The second part of a three-part set on China’s military decisions is this one.
For decades, the United States has tried to work with China on strategic and security-related issues. However, these efforts have mostly been unsuccessful.
Beijing has long resisted US pressure to sign arms control contracts; for example, it recently turned down Washington’s offer to create a multilateral arm power agreement between the US and Russia. Even worse, China has consistently chosen not to participate in proper nuclear negotiations.
The United States has recently managed its aspirations, acknowledging that advancement in this area is never already in the cards, while still remaining committed to bringing China into the arms control collapse. Instead, by suggesting” guardrails” that expand on earlier agreements made in the 2000s and 2010s, the United States has prioritized proposal of China in crisis dodging and crisis management.
The plan is that, in addition to being significant in and of itself, advancements in this area could pave the way for future arms power, as was the case with the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.
Although this drive has not yet materialized, it seems to be a simpler one because, in theory, neither China nor the United States want their relationship to deteriorate unduly and both parties are aware of the potential for escalation in their harsh and intensifying competition.
However, it is unclear how far China and the United States may advance because each has a different perspective on what crises are, how they can be managed, what issue avoidance and crisis management entail, and how to use them.
In order to address these problems, this three-part report examines primary sources, particularly Chinese strategic and doctrinal documents, and draws on the conclusions of Track 2( unofficial ) initiatives, specifically those of the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum.
The first part of today looks at Beijing’s perspectives on both military and general problems, giving background information on how China approaches them and defines important terms and concepts.
Therefore, in Part 2, Chinese thinking about what to do in the event of a military crisis is examined. The report concludes in Part 3 by talking about the repercussions of Taiwanese perspectives for crisis management and dodging with the United States.
The study’s main argument is that China has a fundamentally different perspective on and approach to martial crises than the US, making it unlikely that US-China will make any progress in crisis management and avoidance, particularly given the current state of security.
However, this judgment shouldn’t deter the United States from pursuing cooperation as long as it is aware of what can be accomplished and adjusts its priorities and goals accordingly.
A brand-new but well-established subject
China has long been interested in learning about military crises, but in recent years, that interest has grown significantly, and the Chinese national security community then places a lot of emphasis on it. This area examines the development of China’s viewpoints and how it currently perceives military crisis.
China has always been concerned about crisis, especially military ones. Pan Fei’s Military Crisis of American Imperialism, published in 1951, was the first work of award. Despite this, academic Lin Yi emphasizes that” organized analysis” on this subject took some time to develop in China and has steadily increased since the early 1990s.
Chinese works on problems and increase control through 2005 continued to be” under – theorized and also under growth ,” according to a 2008 research from the RAND Corporation. An earlier research from 2006 by Lonnie Henley had reached the same conclusion.
A century later, two studies that looked at more recent Foreign works came to the same conclusions. According to a 2016 study by Daniel Hartnett and Alison Kaufman,” Army opinions on these problems are evolving ,” but” some critical possibilities” remain.
Burgess Laird makes the case that” the essential components of the treatment of intensification have changed very little over the ages” in a 2017 study. He also notes that his review demonstrates that Chinese opinions” continue to be characterized by the same or similar errors and pauses ,” as noted in the 2008 RAND study’s authors.
These two research undoubtedly demonstrate how important problems and increase management had become in Chinese writings and informal dialogues. Importantly, after being deemed unworthy of discourse by the Chinese side, the Track 1.5 US – China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics Dialogue and later Track 2 activities began to center on this topic in the middle to later 2010s.
Both the number and the quality of Chinese writings have continued to rise. A whole book titled” Prevention and Handling of Military Crisis” is devoted to problems and increase in the 2020 issue of Scientific Military Strategy. The two reasons for this emphasis are as follows:
- ” National security has gradually returned to its pre-crisis condition.”
- ” An increasing trend in martial crisis has also been observed.”
In other words, the argument is that China needs to” carefully study” the issue due to the deterioration of the security setting. It would be risky to refrain from doing so because crises might worsen and spark war, which would have an impact on China’s growth as a whole.
