Demographic disaster may have an unappreciated upside – Asia Times

During the coming decades, it may become extremely difficult to cause Americans to assist defend any of the extremely several countries with&nbsp, birth rates much too small to replace their population, also if&nbsp, a&nbsp, country in question is politically governed.

There is scant evidence that a state ‘s&nbsp, having a&nbsp, delivery rate much lower than is needed&nbsp, to&nbsp, replace&nbsp, itspopulation&nbsp, now&nbsp, diminishes&nbsp, Americans ‘ willingness to help it defend itself. &nbsp, US Senator JD Vance, speaking on the Senate floor on February 12 to oppose further US military aid to Ukraine, pointed out that” not a single country &nbsp, –&nbsp, not&nbsp, even the US&nbsp, –&nbsp, within the NATO alliance has birthrates at replacement level”. But did not mention Ukraine’s beginning level, which is lower than that of any NATO&nbsp, land save Malta. &nbsp, &nbsp,

But, &nbsp, American journalist David P. &nbsp, Goldman, &nbsp, in articles about Taiwan and Ukraine published by&nbsp, Asia Times&nbsp, in October 2021 and January 2022, suggested that&nbsp, those territories ‘&nbsp, extremely low birth rates might warrant limiting American military aid for them. &nbsp, That may be a forerunner of things to come. &nbsp,

The world demographic&nbsp, predicament&nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

In recent years, the&nbsp, baby rate&nbsp, of almost every country in the world has fallen. Everything suggests that&nbsp, this trend&nbsp, might&nbsp, be&nbsp, reversed&nbsp, in the foreseeable future.

Starting in the 1970s, &nbsp, more and more rich or middle- income countries&nbsp, have &nbsp, come to have &nbsp, total fertility rates ( a TFR is&nbsp, the average lifetime number of&nbsp, live births&nbsp, per woman ) &nbsp, much&nbsp, lower than are needed&nbsp, to replace the population. Save&nbsp, for Israel&nbsp, and&nbsp, Saudi Arabia, &nbsp, no rich country &nbsp, now&nbsp, has a Birthrate above 2.1, &nbsp, which is&nbsp, the&nbsp, rate&nbsp, needed for people alternative if infant mortality is minimal and the adult proportion of live births is not artificially diminished.

Countries with TFRs&nbsp, now&nbsp, near or below 1.3 are concentrated in East Asia and southern and eastern Europe. &nbsp, They&nbsp, include:

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Spain and Thailand ( TFRs of&nbsp, about 1.3 ),
  • Ukraine, China, Malta, and Macau ( 1.2 to 1.1 ), and
  • Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea ( 1.0&nbsp, to 0.7 ). &nbsp, &nbsp,

Many&nbsp, other&nbsp, counties– including the Western Hemisphere’s Canada and Chile and Europe’s Albania, Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia and Switzerland –&nbsp, now&nbsp, have &nbsp, TFRs&nbsp, of around 1.4 or 1.5.

In 2022, only one continent, Africa, had a TFR above 2.1. Africa’s TFR was about 4.2, Oceania’s about 2.1, Asia’s about 1.9, Latin America’s about 1.8, Northern America’s about 1.6, and Europe’s about 1.5.

Some of the socio- economic&nbsp, benefits&nbsp, of fertility decline to&nbsp, a&nbsp, below- replacement level – notably freeing more women to work outside the home, and either reducing expenditures on child- raising and education or&nbsp, enabling&nbsp, children to be better- educated&nbsp, at no additional cos – ensue&nbsp, immediately or&nbsp, quickly.

In contrast, the adverse effects&nbsp, ensue with a lag of 20 or more years. One such&nbsp, effect&nbsp, is&nbsp, ever fewer people of military age and working age.

Another is&nbsp, a&nbsp, decades- long&nbsp, increase, to a lastingly higher level, &nbsp, in the elderly&nbsp, population relative to the working- age population and&nbsp, hence&nbsp, in the share of GDP spent on pensions and care for the elderly. &nbsp, For decades, people too old to work&nbsp, also&nbsp, increasingly outnumber people too young to work, so the working- age proportion of the population shrinks, despite&nbsp, a&nbsp, declining below- working- age proportion of the population.

Only countries that already had low fertility in the 1990s are now suffering these&nbsp, lagged&nbsp, adverse effects. &nbsp, &nbsp,

However, with each passing year, &nbsp, these&nbsp, adverse&nbsp, effects afflict&nbsp, more and more countries&nbsp, and afflict many countries more and more strongly. As they&nbsp, become&nbsp, more&nbsp, widespread and acute, &nbsp, it becomes harder not to&nbsp, view&nbsp, peoples with&nbsp, persistent&nbsp, far- below- replacement&nbsp, fertility&nbsp, as&nbsp, committingcollective suicide.

