Three kilometers outside of Adelaide’s dock, a 12-ton fish vessel weighs anchor. A small group of people gathers around a tiny underwater, turns on the handles, primes the explosives, and throws it into the water. The second, constrained port channel that is in charge of the state’s primary fuel supply is where the underground drone uses sensors and sonar to fly.
You may infer the remainder. Australia, a nation that imports more than 90 % of its energy and conducts 99 % of trade by sea, could suffer catastrophic effects from any blockage, accident, or explosion.
Australia’s 34, 000 kilometers of beach likely face a serious potential menace as drone ships or” uncrewed underwater vehicles”( UUVs ) become more affordable, more widespread, and more advanced.
What is possible? Our analysis, which was verified through workshops with experts from all over Australia, demonstrates that the same technologies can improve our maritime protection if we incorporate them into our planning moving forward.
Seabed conflict
Australia’s priority for underwater security is growing, but not by itself. France introduced its Seabed Warfare Strategy in 2022 to combat automatic underwater marine challenges. In response to the Nord Stream oil line’s damage in September 2022, NATO established an Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in February 2023.
Smaller, inexpensive underwater drones have played a significant role in the Ukrainian war. Underwater robots have also made it possible for Ukraine to launch asymmetrical strikes on Russian forces.
Among other things, present drones can be used for intelligence, surveillance, surveillance, mine countermeasures, electronic warfare, antisubmarine war, underwater sensor network development, and special operations.
However, it’s possible that their capabilities will grow. The Haidou – 1 project in China dove to a degree of 10, 908 feet.
The Haiyan, a Taiwanese underground aircraft, has traveled 3, 600 km across the South China Sea in 141 days, breaking the drone sub-elimination record. Although some economists question its existence, Russia boasts of having a design underwater trailer that is nuclear-powered and military.
To manage underground ocean domains, nations are also creating more comprehensive programs.
For example, the Advanced Undersea Warfare System proposed by the United States envisions a community of stationary underwater stations capable of deploying both offensive and defensive drones.
China is building an” Underwater Great Wall” of boats, stand, and drones in the South China Sea to keep an eye on the region and make it challenging for foreign warships to work in foreign waters.
a novel era of maritime conflict?
These changes, according to some experts, mark the start of a” new age of naval battle.” Others contend that as automatic coastal systems become more affordable and efficient, they might be preferred to crewed ones for national defense. According to one estimate, by 2052, more than half of the US naval fleet will be made up of uncrewed ships.
The development of ocean drones may also spur cross or” gray area” approaches to conflict, which can cost adversaries a lot of money while avoiding outright combat and reducing casualties. Uncrewed marine vessels does provide state with a legitimate means of waging war to further their objectives in this situation.
Drone submarines, on the other hand, have a tendency to cause obvious incidents and other behaviors that are unrelated to their instigators. On this level, it is worthwhile to quote the European Seabed Warfare Strategy:
A” convenient” injury in a coastal area or deliberate military action could both result in an assault on the underground portion of submarine wires. In this regard, the ocean is the perfect setting for non-attributable steps in” grey zones” due to its inherent characteristics.
The path that leads to Australia
The threat posed by intelligent, uncrewed underwater vehicles to Australia’s industry was the subject of our recent research.
We held sessions with representatives from the government, the Royal Australian Navy, security, business, and universities in collaboration with colleagues at the RMIT Centre for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, Charles Darwin University and WiseLaw.
Between efforts to safeguard ocean-borne industry and essential underwater infrastructure today and more forward-looking strategies aimed at creating the next generation of coastal defense, we discovered a growing tension.
Australia has committed to purchasing and building nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS security pact, and it wants to do so in order to” acquire and develop new techniques with more undersea features.” This is a good beginning, but the size of the purchases has raised worries that Australia’s government may use them exclusively.
Australia also tests cutting-edge sea security systems through competitions like Autonomous Warrior. However, the dangers to marine industry that underwater robots are likely to create in the future are not fully explored in these exercises.
Our sessions have led to the observation that mines are now seen as a potential problem. Loitering drones loaded with explosives, which could even be commercially available ships carrying homemade explosive, could impede traffic and business ports, stifle naval resources, or obstruct coastal shipping lanes. Delays, a loss of revenue, and higher insurance payments may result from this.
Mine have an enormous impact because they can cause significant damage for a low cost as” set and miss” weapons. Additionally, it is challenging and expensive to locate and destroy them.
Australia is currently essentially shielded from the danger posed by underwater drones by distance. Uavs would need to be deployed from reasonably close by due to current battery and communication technology, and operating in Australia’s coastal environments may be challenging.
But, technology is developing immediately. The Australian Department of Defense is running out of time to deal with the threat posed by underground uncrewed cars.
Matthew Warren is the chairman of the RMIT University Center for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, and Adam Bartley is a doctoral fellow there.
This post makes use of studies supported by the Department of Defense’s Strategic Policy Grants Program. In order to help separate study, events, and activities, the Defense can use the Strategic Policy Grants Program as an open and competitive tool.
The authors’ opinions are expressed here, not always those of the American government or security.
Under a Creative Commons license, this essay has been republished from The Conversation. read the article in its entirety.