New Zealand authorities have been considering role in AUKUS from the beginning, according to data released by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet under the Official Information Act.
Representatives from New Zealand gathered in Wellington for the first of two joint-agency meetings to discuss” Level 2 AUKUS,” which had been renamed “pillar two” on the same day the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was announced on September 16, 2021 ( New Zealand time ).
New Zealand’s non-engagement at the time was attributed to the pact’s main objectives of providing nuclear-powered boats to Australia and its strict prohibition of nuclear-powered vessels in its regional lakes.
Then- prime minister Jacinda Ardern said:” We were n’t approached, nor would I expect us to be”.
It was n’t until March 2023 that probable “non- atomic” involvement in tech posting was officially discussed in New Zealand, during a visit by the US National Security Council coordinator for the Indo- Pacific, Kurt Campbell.
But, according to recently released details, which was obtained as a result of an Official Information Act demand,” Tier 2 AUKUS” discussions took place on September 16, 20, and 23 at Defense House in Wellington.
A month afterwards, on October 22, New Zealand government officials were advised that” there are likely to be major opportunities]for ] future cooperation with AUKUS… beyond the boats, especially in the computer and artificial intelligence places”.
Lack of detail and clarity
These earlier unnamed conferences and their “tier 2” objective suggest that AUKUS was always intended to grow, according to the presence of these meetings.
Additionally, they raise important questions about whether associate members may be viewed negatively within the agreement and whether accepting associates would serve as a way to give the alliance more legitimacy and credibility.
The notion of a “tiered” structure runs counter to new rhetoric around AUKUS. ” Foundation two” has been presented as a standalone technologies- sharing arrangement, properly delineated from pillar one’s nuclear- driven underwater deal.
This also highlights the lack of specific information regarding the proposed benefits of pillar two involvement. As it stands, we know remarkably little about the “advanced capabilities” being developed through AUKUS, due to the secrecy surrounding the pact from the beginning.
What became pillar two has since been presented as an industrial program focused on emerging technologies and job creation. It was initially intended to enhance” joint capabilities and interoperability” between the three AUKUS members.
It appears that the technology is now being used to entice potential members with opportunities for their aerospace and research sectors.
Technology sharing in practice
AUKUS is not a jobs program, according to Australian critics, but rather a strategic initiative that could ensnare members in exclusive US trade restrictions, threaten research independence, and impede international cooperation in research and development.
These concerns recently led former Australian foreign minister Bob Carr to describe pillar two as” cobbled together” and no more than “fragrant, methane- wrapped bullshit”.
Additionally, the US forces are interoperable with Pillar Two technologies. There are no guarantees that autonomous weapons systems or nuclear command, control, and communication infrastructure will use intelligence or data from AUKUS partners.
Indeed, the US has made “integrated deterrence” a core objective of its defense policy, including how it works with “allies and partners”.
Australia will be the first non-nuclear weapons-grade state to receive highly enriched, weapons-grade fissile material and nuclear-powered submarines, according to pillar one of AUKUS.
AI and other pillar two technologies are already assisting in the modernization of the US and UK nuclear weapons command and delivery systems.
Foreign nuclear-capable bombers and submarines “rotated” indefinitely through Australia, in terms of broader AUKUS interoperability.
The Treaty of Rarotonga, which establishes a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and forbids the use, possession, storage, and crucially stationing of nuclear weapons, is in violation of the spirit and letter of its provisions.
No limited involvement
AUKUS has important implications for Australia’s close relationship with Australia in terms of non-nuclear security and security. However, New Zealand has not so far sought to challenge Australian assurances regarding non-proliferation and compliance with the Rarotonga Treaty.
Strangely, it appears that when New Zealand officials, who are not AUKUS members, were creating public messaging about potential involvement in March 2023, designated pillar two as “non-nuclear.”
Through domestic nuclear-free legislation and support for international treaties, New Zealand has taken a leading role in nuclear disarmament. Framing pillar two as technically “non- nuclear” could compromise such advocacy in future.
Prospective partners in AUKUS must be aware that there is no such thing as truly limited involvement. The US continues to dominate in the Pacific region, the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, and potentially dangerous confrontation with China are all supported tacitly by Participation.
Additionally, it offends other important partners in New Zealand.
Few Pacific countries acknowledge climate change as a major threat to their security or believe it has a “non-nuclear” component. States of ASEAN believe it to be establishing an unfairly adversarial relationship with China.
AUKUS aims to expand a tiered, de facto alliance through integrated, nuclear- enabling technologies. This raises important questions for New Zealand regarding whether there is a meaningful distinction between pillar one and pillar two.
Both Emma Shortis and Marco de Jong teach at the Auckland University of Technology’s School of Global, Urban, and Social Studies, respectively, and both work at RMIT University’s Law School.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.