With a seemingly remarkable change in Indonesia’s South China Sea plan while in Beijing, President Prabowo Subianto has dazed and perplexed some outside policy spectators.
Indonesia Foreign Ministry officials were caught off guard, if not shocked, after an official statement released on the final day of Prabowo’s trip appeared to recognize China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim to most of the South China Sea, including part of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ).
The announcement’s speech was confusing so the practical relevance remain unclear. Any advice that Indonesia now recognizes China’s recommended map was immediately refuted by the foreign ministry’s quick release of a clarifying statement.
Some observers are left scratching their heads as a result of this and earlier indications that Indonesia may be defending its maritime country.
Was this a president’s easy haphazard pass intended to lead international plan ahead of political officials? Or does Prabowo’s stance suggest that Indonesia’s political branding is shifting toward China?
Long-running debate
A word from a joint statement by China that refers to a” common knowledge on joint growth in areas of overlapping claims” with regard to sea issues is at the center of the disagreement. This artless phrase carries probably major implications.
China has long asserted wide geographical claims over waters in the South China Sea, which are in line with those of many Southeast Asian countries. For Indonesia, the area of contention is in the North Natuna Sea, which China claims a loaf of despite being in Indonesia’s EEZ.
Since China’s claims have no legal basis, Indonesia has not only consistently rejected this assertion, but also has adopted the unwavering position that there is nothing to explain.
Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 2016 decision the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations supports this. Jakarta has categorically rejected Chinese attempts to engage in conversation about the topic.
Prabowo appeared to recognize that China has genuine territorial statements in the North Natuna Sea, which if true would change Indonesian policy significantly. By putting his name in a formal declaration accepting the idea of “overlapping claims,” Prabowo appeared to accept this.
Indian foreign government officials reportedly fought diligently for the change of the language, but ultimately failed, according to sources with knowledge of the situation. But, since then, the foreign government has issued a statement clarifying that the MOU on coastal participation” may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the’ 9-Dash-Lines claim ‘” and, consequently, “has no impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty, royal rights, or jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea”.
The situation is made even more complicated by Indonesia’s recent warnings that it might be treading a more difficult path in the North Natuna Sea.
A Chinese coast guard vessel was ejected from Indonesian regional waters around Natuna on October 23. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency, Bakmla, released videos of the event and announced its expulsion.
Some people thought that Prabowo, a former member of the special forces, was promoting a more muscular approach. Indonesia continued to refuse China’s sea claims while maintaining a low level of tension under his father, President Joko Widodo.
rookie blunders or corporate shifts?
What should be made of the shock statement, both by spectators and experts?
” With the recently released joint statement stating that we have an overlapping state, that is very important”, said Aristyo Darmawan, a lecturer in international laws at the University , of , Indonesia and an analyst on coastal rules. He suggests that this statement might have two possible consequences.
The first would be that accepting overlapping claims implies that negotiations on the maritime boundary might be in Indonesia’s future. And for a claim that is not based on international law, Aristyo said,” I think it’s absurd to negotiate a maritime boundary demarcation.”
Opening the door to regional resource sharing might be the second implication. Oil and gas are mentioned in the two sides ‘ documents but not explicitly in the joint statement.
” I think that’s something stupid”, said Aristyo. ” It’s like a random person arguing that part of your house is theirs and, therefore, you should share some of the resources”.
By examining how much the statement actually means or alters the facts in the real world, other experts had a slightly more optimistic opinion. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s director, Gregory Poling, described Indonesia as” a huge shift” by accepting an area of overlap and opening the door to joint development. However, he added, the quick clarification issued by Indonesia’s foreign ministry suggests that in practice it is a “dead letter”.
Others suggested that China’s involvement in the matter might be advantageous. ” Prabowo’s administration is laser-focused on energy self-sufficiency, and exploring oil and gas in the North Natuna Sea is a big part of that plan. Working with China on these resources may have fruitful outcomes, according to Dedi Dinarto, a senior Indonesia analyst at Global Counsel’s strategic advisory firm.
Some have chalked up the whole affair to the inexperience of Indonesia’s new Foreign Minister Sugiono, a protégé of Prabowo’s with no previous foreign policy experience.
Sugiono allegedly received advice from officials in the foreign ministry about the problematic language, but he did not, according to a source with knowledge of the situation, push his Chinese counterparts to change their minds.
The source also attributed the pressure on Prabowo’s wealthy business partners, who were eager to maintain a friendly relationship. Some 156.19 trillion rupiah ( US$ 10 billion ) worth of deals were signed at the Indonesia-China Business Forum, though details were not publicly released.
Without making any concessions on the sea issue, former leader Widodo was able to agree to many of these agreements while visiting China as president. Many people wonder if Prabowo’s statement is a sign of diplomatic incompetence or if it indicates a desire to develop even more productive economic ties with China.
Geopolitical sides
A commitment to” carry out broader and deeper security cooperation in more areas” was a final point of interest in the joint statement.
Since China’s claims and incursions in the Natuna Sea in 2016 resulted in a severe suspension of Indonesian and Chinese security cooperation.
A move like this would fit Prabowo’s preference for diplomatic defense and his alleged desire to formally appoint a new security ally to Indonesia.
Last week, Indonesia and Russia conducted their first joint maritime exercise in accordance with this statement. Though given that Prabowo also oversaw the bolstering of security ties with America as the previous administration’s defense minister, this likely should not be over-interpreted.
In public statements, Prabowo has continued to embrace Indonesia’s long-standing commitment to non-alignment. However, that position does not preclude quiet geopolitical repositioning.
Indonesia and the United States had incredibly close relations under President Suharto. Under Widodo, Indonesia arguably leaned to China for investment. Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law and Widodo’s successor, is now being watched closely for how he might incline.
More signs may be coming. Just 19 days after his inauguration, Prabowo embarked on an extend international tour. He has now flown to the United States, where he is scheduled to meet with both President-elect Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden, after three days of traveling there.
The newly elected leader will travel to Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and other Middle Eastern countries that are still unnamed as part of his diplomatic tour.