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The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense ( MND ) has consistently made records of the Chinese Navy and Air Force’s activities available to the world for a number of years, making it possible to understand the military situation on the Taiwan Strait.
However, most observers have focused primarily on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force ( PLAAF ) maneuvers around Taiwan because the MND provides illustrative diagrams of the People’s Liberation Army air activities and aircraft types. Consequently, the maneuvers of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy ( PLAN ) have been relatively underexplored and, in some cases, even overlooked.
Major adjustments to China’s marine operations this year, which aim to further undermine Taiwan’s maritime defense capabilities, are revealed by a comprehensive examination of PLAN activities around Taiwan.
Key observations include the daily deployment of PLAN vessels, the activity of PLAN shipborne anti-submarine helicopters, and the expansion of PLAN operations in the Yonaguni Channel ( the waters between Su’ao, Yilan, and Yonaguni Island ).
Second, the normal range of PLAN vessels has increased, considerably depleting the fight readiness of Taiwan’s military. Due to this wave, Taiwan has had to wait the maintenance schedule for its fleet, which will unavoidably shorten the life span of these aging combat ships. The tendency in the number of PLAN arteries operating around Taiwan is illustrated by the following figure, which was derived from press releases by MND.
This review establishes two analytical classes: the implementation of 5-9 arteries and the implementation of 10 or more vessels, specifically to assess the extent of PLAN’s influence on Taiwan. Reviewing the daily number of PLAN vessels around Taiwan, in 2023, out of 365 days with available data, there were 168 days ( 46 % ) with 5-9 vessels deployed and 24 days ( 6.6 % ) with 10 or more vessels.
In 2024, out of 237 days with available data ( as of August 25 ), there were 177 days ( 74.7 % ) with 5-9 vessels deployed and 26 days ( 11 % ) with 10 or more vessels. A comparative analysis of the regular vehicle operations by the PLAN around Taiwan is provided in the following desk.
The Taiwan Navy presently has four ships and 22 battleships, totaling 26 big battle vessels. However, only about 20 of them, a liberal estimate, are available for deployment at any given time according to maintenance and upgrades.
In recent years, the PLAN has significantly approached Taiwan’s located waters. The number of Chinese naval vessels deployed about equates to the number of PLAN arteries in order to avoid PLAN incursions in Taiwan’s territorial waterways. When 5-9 PLAN warships are present, Taiwan would build 25-50 % of its main combat vessels in answer.
The frequency of these things has increased from 46 % of days last year to 74.7 % this year. More critically, when over 10 PLAN vessels are active, Taiwan would deploy over half of its major combat vessels, with such occurrences nearly doubling from 6.6 % of days last year to 11 % this year.
The current circumstance has impacted the scheduled maintenance plan and shortened the floor fleet’s service life. As of July 2023, 14 ( 53.85 % ) of Taiwan’s combat vessels had , missed scheduled maintenance. More disruptions to maintenance schedules are possible due to the increased speed of PLAN actions this year.
Next, the PLAN and its anti-submarine planes have increased their operations in areas critical to the Taiwan Navy’s ability to maintain its power during a war. This year, the number of PLAN anti-submarine actions in Taiwan’s northeast waters has increased significantly. The trends in these System actions are illustrated in the figure below.
The writers have drawn a dark range from Taiwan’s northernmost point at Eluanbi to Yami Island, the northern stage of the Philippines, to examine the functional areas. The limit between Taiwan’s northeast and southern waters is marked by this line. Also, the Yonaguni Channel divides the eastern lakes of Taiwan from the northern lakes.
This year, there has been a spike in the speed of these aircraft activities in Taiwan’s northeast waters. In 2023, these helicopters operated on 90 days, with 33 days ( 36.7 % ) in the southwestern waters and 59 days ( 65.6 % ) in the eastern waters. In 2024, up until August 25, there were 64 days of activity, with 17 days ( 26.6 % ) in the southwestern waters and 58 days (90.6 % ) in the eastern waters of Taiwan.