Beijing places the greatest importance on this stage. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy, for instance, emphasizes that the start of a battle had have” a big impact and intervention on the peaceful growth of our country, and even eliminate the hard-won achievements of transformation and beginning up.”
There is little doubt that Beijing is mostly worried about the possibility of a problems between China and the United States, whether it be over Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, or the East or South China Sea, based on Chinese writings and debate in informal discussions.
For instance, at a recent Track 2 dialogue, Chinese respondents claimed that the US had launched” multidimensional assault” intended to” suppress China at all levels” and added that this increased the likelihood of an emerging US-China crisis.
The same conclusion is reached by the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, which states that” intensified strategic competition between main power is the primary cause of numerous military catastrophes.”
With Chinese academics like Cao Qun penning lengthy essays accusing the United States of playing the” Taiwan card ,” the Taiwan issue is by far the focus of Beijing.
However, previous conversations have suggested that China is becoming more worried about problems developing with a few different nations, particularly India.
existing opinions
How does China currently perceive and approach problems, particularly those involving the war? The 2020 Science of Military Strategy covers important terms and concepts in detail in its book on the subject. It emphasizes that such catastrophes” are the crossroads of war and peace” and defines a military problems as” a unique phenomenon and type of battle in international relations.”
The white paper also cites the Taiwanese publication” Military Language ,” which from 2011 defines a martial crisis as” a dangerous condition that may result in armed conflict or conflict between countries or political teams.”
It further contends that three factors contribute to military crisis:
- First, it is necessary to threaten” the big corporate passions” of the parties involved.
- The moment for decision-making, answer, and communication is essential, but there is doubt about the course of events.
- Finally, there is a” fairly significant risk” that the crisis will spiral out of control and lead to war.
In other words, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy defines defense crisis as unavoidable, extremely dangerous, and posing a real threat of increase, as well as the possibility of war.
Foreign academics concur with this description. Military crisis, according to Lin Yi, are” crises and states of emergency that occur between particular countries or political parties, threaten one or both parties, and may lead to conflict or military fight.”
A military crisis is” a special social phenomenon between peace and war ,” according to Xu Zhou, who quotes the Modern Chinese Dictionary when he says that a crisis” is [ a critical moment of serious difficulties.”
Beyond straightforward concepts, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy distinguishes between the” major types” of military problems and determines what those” major features” are.
It distinguishes between the following key kinds when describing them:
- Military crises that are both traditional and nontraditional, with the traditional being brought on by territorial / maritime, resource, ethnic / religious, or geopolitical disputes or conflicts and the unconventional by terrorism, pirate attacks, proliferation, etc.
- both unintentional and intentional crisis,
- Low, medium, and high-intensity crises, with the first two being referred to as” quasi-crises” and the last being” question-wars ,”
- abrupt and steady problems, as well as
- those involving the major power, additional nations, or organizations.
The report makes the case that military problems frequently combine by describing the key characteristics:
- Prospect and inevitable,
- finality and progression,
- Stability and conflict, as well as
- options and risks.
Overall, the notion is that military crises are” struggles ,” distinct from but not entirely unrelated to the normal course of events. Importantly, as was already mentioned, the 2020 Science of Military Strategy believes that crisis are extremely defining the status quo.
Military crises are therefore the second stage of a range of turmoil, with full war being the final stage, if the new normal is now one that is prone to crisis or, worse, an environment in crisis. Therefore, it is implied that China now more than ever anticipates military crises and should positively prepare for them.
Then, Part 2: China’s main goal in a problems is to prevail.
David Santoro, PhD, is the president and CEO of the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. His areas of expertise include proper punishment, disarmament, and the geography of Asia and Europe.
The National Bureau of Asian Research, a Seattle-based non-profit organization, published this condensed version of chapter 1 of the novel text China’s Military Decision – Makiing in Times of Crisis and Conflict, which was edited by Roy D. Kamphausen. Republished with your type consent. Get the complete book for nothing.