In response to the growing threat of dynamic Chinese action, Taiwan’s first indigenous equipped sea drone represents a significant step toward developing asymmetric warfare capabilities.
Multiple media outlets reported that Taiwan’s state-backed shipbuilder CSBC Corporation unveiled the Endeavor Manta, its first domestically developed military-grade uncrewed surface vehicle ( USV), at Kaohsiung’s Singda Harbor this month.
In light of rising tensions with China, Taipei’s efforts to develop asymmetric warfare features are important.
The trimaran-hulled vehicle, which was built from fiber-reinforced plastic and is designed to work in the Taiwan Strait, measures 8.6 meters in length and 3. 7 feet in diameter. It can carry more than one parameter ton of cargo, including mild torpedoes and explosives, at a top speed of 35 tangles.
In earlier 2024, CSBC began developing the Manta after Ukraine’s usage of USVs against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The vessel has advanced capabilities, including AI-assisted targeting, automatic routing, collision avoidance, and swarming control, as well as four different remote communication modes, including 4G, radio frequency, and satellite.
If compromised, it is programmed to go back to basic or self-destruct. All techniques are produced locally, away from satellite and engine components that are imported from abroad.
In light of the growing confidence of the Chinese army, the launch of The Mantra highlights Taiwan’s emphasis on indigenous defense innovation.
Scott Savitz makes a deeper analysis of the potential military responsibilities of Taiwan’s Manta USV because they strike at the waterline and carry violent payloads significantly heavier than those of the former type in a RAND commentary from January 2023.
Savitz claims that the People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) fleet could be overrun by swarms of low-profile USVs that are difficult to spot and counter. He mentions that they could also be used to force an opponent fleet to embrace slower and more resilient formations in place of naval minefields. Additionally, he claims that USVs had deliver loitering munitions or explosive materials for further damage.
Additionally, Eric Rosenbach and other authors mention USVs ‘ potential long-duration missions, including mine-laying, electronic warfare, and intelligence gathering in environments very dangerous for manned systems, in a February 2025 Belfer Center report.
Rosenbach and some claim that these systems would work independently in electromagnetically restricted environments where PLA electronic warfare would be in jeopardy.
In an article in the November 2021 Trials, Karl Flynn mentions that USVs could be used for supplies. USVs enable distributed forces to be redundant and simultaneously replenished, which is especially useful in settings like those on Taiwan’s front islands, including Kinmen and Matsu.
Taiwan’s USVs may not be the war-winning know weapons some might claim them to be, as with the Ukraine conflict. USVs, for instance, lack the variety, endurance, firepower, versatility, and range of staffed warships. But, their autonomous nature and lower cost help to significantly offset these drawbacks.
Also, if they encounter complex issues in a sea environment, there is no way to fix them. Electronics and equipment that are sympathetic may be affected by water apply and salinity. Taiwan’s Manta has a self-destruct process, but there is still the possibility of having its encrypted codes compromised and a faulty product being discovered and analyzed.
In a June 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ), Stacie Pettyjohn and other authors make the claim that a defense of Taiwan must rely on a “porcupine strategy” built on numerous smaller, easily concealed weapons, such as USVs, to lower the cost of such aggression.
According to Pettyjohn and others, suicide USVs carrying big, violent payloads can harm big warships and can be used by aerial drones or other USVs gathering intelligence to take their prey.
Additionally, they suggest that Taiwan deploy USVs to give early notice about an invading fleet’s progress and determine resilient troop transports. Additionally, they claim that USVs you create minefields that could “kill zones” for an invasion fleet that are prone to air- and land-based missile strikes.
Taiwan’s aircraft sector is still developing. Jane Rickards notes that Taiwan is aware of China’s major lead in aircraft manufacturing but also hopes to get up. In a December 2024 article for The Strategist, Rickards writes that Taiwan is aware of this fact.
Su Tzu-Yun of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research ( INDSR ), who asserts that Taiwanese drone makers are generally better at hardware but are generally weak at system integration and design, quotes Rickards.
More, she quotes IMSAR, a US manufacturer of superior radars, as Richard Weir, vice chairman for international strategy and authorities relations, who claims that Chinese drone makers are more reluctant to recognize missions, weapons, and sensors for the drones before they are created.
Additionally, Harun Ayanoglu mentions that Taiwan is struggling to grow its drone industry in a January 2025 article for the Central European Institute of Asian Studies ( CEIAS ).
Ayanoglu points out that Taiwan’s manufacturers are deprived of administrative comments and profit because, unlike Turkey and Israel, Taiwan may export its drones to active combat zones due to political restrictions.
Taiwan’s drone strikes do not change the fact that US military intervention would be necessary for the self-governing island’s survival in the event of a Chinese invasion, on a strategic level. ” Strategic ambiguity” is a factor in US policy on Taiwan, but this may serve to cover up indecisiveness over the issue.
In a February 2025 Foreign Policy article, Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim make the claim that direct US military action could have disastrous effects on people and economies, including potential nuclear escalation.
The authors point out that the US is under pressure to defend Taiwan in order to maintain its credibility, but such a move could lead to China’s escalation. Additionally, they point out that Taiwan’s defense strategy is insufficient because it relies more heavily on expensive items like frigates and fighter jets than on asymmetric capabilities.
They claim that the US relies on regional allies and strategic clarity to navigate these complex issues in order to help Taiwan avoid becoming too deeply involved in a larger conflict.
However, Michael Schiffer asserts in a Financial Times (FT ) article this month that China’s coercive strategy through military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, and economic entanglement has lost effectiveness as a result of its increasing military asymmetry.
Schiffer claims that China no longer fears a flimsy US response, and that Taipei grows increasingly anxious over inconsistent signals, especially given Trump’s foreign policy’s volatility. He contends that the US’s anti-China strategy is insufficiently weighed against its military deterrence.
He claims that the US must adopt strategic clarity, detail the effects of Chinese aggression, and strengthen Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and informational support without breaking the” One China” framework.