The increased exercise of these aircraft in Taiwan’s northeast waters has some implications. Initially, their presence suggests that PLAN vessels are near, as these planes take off from such arteries. Second, these operations likely involve practicing or executing anti-submarine warfare ( ASW), targeting underwater activities by Taiwan, the United States, or Japan. Third, the aircraft may be working with PLAN boats to provide administrative teaching, enhancing their ASW abilities in these waters.
The significant threat that Taiwan’s naval power protection zone faces during wartime is the result of the aircraft activities in Taiwan’s northeast waters. Taiwan’s main marine foundations are located at Zuoying in Kaohsiung, Magong in Penghu, and Su’ao in Yilan, with two of these foundations directly in the path of a possible Army abuse.
As a result, the Taiwan Navy would travel its ships to the northeast lakes of Taiwan, rather than remaining in the Taiwan Strait, during war. These anti-submarine aircraft operations in Taiwan’s war protection zone appear to be aimed at preparing the field.
These activities severely threaten Taiwan’s ability to maintain its naval fight capabilities by locating and engaging boats from Taiwan or other nations, or by working with PLAN boats to attack Chinese naval vessels.
Third, the occurrence of PLAN vessels passing through the Yonaguni Channel has considerably increased, good according to Taiwan’s prospective new submarine base in Su’ao, Yilan. As of August 25th, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported a noticeable increase in the number of PLAN destroyers and frigates transiting these lakes. According to the information provided by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, the following table provides data on the actions of PLAN ships and battleships.
PLAN vessels have been transiting the Yonaguni Channel since 2021, with 18 registered routes as of August 25 this year, a double of the nine routes that were all of 2023.
PLAN ships ‘ increased activity in the Yonaguni Channel this year is most likely a result of Taiwan’s recently completed indigenous-built ships and the possibility of building a new underwater base at Su’ao, Yilan.
Recently, Taiwan’s even underwater center was at Zuoying in Kaohsiung, immediately facing China. Given the need for a foundation on Taiwan’s eastern coast for military force protection, the timeframe is important: Taiwan began the construction of the new underwater in , November 2020, launched her in , September 2023, and reports from , March 2024 , suggested plans for a new underwater base in Su’ao, Yilan.
As previously mentioned, Taiwan’s eastern waters are crucial for preserving its naval forces during wartime, with submarine warfare underwater serving as a crucial area of engagement for the PLAN and Taiwan Navy. Therefore, the potential submarine base at Su’ao, Yilan, is strategically vital for Taiwan’s defense.
This strategic significance likely accounts for the PLAN’s increased activities in the Yonaguni Channel, which aim to prepare the groundwork for upcoming operations against Taiwan’s submarines.
In conclusion, the PLAN’s operational adjustments this year carry significant military implications. They point to China’s continued efforts to strengthen its military stance against Taiwan and suggest that the PLAN is acting strategically in response to Taiwan’s naval strategies and recent developments.
Based on the above trends, two suggestions are proposed. First, while emphasizing asymmetric warfare for decisive battles, Taiwan’s conventional military assets should receive more attention.
A lack of significant naval vessels could cause China to occupy Taiwan’s waters and impede maritime transportation to its offshore islands, given China’s attrition strategy that involves jurisdictional issues. This could resemble China’s blockade of Philippine resupply missions at the Second Thomas Shoal, which can only be effectively fought with anti-ship missiles before a war starts.
Second, in response to China’s ASW activities, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States should enhance their coordination in these critical waters. Formal military alliances or sensitive information exchanges are not required for this coordination, but it could take the form of informal collaboration.
For instance, several nations could combine naval training in two distinct but adjacent designated waters or rotate the same area. Such measures would put more pressure on the PLAN’s operations and even cause them to fail to meet its ASW goals.
Cheng-kun Ma ( [email protected]. Additionally, tw is the director of the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA ), and a professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies ( ROC). Tristan Tang ([email protected] ) is a research associate at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA ).