China is constructing more powerful marine boats, sending menacing warnings that an invasion might cross the Taiwan Strait.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the three modular Shuiqiao-class landing barges are currently undergoing sea trials near Nanshan Island in accordance with the People’s Liberation Army-Navy ( PLAN ) colors.
They have jack-up legs and ramps, and they were built to work with civilian ferries, significantly expanding the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) logistics reach in a conflict situation over Taiwan.
Each compact barge segment’s capabilities are special. One has a 400-foot spear bridge and four 105-foot jack-up feet and is about 360 feet longer. On each side of the second category, which measures approximately 440 feet, are two drop-down loading stairs. The largest next sector, which has eight 180-foot jack-up arms, is about 600 feet longer.
According to the WSJ report, the boats you help even the heaviest armored cars in China. That makes it possible for the Army to increase the number of potential landing areas, making Taiwan have to spread its limited causes across a wider entrance. Taiwan’s ability to defend all at once is limited, despite the presence of numerous beaches that are carefully monitored and fortified.
A next set of these programs is currently being built, according to the WSJ record. Yet if full-scale war capacity is still a goal, this action suggests that China is accelerating efforts to comply with President Xi Jinping’s demand that the PLA be able to engage Taiwan by 2027.
These boats improve existing abilities as enablers, but they are neither game-changers nor significant property on their own.
In a March 2025 report from the China Maritime Studies Institute ( CMSI), J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart assert that the Shuiqiao-class barges significantly increase the PLA’s over-the-shore logistics capability. Without fixed interface network, they claim the program makes it possible to move large amounts of cargo and supplies between dense urban areas.
A second three-barge established, according to Dahm and Shugart, can hold everything from lighting vehicles to 50-ton tank. They point out, however, that single-lane, directional traffic can only pass through the thin 6-meter-wide roads.
The barges would be useful but possibly bottlenecked during high-intensity landings because it would take 40 to 60 minutes to offload a heavy combined arms battalion, which is roughly 150 vehicles.
These throughput limitations highlight China’s greater difficulties with sealift capacity. In a CMSI report from April 2022, Dennis Blasko points out that the PLA Ground Force ( PLAGF ) maintains only six amphibious combined arms brigades despite modernization.
Blasko claims that this only accounts for 7 % of the PLAGF’s overall brigade force and lacks the lift capacity to move an estimated 30 000 soldiers and more than 2 400 vehicles.
Blasko adds that PLA exercises often go beyond the battalion level and that the majority of sea movement drills involve roll-on/roll-off ferries or restricted Program support from the civilian sector. Additionally, Blasko makes note of the fact that China’s marine brigades are geographically dispersed, which may need days or even weeks to put them together close to embarkation points.
However, some experts claim that China has presently overcome significant transportation challenges. In a War on the Rocks content from October 2022, Thomas Shugart writes that China’s sealift ability is no longer a pressing issue. He contends that China’s use of human roll-on/roll-off ferries and car carriers significantly improves its ability to conduct military operations.
According to Shugart, China’s human shipping currently has more than 2.4 million tons of transportation capacity, far exceeding the marine fleet of PLAN. He claims that these vessels, which were built for quick loading and unloading, could provide an original flood with 60, 000 troops and eight big brigades.
Taiwan has 14 beaches that are suitable for marine crossings, according to Ian Easton’s report from July 2021 to Project 2049. Additionally, Bloomberg notes that these sites are well-defended and surrounded by military installations and difficult ground.
Additionally, Bloomberg mentions that barriers may restrict exposure. Even so, according to a report from Newsweek in December 2023, there may be close to two dozen sustainable landing sites, according to more cautious defense analysts.
However, environmental factors also affect functional viability. In a 1945 content titled” Shiqiao barges” by Andrew Erickson, the ship’s range of possibilities is limited by the slick wind and bad beach problems. According to Evans, the systems have only been seen in quiet water, which suggests that simply favorable conditions might be used for them.
Even if the barges bring the cars to sea, they do not move them inland, according to Erickson. Any military advantage could be negated by ill located landing sites or poor road access.
In addition, harsh opposition would oppose the PLA’s ability to establish and maintain a foothold. In a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs content, Ralph Bentley claims that Taiwan’s defence strategy focuses on preventing China from gaining a foothold. According to Bennett, Taiwan has extensive coastal defenses, including marine mines, seaside engineering, cellular anti-ship missiles, and long-range ordnance.
These instruments are intended to intimidate Chinese marine forces before they can retreat, according to Bentley. He points out that this method focuses on destroying fragile transportation boats as they cross or approach the Strait.
More than just military preparation, China’s boat system indicates that it is proper. It embodies a high-risk, high-reward thinking and social resolve. In an article for the Institute for National Strategic Studies ( INSS) in October 2024, Joel Wuthnow claims that a failed invasion would likely cause an ongoing period of instability.
Wuthnow suggests that Beijing may resort to a long-term siege, attacks, anti-satellite hits, or even nuclear demonstrations in the event of a Chinese military battle.  ,
Although it’s unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) will disband in such a scenario, Wuthnow writes that a failed invasion of Taiwan could prompt military reorganization and purges. From this perspective, the Shuiqiao ships might be more important as indicators of eagerness than actual invasion systems.
This month’s writing for The Interpreter, Vincent Thus, who writes for The Interpreter, makes a similar claim to 1949, when Nationalist leader Fu Zuoyi happily surrendered Beijing to prevent its damage.
Although the circumstances differ, But contends that China may be trying to persuade Taiwan’s leaders and citizens that unification is expected by combining military posing with cyberattacks, economic stress, and the inherent threat embodied by its aquatic buildup.
The boats are more important for their emotional impact in this mathematics than their capabilities.