Their&nbsp, collective suicide is largely the result of individuals ‘ choices. No country’s government&nbsp, save China ‘s&nbsp, has sought to reduce fertility to&nbsp, far&nbsp, below the population- replacing&nbsp, level, and&nbsp, the fertility- reducing&nbsp, effect of China’s “one child policy” dwindled&nbsp, to insignificance over the 36 years of its implementation. No increase in Chinese births followed&nbsp, its&nbsp, termination&nbsp, in 2015. As the&nbsp, Chinese grew&nbsp, richer, &nbsp, they&nbsp, wanted&nbsp, far&nbsp, fewer children –&nbsp, just&nbsp, as&nbsp, folks in&nbsp, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and Japan&nbsp, had&nbsp, previously.

Collective suicide by&nbsp, far- below- replacement fertility&nbsp, is not easily&nbsp, halted. In order&nbsp, to stabilize&nbsp, the population&nbsp, of a country that has long had such low fertility, its working- age adults&nbsp, must raise an average of two children per woman while providing&nbsp, pensions and&nbsp, medical&nbsp, care for relatively numerous old people. Absent some more efficient way of raising children or supporting the elderly, &nbsp, a&nbsp, heroic&nbsp, future&nbsp, generation&nbsp, of people would have &nbsp, to&nbsp, work more or&nbsp, consume less&nbsp, of their incomes&nbsp, than&nbsp, their&nbsp, now- living&nbsp, forebears, &nbsp, who&nbsp, have proven&nbsp, unwilling to raise two children&nbsp, per woman&nbsp, despite having&nbsp, relatively&nbsp, fewer&nbsp, old people to support.

This collective suicide&nbsp, also&nbsp, will become ever- harder to&nbsp, prevent&nbsp, by immigration. Sub- Saharan Africa, projected to have &nbsp, nearly&nbsp, half the world’s population by the end of this century and a growing majority of&nbsp, it&nbsp, during the 22nd&nbsp, century, &nbsp, is the only prospective source of enough immigrants to alleviate substantially the population decline of the rest of the world&nbsp, at current rates of fertility. However, &nbsp, to absorb&nbsp, sub- Saharan Africans&nbsp, into&nbsp, Asia and Europe&nbsp, as fast as is needed and in the numbers needed&nbsp, seems prohibitively problematic in diverse respects.

At&nbsp, China ‘s&nbsp, present fertility rate, &nbsp, China’s birth cohort&nbsp, will&nbsp, shrink by half every generation. &nbsp, To offset even half that loss with immigrants from sub- Saharan Africa would make China’s population mostly African&nbsp, in&nbsp, less than&nbsp, three generations. It seems absurd that this could occur peacefully and successfully.

Moreover, &nbsp, democracy&nbsp, does&nbsp, not&nbsp, prevent&nbsp, peoples&nbsp, from committing&nbsp, collective suicide by&nbsp, low&nbsp, fertility. Italy, Spain, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have &nbsp, had both&nbsp, democratic governance and&nbsp, far- below- replacement birth rates&nbsp, for decades.

South Korea&nbsp, has &nbsp, the world’s lowest TFR, &nbsp, now&nbsp, reportedly&nbsp, about 0.7, only one- third of the&nbsp, rate needed for population replacement. By contrast, North Korea, &nbsp, no paradigm of democracy, &nbsp, is thought to have a TFR of about 1.8. &nbsp, Even though North Korea’s population is only half as large as South Korea’s, its&nbsp, birth cohort already is&nbsp, larger than South Korea’s, which implies that in&nbsp, 20 years, &nbsp, North Korea&nbsp, will have more&nbsp, military- age&nbsp, people&nbsp, than South Korea. &nbsp, Thereafter, absent change in their relative fertility, North Korea’s military- age population will increasingly outnumber South Korea’s.

Implications for&nbsp, future&nbsp, US military aid&nbsp, and interventions

Since the late 1940s, US military interventions in foreign lands and large- scale foreign military assistance by the US to other states have &nbsp, been&nbsp, most&nbsp, easily sold &nbsp, to US voters when&nbsp, they&nbsp, could plausibly be presented as required by international solidarity in defense of democracy.

Consequently, US proponents of such intervention or assistance have routinely tried to present it&nbsp, as&nbsp, defending&nbsp, or spreading&nbsp, democracy, even when this strained credulity. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations&nbsp, tried&nbsp, to present successive governments of South Vietnam as democratic, both before and after abetting, in 1963, a military coup that assassinated the leader of one such government.

