With a fierce new navy vessel poised to proclaim its extensive regional states, China is upping its match in the South China Sea.
China is expanding its maritime capabilities, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reporting this month. A new navy vessel is being built in the style of a sophisticated warship with state-of-the-art security systems.
SCMP says that the vessel, spotted at Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard, is intended for implementation in the controversial East and South China Seas, particularly in areas disputed with the Philippines. According to the report, China’s new ship growth occurs as these parts ‘ growing territorial disputes escalate.
SCMP says that the ship, based on the Type 052D guided-missile warship, has been modified for navy jobs, seen in the treatment of the horizontal build system and installation of a 76mm primary weapons. It notes that the fleet, equipped with Model 382 air search transponders, boasts enhanced heat monitoring capabilities.
The same statement says that China’s fresh navy vessel, with a movement selection of 6, 000 to 7, 000 lots, fills a proper distance and is comparable to Japan’s larger navy vessels. The ship has a range of over 6, 000 nautical yards, which enables extended guards in the South China Sea without numerous supplies, according to the report.
The massive new vessel may be a follow-on design of its Zhaotou-class maritime law enforcement ( MLE ) vessels.
The school is the largest fleet of its kind in the world, according to Andrew Erickson and other authors in a 2019 Naval War College Review post.
These enormous cutters, each measuring 165 meters in length and exceeding ten thousand lots, are a testament to China’s manufacturing skills and its proper emphasis on MLE, according to Erickson and others.
They say that the Zhaotou-class, part of China’s following water pressure centered on the consolidating China Coast Guard (CCG), has been designed to operate anywhere worldwide with maximum energy.
Regarding the tools, Erickson and people mention that the Zhaotou can be equipped with a 76mm key weapon and has a helicopter board.
But, they note that despite the Zhaotou’s remarkable size and features, the logic behind its development remains speculative, suggesting that it was built in response to Japan’s implementation of its Shikishima-class cutter.
The Zhaotou MLE deployment in the South China Sea may provide some insight into how China intends to use a vessel that is even bigger than that.
Collin Koh mentions that China has been using its formidable Zhaotou MLE vessels to assert its territorial claims and rule in the South China Sea in an article from May 2023 Proceedings.
Koh notes that these vessels, exemplified by the Haijing 3901 recently deployed off the Philippines, are a significant part of China’s maritime strategy, blurring the lines between military and nonmilitary actions.
He notes that China’s strategy, often referred to as “gray zone” aggression, involves coercive tactics that stop short of prompting a conventional military response.
Koh points out that Southeast Asian nations actively resist Beijing’s maritime coercion by deploying their encroaching naval and coast guard assets despite being outmatched by China’s naval power. He claims that their opposition is essential because the region must maintain relations with China while upholding their national interests.
Koh adds that the US and the rest of the world support these smaller nations by raising awareness of the maritime domain and providing capacity-building assistance.
He points out, however, that the disparity between maritime force levels persists and calls for greater regional cooperation and indigenous shipbuilding capabilities to strengthen Southeast Asian countries ‘ ability to defend themselves from China’s “gray zone” tactics.
China’s introduction of its new coastguard vessel further highlights the disparity between China and other nations claiming territory in the South China Sea, particularly the Philippines.
The CCG has larger, more effective vessels than the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), which gives it an advantage in terms of sea endurance and operational abilities, especially in troubled areas like the Second Thomas Shoal.
These Chinese vessels are designed to operate continuously for an extended period of time, giving China a strategic advantage in enforcing its maritime claims and controlling disputed waters.
The PCG’s smaller fleet, in contrast, struggles with limited endurance and frequent resupply and maintenance, which prevent it from maintaining its position in the area.
Manila’s difficulties in enforcing its territorial claims in the South China Sea are made worse by China’s blocking and harassing its resupply missions to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, its underfunded military and coast guard, and US ambiguity regarding supporting Philippine territorial claims under the two parties ‘ mutual defense treaty.
In order to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the South China Sea, the Philippines has launched an “assertive transparency” campaign in spite of those difficulties. The intent of the strategy is to draw attention to China’s assertive actions at sea, galvanize domestic and international support, and impose reputational costs on China through visual proof and media attention.
To further its assertive transparency strategy, the Philippines uses various resources, including deploying PCG and PN vessels with embedded journalists to document Chinese harassment, enhancing maritime patrols, and improving its maritime domain awareness through technological advancements.
Additionally, the Philippines makes use of international support by negotiating with allies for joint patrols, military support, and diplomatic support, which are essential to the success of the strategy.
In a March 2024 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank, Josiah Gottfried mentions how the PCG has undergone significant changes in recent years, strengthening its maritime security capabilities in the face of growing regional tensions and territorial disputes.
Following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with China, which glaringly exposed its limitations, the historically underfunded and underequipped PCG began its modernization.
He points out that the PCG’s fleet has more than doubled, its maritime domain awareness has increased, and its workforce has increased from 4, 000 to 30, 000 thanks to increased domestic priority and international assistance from Japan.
Gottfried makes note of Japan’s significant support for the PCG, which includes the US’s support for its National Coast Watch System (NCWS), as well as its support for 12 large ships and radar stations.
He says other global partners like France, Germany, Australia, Canada and the EU have also provided valuable support. Gottfried adds that the PCG’s budget has quadrupled, reflecting its enhanced role in Philippine maritime security.
He points out, however, that it is still difficult for the PCG to maintain a consistent presence in the South China Sea.