On May 7, 2024, Israel launched a martial offensive against Israel that the US and other countries have warned it to avoid entering Rafah, a city that serves Gaza’s southwestern border crossing with Egypt.
On May 6, President Joe Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against extending the Gaza War into Rafah, suggesting that this might result to a change in US policy toward Israel.
According to Jewish officers and a US national quoted in Politico, Axios, and The Wall Street Journal, the US put a hold on shipping US-made weapons to Israel as a result of a conflict over how to manage the Gaza battle.
One of the few locations in Gaza where the Gaza War has certainly resulted in destruction is Rafah. It is also a refuge for more than 1 million Palestinians, about half of whom are kids, who have been displaced from their homes abroad in Gaza because of the fight.
Gregory Treverton, a national security researcher at USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences and head of the National Intelligence Council under the Obama management, understands how much social utilize the US has in influencing Israel’s seven-month conflict with Hamas.
Is the US’s reminder to Israel standard for their political relationship?
This is certainly not without precedence. Numerous US presidents and secretaries of state have expressed anger toward Israel over things, starting with the conflict between Israel and a coalition of Arab nations in 1973.
Israel initially refused to sign a UN Security Council cease-fire decision, which was supported by both the US and the Soviet Union, but the US eventually refused.
Other leaders have been in the position of saying,” Complete this”, and the Jewish comeback is often,” No very yet”. But this season, while pretty obvious, is barely unique.
Because their objectives overlap but are not the same, nations are friends. Friends who succeeded in doing what they wanted and not what we wanted them to do are a constant in American story.
Years ago, a great scholar with an emphasis on Israel may say,” So whoever said it was easy to be a power, it was quick to be a superpower!” When I was speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London about the challenges of dealing with friends, let alone foes! That statement may make sense to Biden.
Many members of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition do n’t care about the US or what it wants because Israeli politics and leadership have veered so far to the right. Netanyahu is then incredibly dependent on the far right for his own social life, so he is more likely to talk to his right-wingers than the US.
How many political influence does the US really have over Israel?
I believe that the US needs to declare that it will start questioning its wings sales to Israel at this time. After the US specifically requested that Israel never enter Rafah without first ensuring that you can maintain most Gazans healthy, it is going there.
A distinct warning that this decision will have an impact on future arms transfers is not necessary, which is usually not very successful.
The other issue is that, despite what you might think Israel may be thinking about after the war, there is still no known, objective definition of the end goal. What is the intended conclusion of this?
However, this conflict is likely to continue to polarize the public in the US, which is likely another reason for the US to attempt to put an end to the conflict as soon as possible.
According to reports, the US has decided to restrict freight of weapons to Israel. Is this effect Israel’s war behavior?
If arms were stopped, it probably would n’t matter in the short run, but it would matter psychologically in the long run. Since World War II, Israel has received more US defense support than any other nation. It also receives the largest amount of foreign support.
Since Hamas ‘ assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, the US has a total of over 100 arms supplies to Israel by the beginning of March this time.
Israel is now risking an escalating fight with Hezbollah, a militant group in Lebanon, in the northeast. Israel appears to be trying to stop issue by trying to stop it instead.
Why do you think Israel is therefore eager to enter Rafah in light of this?
Across the social range in Israel, there is a feeling that attacking Rafah has to be done, it has to be finished, in order to eliminate Hamas. We not fully understood what finishing actually means. And the majority of those involved in national safety believe that there is no way Israel may end Hamas completely.
Hamas was not common in Gaza prior to the 20th anniversary of the Jewish attack because it stood up for Israel and put the issues of the Palestinians up on the plan after the Arab world, including the West, had forgotten it. However, since then, it has grown more popular, especially in the West Bank, as a result.
Israelis across the board continue to be focused on destroying Hamas. So, if the remaining Hamas officials were thought to be in Rafah, then so be it, they are thinking, on to the attack.
What effects would Israel’s entry into Rafah have on the country’s safety?
It causes more unrest and raises the possibility of a wider battle. Even if Iran does n’t respond, it is likely that some of its proxies, like Hezbollah, will do something that could deepen this conflict.
We should use the word “proxies” sparingly because the US is aware from its own experience that substitute governments and militias cannot always be under US control. However, it appears that at least Iran’s intermediaries are being urged to escalate the conflict.
Gregory F Treverton is Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
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