In recent aerial battles over Kashmir, India lost a number of combat aircraft, including the priceless French-made Rafale fighters, the popular-made Su-30 MKI and MiG-29, and an unmanned aerial vehicle ( UAV ), which, if true, would challenge perceptions about India’s airpower superiority over Pakistan.
Although the human element on either side clearly played a part in the results, the skirmishes may have also demonstrated the superiority of China’s warrior and missile systems over its Western and Russian counterparts.  ,
Pakistan’s advantage in terms of weapon and fighter plane may have been its key advantage over India on the defensive front. The Chinese-made PL-15E beyond visual range ( BVR ) missile, whose wreckage was recovered in Punjab, India, marking its combat debut, was one of them.
The Chinese PL-15 beyond-visual-range ( BVR ) missile, according to a report from Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI), performs similarly to the US AIM-120 AMRAAM and surpasses the Russian R-77.
According to Bronk, the PL-15 has a small active electronically scanned array ( AESA ) radar and a dual-pulse solid rocket motor. Although a South China Morning Post (SCMP ) article from September 2021 states that the export version ( PL-15E ) is limited to 145 kilometers, he estimates the range of the PL-15 to be 200 kilometers.
In addition, Douglas Barrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS) notes in a September 2022 article that the PL-15’s solid-propellant propulsion achieves faster burnout speeds than the Meteor missile used aboard India’s Rafales.
He acknowledges, however, that the Meteor’s ramjet giver maintains sustained thrust throughout its flight and increases mid-course energy. The missile’s benefits is amplified by its launch platform’s capabilities.
According to Bronk, the Chinese-made J-10C fighter’s capability includes an actively electronically scanned array ( AESA ) radar, a cutting-edge infrared search and track ( IRS T ) system, electronic support measures ( ESM), a radar warning receiver ( RWR ), a missile approach warning suite ( MAWS), and datalinks, giving it a better chance of surviving in a situational awareness match with its contemporary competitors.
Bronk claims that the J-10C can compete with Western single-engine fighters like the F-16 and Gripen while also presenting a smaller radar, visual, and infrared ( IR ) signature than Russia’s Su-27 variants.
He points out that the J-10C and potential variants could be the most significant near-peer underwater pacing threat for European states in 2020 with AESA radar, long-range PL-15 missiles, a contemporary cockpit, and helmet-mounted displays.
While the J-10C’s ability expands, its American foes may be displaying age-related signs. Significant shortcomings are identified by a January 2025 report from the French Institute of International Relations ( IFRI ) as the Rafale’s lack of radar stealth and dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses ( SEAD ) capabilities.
Older French Air Force officers are cited in the report as saying combat operations against stealth combatants during joint exercises are “very difficult to win” with the Rafale’s present device suite.
The Rafale may still be useful in the near-to-medium word, but its limitations may make it obsolete in high-intensity alliance operations, which are dominated by fifth-generation aircraft.
In addition, Rajorshi Roy mentions that India’s Su-30 MKI ships had a small preparation rating of only 60 % at the time of his reading in an April 2023 content in the peer-reviewed MGIMO Review of International Relations journal, partly due to issues surrounding the supply of Russian spare parts for the plane type.
Pakistan’s fleet of airborne early warning and control ( AEW&, C ) aircraft may have had a significant impact on the operation of Indian fighters.
In a 1945 article this month, Sebastien Roblin claimed that Pakistan’s Erieye-equipped Saab 2000 airborne early warning and control ( AEW&, C ) aircraft can track and detect hostile aircraft at altitudes up to 450 kilometers, including those that are attempting to avoid radar.
Roblin points out that these platforms can arrange with pleasant fighters operating with their radars out, increasing stealth and survival. He adds that the Chinese PL-15 weapon, reportedly used by Pakistan in new skirmishes, is designed to obtain mid-course advice via datalink from AEW&, C platforms like the Saab 2000, enabling it to land on targets without the developing fighter having to reveal them.
Roblin points out that this connected approach prevents an aircraft from receiving early warning until its onboard AESA seeker activates for end guidance.
In an August 2022 Center for Air Power Studies ( CAPS) article, Swaim Singh mentions that India has only three A-50E I units and the same number of domestically developed Netra Mk 1 planes, but that it is lagging behind on AEW&C capability to monitor its vast airspace.
These functional flaws even contribute to the overall strategic perspective, where Pakistan’s flying victories over India might be its strongest sales pitch to China for its fighter jets so far.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ( SIPRI ) lists China as the fourth-largest arms exporter in 2024, but it struggles to sell its fighter jets overseas, with customers confined to countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zambia, Sudan, and North Korea.
But, Pakistan’s performance in the most recent brawls with India may boost China’s warrior selling ball in the Middle East, according to Paul Iddon in an article for Forbes. Countries like Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia may be potential clients, according to Paul Iddon.
For sales could help China’s “fighter politics” campaign, with fighter aircraft’s stringent professional, maintenance, and training requirements fostering stronger strategic ties between China and its clients while also acting as a bulwark for Beijing.
In their most recent conflict over Kashmir, India and Pakistan may have incorporated the strategic lessons from the 2019 Balakot airstrikes into their responses.
In a South Asian Voices ( SAV ) article from February 2024, Muhammad Faisal and Huma Rehman claim that Pakistan’s threshold for risk-acceptance has increased as a result of the Balakot airstrikes, making using military force a viable response.
Faisal and Rehman argue that the Pakistani government and military are unable to take action against territorial sovereignty violations, and that clear diplomatic communication during a conventional, non-nuclear crisis and after similar retaliatory strikes is essential to de-escalation.
Deependra Hooda mentions in a February 2022 Stimson Center article that the Balakot airstrikes were a clear illustration of a space within the sub-conventional conflict boundary wherein India can use airpower to target while having escalation control.
According to those observations, the most recent India-Pakistani conflict may reflect an evolution of a dynamic that was developed during the Kargil War in 1999 and refined during the Balakot airstrikes, with both nuclear-armed parties finding room for non-nuclear escalation without appealing to either for a nuclear response.
Pakistan’s recent victories against India’s fighters and at least one drone may have changed South Asia’s airpower balance and contributed to China’s rise as a true global force in aerial warfare and fighter sales.