing access to uranium, or at least at least enough of it to feed France’s reactors.
It is n’t clear how the Legionnaires can help the Ukrainians. Ukrainians have sophisticated intelligence support, some of it provided by their own FPV drones and spies, and others thanks to US and other NATO intelligence and surveillance resources supporting Ukraine.
Anyway, the issue with Ukraine is not about how to fire artillery but rather where the ammunition is supposed to go. Ukraine continues to complain that 155mm howitzers are not supplied enough.
The placement of the Legion soldiers in Slavyansk is incredibly provocative and contradicts statements made by Macron and the French government that they would replace Ukrainian army units in western Ukraine, which could then be moved eastward to combat Russians. This French depiction of a soft deployment is directly waging a war against Russia as Slavyansk is on the front line.
How will NATO respond to French military decisions? This is a key question. The French cannot ask NATO for support under its renowned Article 5, the NATO Treaty’s collective security component, because France is acting on its own without its support.
Because France has chosen to be a combatant, forcing an Article 5 vote would seem difficult, if not impossible, if Russians attacked French troops outside of Ukraine.
Of course, each NATO member could support the French either by sending their own forces or by providing logistical and communication backstop. For instance, Poland cannot be used to transport Foreign Legion soldiers to Ukraine. Will Russia accept this as proof that it is at war with both France and Poland?
No one has the ability to answer any of these questions with any degree of certainty at the moment. Even if the Russians are Foreign Legion soldiers, it is unlikely that they will tolerate a growing number of French army soldiers. Russia’s response is not certain.
Stephen Bryen served as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Near East Subcommittee’s policy director and as its deputy undersecretary of defense.  ,
This article was first published on his , Weapons and Strategy , Substack and is republished with permission.