Is the US Army’s Black Eagle hypersonic missile a significant advance in a new wave of warfare, or is it still struggling to understand its purpose?
According to the DOD’s most recent annual report, The War Zone reported this month that the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) is still unsure about the lethality and survivability of the US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile due to limited test results.
The weapon, part of the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon ( LRHW) program, is designed to provide the US Army and US Navy, including Zumwalt-class ships and Block V Virginia-class ships.
Despite having the missile launched successfully from Cape Canaveral in December 2024, issues with previous testing, including many build cancellations and equipment failures, have prevented the rocket’s deployment at a time when China and Russia have demonstrated fast weapons in their particular arsenals.
The Office of the Director, Operational Test &, Evaluation ( DOT&, E) says that testing have not provided sufficient data to determine the missile’s operational effectiveness or whether it requires multiple cuts to destroy target, a key concern given the state’s high cost and limited army.
Also, survivability against dynamic, electronic and digital threats remains untested. The US Navy has freely tested the rocket’s weapon, but the effects are still under study.
There is little time left to make adjustments if performance issues arise because the technique is anticipated to be operational by 2027. The US prioritizes using fast weapons to combat China and Russia, but gaps in testing leave Black Eagle’s battle viability a mystery.
The US Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon is a truck-launched missile system designed to counter enemy anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) capabilities. Co-developed with the US Navy, it uses the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB ) and a two-stage booster. It reaches velocity above Mach 5 and has a reported variety of 2, 776 meters.
The second Black Eagle power, assigned to the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, faced several testing failures, delaying first fielding to Fiscal Time 2025.
But, questions remain regarding unsettled costs, technical issues, and reliability, which raise questions about whether the US-China missile race will absolutely change hands.
A July 2024 US Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) report examines key gaps in US hypersonic weapon testing that have delayed fielding, including inadequate infrastructure, high costs, and limited historical data, while digging deeper into why the US is trailing in developing hypersonic weapons.
Flight tests are limited by the length of the distances required and the need for extensive device protection, while testing requires specialized features like wind caves and long-range test websites. Cost estimation and test planning are hampered by a lack of experience, with unsuccessful tests resulting in significant delays.
As a result, the DOD relies on expert opinions over historical data for cost projections, while digital engineering tools remain underutilized.
A January 2025 Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report mentions that the DOD’s FY2025 hypersonic research budget increased by US$ 6.9 billion, reflecting growing urgency, but it also notes that a lack of established programs raises questions about mission requirements and long-term funding, with delays threatening to make the capability gap for upcoming missile warfare.
Why does China develop operational systems while Russia deploys them in Ukraine while the US is lagging in hypersonic development? The answer may be more straightforward than expected —hypersonic weapons are not invincible. Traditional cruise and ballistic missiles offer comparable speed, range and effectiveness, potentially making hypersonics an expensive redundancy.
In a RealClear Defense article this month, Shawn Rostker makes the claim that hypersonic weapons, which are praised for their speed and precision, may be overhyped due to significant technical and strategic shortcomings.
Such challenges include immense thermal stress in flight, communications blackout at hypersonic speeds, highly visible launch signatures, aerodynamic drag while maneuvering, immature scramjet technology and fragile electronic components.
He contends that US defenses, such as Aegis and Patriot PAC-3, can intercept hypersonic weapons moving at Mach 10 or lower during their final descent. However, this assumption hinges on ideal engagement conditions.
Abraham Mahshie discusses the effectiveness of the current missile defenses against hypersonic threats in a January 2022 article for Air &, Space Forces Magazine. While the Aegis Baseline 9C capability, including the SPY-1 radar and SM-6 interceptor, can defend against some hypersonic threats, these systems primarily rely on terminal phase interception, which is less effective.
Additionally, Mahshie says the curvature of the Earth limits radar detection range, providing only brief response windows. He notes that ground-based radars can detect these threats but are often too late for effective interception, necessitating faster, more agile interceptors and enhanced tracking capabilities.
Further, Rostker mentions that while China and Russia allegedly operate their hypersonics within the Mach 10-12 range, Aegis or Patriot would have to intercept them if they had enough drag in flight. He points out that hypersonic weapons may be used over the top for propaganda and marketing despite being a part of the future US military strategy.
In line with Rostker’s reasoning, a January 2023 US Congressional Budget Office ( CBO ) report suggests hypersonic weapons ‘ value may be exaggerated due to their extreme costs, technical challenges and limited operational advantages over existing alternatives.
According to the report, developing and deploying ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads, which have comparable speed, range, and accuracy, costs about one-third more to develop and test these missiles.
Additionally, it is mentioned that unless adversaries develop highly effective long-range interceptors, which they currently lack, hypersonic missiles do not offer significantly more survivability against missile defenses.
Ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads and subsonic cruise missiles are seen by the CBO as viable alternatives that have comparable capabilities at lower costs and with fewer technical difficulties.
With soaring costs, unresolved technical hurdles and credible alternatives, Dark Eagle risks becoming another DOD white elephant. China and Russia continue to develop their hypersonic arsenals, which could make the US question whether or not it is competing in the right arms race.