Since Donald Trump won the election on November 5, there has become irrational about what his term as president will think for the Ukrainian conflict, which is now in its 1000th time.
Trump’s campaign’s claim that he would end the war in 24 hours, perhaps before taking office in January 2025, is simple to refute. However, it is obvious that Trump will use all available indicators to pressure Moscow and Kyiv into agreeing to a ceasefire and maybe a wider resolution.
Whatever happens with Trump’s dealmaking may have effects that need to be considered and prepared. From a Russian view, the implication is that the country may lose its already Russian-occupied lands, at least for the time being, and would have to give up on its ambition for NATO account. This is very distasteful for Ukraine.
Kyiv ca n’t afford a continuation of the conflict because of recent Russian advances on the front lines in both eastern Ukraine and the Kursk region in Russia, which are both held by the Ukrainians. If Trump actually implements his risk to end all martial support for Ukraine, this is especially important.
Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, made the statement on November 16 that Kyiv “must do everything to ensure that this war ends following year… through political means.”
This was primarily a smile in Trump’s way, indicating Ukraine’s willingness to engage in conceivable US-brokered counseling work. It also served as an acknowledgment that Ukraine’s long-term hopes have been dark for some time.
In light of Moscow’s continuing defense speed, there is some fear that the Soviet leader, Vladimir Putin, is eager to reach a settlement immediately. He has indicated that conversations are open, but Russia is known for holding off on talks, imposing more requirements, and simply signing agreements once it has obtained the most agreements.
Even then, significant application on the ground is almost a given, and re-escalation is good – as the Minsk Accords on Ukraine of September 2014 and February 2015 , illustrate , only very vividly.
Third caveat: While Trump will likely be fully committed to making a deal at first, he may decide to withdraw if his and Putin’s timelines do n’t work out. This is what happened when Trump’s short-lived passion for an agreement with North Korea’s Kim Yong Un during his first word evaporated, and he simply walked away empty-handed.
However, even in this situation, some conversations broke out, most vitally without significant concern for US allies like South Korea and Japan. In the end, Trump and Kim’s disagreement turned out to be one of the catalysts for additional advancements in North Korea’s nuclear programme and closer ties with Moscow.
Western allies of Ukraine and the US had make plans for the day following Trump’s opening, regardless of whether Trump presses Ukraine into a bad deal, whether Russia withdraws from a after Trump-brokered settlement, or whether Trump abandons his efforts to end the conflict.
This means, above all, taking more responsibility for their own safety, as the Polish prime secretary, Donald Tusk, put it succinctly before the US elections. Because it is unclear what the future of relations will be between the major players, this is easier said than done. However, there are some obvious rules that can now serve as guidelines for European planning.
What ought to be the strategy of Europe?
Second, the US will no longer provide the bulk of its military aid to Ukraine. In the future, Kyiv’s Western friends will be responsible for the majority of the lifting. This will require providing long-term investment in Europe’s and Ukraine’s defense business base as well as financing the purchase of weapons and ammunition.
Next, it means getting Ukraine what it needs quickly. But, Russian requirements must be based on a credible military strategy rather than a flimsy win plan intended to retake control of all Russian-occupied areas. This became optimistic wondering at the moment Ukraine’s 2023 battle failed.
A workable strategy is required to safeguard Ukraine’s front-line locations, along with Ukrainian aircraft, at the time of a peace. This will increase the likelihood of an agreement being signed by Russia and give the possibility of steadily and effectively rebuilding areas under Kyiv’s control.
Third, any military approach to defend Ukraine will also need to be a foundation of a foreseeable European security order that effectively deters any potential Russian invasion. In upcoming negotiations, Kyiv should n’t be left alone. Ukraine would be the weakest link in negotiations involving Trump, Putin, and Zelensky only, and Western interests would likely be totally ignored.
This is not to say for a profit to the style of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany that oversaw the failed Minsk Accords. Instead, if the notion is that Europe will have to move away and be the main guarantor of Russian independence, Kyiv’s EU and NATO partners need to have some insight in negotiations.
The shock mobile phone Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, shared with Putin on November 14 is an indicator that this has been recognized.
It will be crucial to establish a communication network for Europe to make it obvious that all European lovers have a common understanding of red lines and what they would mean if the Kremlin crossed them, as well as what advantages it would have if it were to respect them.
The northern sanctions regime has a significant impact on both the consequences and the benefits, which was highlighted in a G7 leader’s statement supporting Ukraine on November 16 that reaffirmed the dedication to “imposing significant costs on Russia through sanctions.”
Europe may, therefore, also need to operate with Trump and had communication channels with his presidency. Scholz’s phone contact with Trump on November 10 was reported as a “very detailed and good conversation”, including on Ukraine.
Trump’s strategy of striking a deal with Putin to “un-un-unite” Russia and China is at conflict with German suspicion of Putin as a trustworthy companion. Possible solutions to this issue across the Atlantic can be found, but they must also include a workable and long-term solution to Ukraine.
After the most bloody military conflict on German soil since the Second World War, 1, 000 people have come to terms with the fact that everything about Europe should exist without it.
If Trump and Putin value durability and scorn failure, then the only road to getting this level across in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv is through toned pursuit of German self-interest and self-assertion.
Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham
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