In the contested South China Sea, where foe claimants are competing to build up features to get a military edge, Chinese scientists have developed a novel method to overcome the challenges of constructing on delicate coral sand.
Scientists from China’s Ocean University have discovered a new excavation technique that overcomes the limitations of soft coral sand for artificial islands, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP ).
SCMP notes that China’s three largest artificial islands, Meiji ( Mischief Reef ), Yongshu ( Fiery Cross Reef ) and Zhubi ( Subi Reef ) create a triangular defense position against US bases in the Philippines.
According to the report, China has used a unique technique to extract coral from the reef’s core, pulverize it, and pile it up to create elevated synthetic land to house different facilities, turning seven reefs in the Spratlys into unnatural islands.
According to SCMP, Chen Xuguang, a member of the Chinese scientific team, suggested digging deep beneath each isle to boost China’s position within the region without provoking its neighbors.
According to the SCMP report, China’s military and government have mandated that development activities may not interfere with normal operations or the balance of existing floor structures due to the delicate underlying coral gravel layer.
Chen and his coworkers have developed an executive method that creates a rock-heavy underwater mass by introducing a fluid of fine plaster particles into the earth through horizontal pipes, fills the gaps between the coral sand grains, and solidifies into a rock-hard size once the plaster sets.
SCMP points out that down-to-earth laboratory tests demonstrated that tunnels could be excavated in this artificial substrate without the presence of external seawater or secondary disasters like ground subsidence.
The US and the Philippines have been dealing with an ongoing issue caused by China’s reclamation of the South China Sea, which has prompted both countries to look for a long-term solution.
Weston Konishi explains in a January 2018 article for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs that the US’s primary approach to South China’s land reclamation activities is to carry out Freedom of Navigation Operations ( FONOPS). Still, Konishi says it is unclear if this strategy will practically impact China’s land reclamation activities.
Further, in a March 2023 Associated Press ( AP ) article, Jim Gomez mentions that the Philippines has launched a strategy of publicizing China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. The Philippines has accused China of destroying coral reefs in the disputed Scarborough Shoal, causing the former’s fishermen’s livelihood, in the most recent round of allegations this month.
Gomez claims that by pressuring China to admit or refute its actions in the South China Sea, the Philippines hopes to expose its “grey zone” activities and cost the country money by doing so.
But, as with US FONOPS, the Philippines ‘ publicity strategy against China may have little practical impact on China’s land reclamation efforts.
David Hutt, in an April 2024 Deutsche Welle article, says that an increasing number of European US allies, such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, have deployed warships to the South China Sea in recent years.
Hutt claims that these nations have an unreliable position regarding the Philippines ‘ claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea. He adds that if a conflict breaks out in that strategic body of water, it is doubtful that they have the military resources to support the Philippines.
The Philippines has been quickly modernizing its military on a tight budget and diversifying its defense partnerships to include Japan and Australia, but the United States ‘ resolve is still the key factor in the Philippines ‘ defense strategy in the South China Sea.
US officials ‘ assurances to the Philippines of an “ironclad commitment” and increased naval exercises and shows of force in the Philippines ‘ exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) may not be very favorable for the Philippines.
The disparity in US military support to key allies and partners is one indication. Former Philippine senator Panfilo Lacson made a point about the significant differences between US aid to Taiwan and the Philippines in April 2024.
Lacson claims that US$ 500 million is just “alms” to comfort the Philippines because it could become a potential collateral target if the US invades Taiwan and uses it as a staging area. He points out that Taiwan has received only$ 8 billion in military aid from the US, which is a paltry sum.
Quinn Marschik, a journalist for The National Interest, claims that China is unlikely to stop the South China Sea’s freedom of navigation because it is the main beneficiary, and that disputed features in this month’s article have little strategic value for the US and are militarily indefensible.
He claims that the US has benefited from the Philippines ‘ willingness to be a staging area in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, increasing the risk of escalation, rather than easing the tensions between China and the Philippines.
Marschik continues, adding that the US’s ability to risk nuclear conflict with China is uncertain regarding the features and islands in the South China Sea. He adds that implausible assurances about the Philippines should be replaced by a firm commitment to defend its main islands in the event of an attack.
The US has continued to be ambiguous about its commitment to defend the Philippines in the South China Sea, much to the US’s advantage and perhaps to the chagrin of Philippine experts.
Melissa Loja and Romel Bagares point out in a two-part Cambridge Core article this month that the US’s 1975 and 1979 interpretations of its Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT ) with the Philippines dispel any legal obligation to defend the latter in an armed conflict over the Spratly Islands. They state that those legal interpretations were not changed in US government statements in 2024.
Loja and Bagares claim that the US is careful to keep its prohibition on an “armed attack” against Philippine armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft, including the Coast Guard, when they are present in the country’s EEZ, but not when they are on the disputed Spratly Islands or their respective territorial waters.
They point out that the US has condemned China but did not use force in response to harassment and attacks on Philippine resupply missions in response to the beleaguered outpost, even though the Philippines ‘ decrepit warship BRP Sierra Madre grounded at Second Thomas Shoal is covered by the 1951 MDT.
While they say the 1951 MDT covers Philippine installations, forces and vessels on Reed Bank, the 1975 US interpretation excludes the disputed Scarborough Shoal from treaty obligations.
For Loja and Bagares, it’s important to ask whether the US is willing to honor its treaty obligations with the Philippines when American soldiers are battling over rudimentary features scattered across the South China Sea.