To “widen” or to “deepen”. This has been a perennial gimmick in the never-ending process of European integration and has long been one of the EU’s ( EU) history’s biggest problems.
In its day, France pushed for a deeper Union, while the UK pushed for a wider one. Because the British were heavily invested in the single market, they were keen to maximize monetary exchange and to make the possibility of EU social unification as difficult as possible because having more members may make any decision-making process more complicated.
France prioritized a focus on global democratic integration as a means of bolstering the EU’s foundations, despite its desire for an extended market.
Increasing and widdening are no mutually exclusive. In truth, both are important to Western integration, and in process both plans coexist, as all expansions have brought about changes. So, the discussion is not about choosing one or the other; rather, it is about how much the power balance between EU member states changes as a result of placing one or the other in the spotlight.
Renegotiating election laws and a change in the level of influence held by various EU institutions are the main factors behind all EU expansions. Since its founding, the EU has expanded east, and Russia’s attack on Ukraine means this is expected to continue. But, it is unclear exactly where “Europe” begins.
The 2004-2007 EU enhancement
In looking at current applicants for EU arrival, it is for second examining its second extension, which took place from 2004 to 2007.
Despite numerous shortcomings, this growth was widely successful in making new members more “European” by European standards.
However, the extension was fairly rushed: it included to many states that, some said, the EU was certainly ready to take in without problems. These nations were apparently not entirely informed of the repercussions of the action they were taking.
No fewer than 12 states participated in the largest and most difficult enhancement in the history of the EU. These were done in two phases: ten in 2004 ( Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia ) and two in 2007 ( Bulgaria and Romania ).
These nations had governments that showed administrative and judicial deficits, higher levels of corruption, and small protection for the privileges of some ethnic minorities. These nations were less developed than their western relatives.
The EU’s administrative framework suffered from a number of shortcomings, including the need for consensus in sensitive areas like immigration and defense. The emergence of a pan-European identification was even hampered by the continuous admission of so many novel member states.
These nations ‘ democratic transitions have been rocky, and the economic and social transitions have not always withstanded criticism or analysis. However, the EU has assisted them in adjusting to the construction established by their northern neighbors.
Potential extension
As of 2024, there are ten countries aspiring to EU membership: six in the Western Balkans ( Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia ) and four in other regions ( Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Turkey ).
The EU’s approach toward the Western Balkans has been anxious, provoking uneasiness and disillusionment. Therefore, treating each potential candidate separately to create individual “packs ” for negotiation would be the most likely choice. When it comes to the EU’s needs, Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia ( in this attempt ) are in the best place for entry. There are a number of issues with the region’s another three state.
The conflict that is currently raging with Russia has largely contributed to the acceptance of Ukraine and Moldova as candidates.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is regarded as a brittle nation. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srprska, the two government bodies that make up it, govern with their tails to one another. Shared organizations do not function properly, and the state ’s cultural Nationalists have threatened to seek independence. It is is even under NATO and EU supervision.
Kosovo is never recognized by several nations, including EU nations like Spain and Greece, politely.
Since the end of Yugoslavia, Serbia has remained near to Russian objectives.
Given that it has two lands under Russian control ( South Ossetia and Abkhazia ), it is unlikely to gain entry any time soon. It is geographically isolated from the rest of the EU, and it also lags behind on all development issues.
Regarding Turkey, it seems obvious that the EU does not have any true involvement in welcoming them. They have only been able to close one of the 35 pages in discussions on the EU’s acquis communitaire ( the regulations, rights, and rules that bind all EU member states ) after 25 years of discussions.
Possible challenges
In the (very ) long term we will likely see the EU grow from its current 27 states to as many as 35, though the oft-touted horizon of 2030 is unrealistic. Meeting the terms of the acquis presents a significant challenge for the current prospects, away from their significant economic differences with Eastern Europe. A plethora of unsettled territorial and diplomatic disputes can be added to this.
Despite the precedent set by Cyprus, where the north is occupied by Turkey and where there is no chance of reunification following the unsuccessful 2004 referendum, the EU should enlist states with internal disputes ( such as Bosnia ), states whose existence is not universally acknowledged ( Kosovo ), or states that do not have complete control over large areas of their own territory ( Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia ). These things are enough to prevent their entry.
The Union does not repeat the error it made by introducing ten fresh member states simultaneously during the enlargement process from 2004 to 2007. It is much more sensible to take a rushed, liberal approach, grouping countries into smaller groups which can then slowly combine. Forward planning is also needed. It would be sensible to reform the decision-making processes in the European Community as well as other political control mechanisms that should be used when new users are integrated before granting arrival to new members.
Prior to a fresh member’s membership, research has shown that the EU has more control in the negotiations than it does in the later stages. The freedom of an International member state are suspended under Article 7 of the Lisbon treaty if it” seriously and consistently violates the rules on which the EU is founded,” but this is all but impossible to do in practice. It requires a unanimous vote, and financial sanctions are not enough to change the course of authoritarian institutions, as proved by Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and, until October 2023, Jaroslav Kaczyński’s Poland.
Problems like the COVID-19 crisis and the continuing war in Ukraine are the driving force behind Western integration, but with the main Franco-German plane losing power, common opinion is not so passionate about integration. This tense, disjointed picture is manifested by the rise of the populist whoopines much right on the continent, even in the EU’s founding nations.
Today, the EU has a long list of key issues to face: typical defense (especially if an isolationist such as Trump returns to the US president ), the energy transition, environmental issues, Europe’s relative technological and digital barbarism and the unsatisfactory common migration coverage, among others.
Practical considerations
If the EU is to increase from 27 to 35 member states, it will need to implement extensive institutional and fiscal reforms. No matter how difficult it is to reform the necessary treaties, each member’s setting aside a budget for the EU of only 1 % of GDP is economically unsustainable.
Due to the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s size not expanding with each new member, there will also need to be smaller and more distributed. The European Council’s veto rights will no longer be respected, and the rule of law will be strengthened.
Following the June 2024 elections, achieving this would require a broad consensus among the main pro-European political parties. Without this, further enlargements will not be possible.
In the meantime, passarelle or “bridge ” clauses could, in some cases, be used to circumvent the need for unanimity, and to make greater use of enhanced cooperation and constructive abstentions. These includes so-called “two-speed ” agreements, in which countries interested in a proposal join while those not interested simply abstain.
If the rising Eurosceptic tide is to be stemmed, this all has to be done while also keeping the public well informed: 53 % of Europeans approve of enlargement, while 37 % are opposed.
Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat is catedrático de ciencia política, Universitat de Barcelona.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.