On March 3, US President Donald Trump paused all US military aid to Ukraine. This move was apparently triggered by a heated change a few days before between Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.
In response, European Union leaders have now committed to rearm Europe by mobilizing €800 billion ( about US$ 867 billion ) in defense spending.
Of the EU leaders, 26 ( excluding Hungary ) signed an agreement that peace for Ukraine must be accompanied by “robust and credible” security guarantees.
They agreed there can be no discussions on Ukraine without Ukraine’s membership. It was also agreed the EU may continue to give regular defense and non-military aid to Ukraine.
At the same time, the United Kingdom has committed to the biggest increase in military saving since the Cold War.
The EU’s united front may produce powerful threats and hinder a direct assault on EU countries.
But, for Ukraine, it will not lead to a military victory in its war with Russia. While Europe has stepped up money, this is not enough for Ukraine to fight Soviet troops now occupying about 20 % of the country.
For Ukraine, the departure of US support did greatly tension the ability to keep fighting. Ukraine will probably want to find a way to freeze the issue this year. This may mean a temporary ceasefire that does not fully lose Russian country to Russia.
A Trumpian view
The greatly different methods of the US under Trump and the EU level to a deeper philosophical break.
While the Trump administration has acted more quickly and confidently in international politics than many expected, its view is hardly surprising.
Since Trump won the US presidential election in November last month, Europe and Ukraine have known that a change in US scheme would be on the cards.
Trump’s method to Ukraine is not only about financial issues and withdrawing US military support. It is about a deeper, more substantial clash of viewpoints.
Trump ( and, it appears, his core support base ) hold a “great power politics” approach to world affairs.
This technique assumes we live in a competitive world where states are motivated to maximise profits and dominate. Results can be achieved through sanctions or rewards.
Countries with greater military or financial power” matter” more. They are expected to establish their will on weaker locations. This stance underpinned much of the imperial action of the 19th and 20th centuries.
This view expects conflict – and it expects stronger nations to “win”.
Regular with Trump’s perspective, Russia is a local authority that has the “right” to command smaller states in its village.
Trump’s method to Ukraine is not an aberration. Nor is it a short-term and unexpected measure to get the worldwide spotlight.
Trump’s view leads to the logical and consistent assumption that Russia will seek to control nations within its sphere of influence.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented an attempt to impose its will on a militarily weaker state that it considered to be in its lawful area of control.
The EU option
Opposed to this view, the EU is founded on the idea that nations can work together for shared profits through cooperation and compromise. This method underpins the function of what are called the Bretton Woods Institutions created in the aftermath of World War II.
This view expects cooperation rather than conflict. Socially useful and collaborative solutions are found through dialogue and negotiation.
According to this view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is about a conflict between the values of a democratic politics and those of an oppressive authoritarian regime.
Zelensky has himself constantly framed the issue as being about a fight of values: liberty and democracy than authoritarianism and manage.
A mix of both?
Since Trump’s subsequent opening, Western leaders have presented a united front, motivated by facing a planet where US military support cannot be guaranteed.
Nevertheless, there is inner division within Western countries. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in anti-EU attitude within EU member states. The UK’s return from the EU is an example of this trend.
EU officials recently followed a course of participation with Russia, with minimal success. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, France and Germany helped resolve the Minsk Agreements. These contracts, signed in 2014 and 2015, were designed to prevent further attacks by Russian-backed parties into Ukrainian sovereign place.
This did not prevent Russia’s full-scale war of Ukraine in 2022.
In an emerging new world order, management may involve going beyond the apparent contradiction of a concentrate on defense strength or assistance. Officials may need to combine both.
Jessica Genauer is a senior lecturer on foreign connections at Flinders University.
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