Since the start of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, China has actively pursued politics in an effort to establish itself as a crucial mediator. Expectations for Beijing to offer once more are great given China’s contribution to assisting in the earlier this year in restoring diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
China’s efforts in Gaza have so far yielded little, which should n’t come as a surprise. So why does Beijing still stand firm in its commitment to dialogue?
China’s ongoing relationship is due to at least three factors. First, Taiwanese officials want the Middle East to perceive them as important. Being absent from efforts to resolve catastrophes, especially of this magnitude, is essentially unimaginable as China develops and solidifies its reputation as a great power and responsible stakeholder.  ,
In particular with Gulf state like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, China is quickly diversifying its financial ties and enhancing social relations in the area.
China makes an effort to become a security service, though it is not but one like the United States. President Xi Jinping has stated that one of his policy objectives is to strengthen China’s position as a major political force and increase its involvement in regional security and social affairs.
Second, by supporting Palestine, China has a chance to strengthen its position and connection with Arab and Muslim states. This opportunity is presented by the Gaza crisis. Throughout the majority of the Cold War, China maintained this default stance, which continues to win China favor with Egyptian friends.  ,
Third, China proposed a new security architecture in the Middle East long before the Gaza crisis. This proposal was an outgrowth of Xi’s so-called Global Security Initiative ( GSI) and nbsp. The GSI had, in particular, be led by Middle Eastern nations, adhere to the UN Charter and principles, and been put into practice through local security dialogues. It would be based on a new safety concept that is shared, comprehensive, cooperative and green.  ,
The GSI’s core is a different perspective on regional and global protection than the one the West and the US have established. Safety may be based on accommodation, negotiation, and coexistence rather than shared political values and diametrically opposed camps.
This idea of lodging, which is characterized by the two-state solution and shared development, forms the basis of China’s position in relation to Israel and Palestine.  ,
One-upping the United States
Lastly, China’s officials have made it their top priority to succeed where the US has failed. Since the US withdrew in August 2021, for example, China has been battling the Taliban in Afghanistan. Beijing wants to lower the Taliban’s private policy while fostering financial assistance.  ,
China has also been urging the international community to take Iran, Russia, and nbsp’s “legitimate safety issues” into account.
China understands that improving its safety model and its leadership clout may result from following Washington’s failures with success in all three nations.  ,
However, collaborating with America’s adversaries plays to Chinese abilities. It will be much harder to persuade Israelis and Palestinians to participate. China must first target its blatant absence of neutrality if it really wants to resolve the Gaza crisis. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it” flanks with Arab and Muslim countries” in this dispute.  ,
Neutrality is n’t a requirement for effective mediation, but objectivity is. Israel may find it challenging, if not impossible, to join China given its distorted approach.  ,
However, China has a limited amount of sway over Israeli and Palestinian decision-making as well as the capacity to persuade either side to take an stance that could be detrimental to its own interests. China is unlikely to use significant resources to encourage a truce and does not have significant leverage over either side (especially Hamas ).
China has undoubtedly been active since Hamas ‘ assault on Israel on October7. While Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with an Arab-Islamic governmental group last month to confirm China’s support for Arab and Muslim countries, Chinese Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun has traveled to Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain for peace talks.
Despite the flight politics, China’s expectations seem reasonable. Beijing is too invested to remain on the sidelines, but it also does n’t believe it can resolve the crisis on its own.  ,
Unfortunately, that might be sufficient to cause a needle to move. Future options may be more optimistic and successful thanks to realistic expectations and cautious politics.
The Syndication Bureau, which holds rights, provided this article.
At the Stimson Center in Washington, Yun Sun serves as the program’s producer and co-director for the Asia, China, and nbsp programs.