In and after 2003, George W. Bush’s administration committed US forces to remaining in Iraq and creating a democratic government of that country, that failed&nbsp, due to&nbsp, hostility between Shi’ites and Sunnis, as observers including former Secretary of State Albright had&nbsp, publicly warned that it would. Successive US administrations attempted to persuade Americans that an Afghan government that was capable of maintaining its democratic spirit could be and is being created between 2001 and 2017. &nbsp, In 2021, that was shown to be nonsense.

However, to argue that Americans must spend blood or treasure to defend foreign countries with persistently far below the replacement birth rate may in the future increasingly appeal to Americans as tantamount to arguing that America is ideologically obligated to allow its friends to commit collective suicide democratically rather than undemocratically. Such&nbsp, an&nbsp, argument&nbsp, may increasingly fail to pass the laugh test.

Unfortunately, no one has demonstrated how to raise birth rates without imposing more state coercion than Americans would either tolerate at home in the US or suggest to other counties.  Despite many countries having adopted various pro-natalist policies over the past 50 years, none have been successful in raising birth rates much. As a condition of continuing US support or alliance, the US cannot demand that other nations raise their birth rates.

The TFR of the US itself, stable at around 2.1 for two decades after 1990, has fallen to below 1.7 during the past decade. Even at this level below- replacement fertility, if sustained, will tend to weaken the US economically and militarily, &nbsp, unless&nbsp, offset by diversely problematic mass immigration. This troubles not only JD Vance but also many other Americans who ca n’t figure out how to reverse fertility decline in their&nbsp, own country, much less elsewhere.

Furthermore, &nbsp, to re- base arguments for US foreign military assistance or intervention on fear of geopolitical threats, rather than&nbsp, on international democratic solidarity, may&nbsp, become&nbsp, more&nbsp, difficult&nbsp, in a world in which&nbsp, now- threatening&nbsp, countries&nbsp, are &nbsp, in&nbsp, steep&nbsp, demographic decline. Russia&nbsp, and&nbsp, China, now&nbsp, perceived by Americans as the most fearsome&nbsp, foreign powers, are &nbsp, both&nbsp, afflicted bylow birth rates. &nbsp, Fear of these countries, even if warranted now, may&nbsp, seem&nbsp, ever- less- warranted&nbsp, to US voters&nbsp, by mid- century when, absent large increases in fertility, &nbsp, they will be imploding demographically.

A more plausible candidate for the&nbsp, greatest&nbsp, perceived&nbsp, international&nbsp, threat&nbsp, in the&nbsp, mid- and late&nbsp, 21stcentury may be&nbsp, unwanted&nbsp, emigration from demographically exploding and still&nbsp, poor&nbsp, sub- Saharan Africa. Fear of that&nbsp, might&nbsp, be shared by American, Asian and European&nbsp, countries&nbsp, with diverse&nbsp, forms&nbsp, of government, &nbsp, engendering migration- restrictive&nbsp, cooperation&nbsp, that&nbsp, transcends differences of political ideology.

National fertility trends over recent decades suggest that, absent development of&nbsp, effective and&nbsp, acceptable means&nbsp, to&nbsp, control&nbsp, and limit&nbsp, fertility decline, &nbsp, every&nbsp, country outside Africa&nbsp, except Afghanistan, &nbsp, Israel, Samoa and the Solomons&nbsp, will&nbsp, suffer&nbsp, population aging and decline by the end of this century.

However, it’s an ill wind&nbsp, indeed&nbsp, that blows no good&nbsp, at all. &nbsp, The&nbsp, proclivity&nbsp, to&nbsp, pro- democracy&nbsp, war- waging&nbsp, that has survived bloody&nbsp, failure&nbsp, in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan&nbsp, might&nbsp, not survive&nbsp, this&nbsp, depopulation. &nbsp,

In&nbsp, a&nbsp, world&nbsp, in which all non- African&nbsp, peoples&nbsp, are dying, &nbsp, the&nbsp, only good&nbsp, reason&nbsp, for any of&nbsp, them&nbsp, to war&nbsp, with&nbsp, any&nbsp, other&nbsp, would &nbsp, be&nbsp, to&nbsp, reduce&nbsp, non- productive expenditures by conscripting&nbsp, old- age pensioners&nbsp, as front- line infantry&nbsp, –&nbsp, not&nbsp, to defend&nbsp, or spread&nbsp, a&nbsp, form of government. &nbsp, In&nbsp, such a world, Westerners&nbsp, might&nbsp, return to&nbsp, the&nbsp, millennia- old pragmatic&nbsp, wisdom&nbsp, pithily versified byAlexander Pope&nbsp, in 1733:

For forms of government let fools contest;Whate’er is best administer’d is best.

” Ichabod” is a former US diplomat.