A new RAND statement emphasizes China’s growing tactical maneuvers and risk tolerance, which are both extreme steps in a fight against US dominance in the space industry.
The People’s Liberation Army ( PLA )’s perspectives on space-based escalation over the past two decades are examined in the RAND report, which examines open-source Chinese defense literature.
It asserts that China’s leaders anticipate violent potential strategies, including the expanding military of space, from the US as a dominating but declining power.
According to the report, the PLA’s strategy includes both coercion and deterrence, a military combination that seeks to force adversaries to follow their political goals or face a damaging space-based war.
The statement outlines the PLA’s developing views on area- based escalation. These viewpoints reflect a growing wish to openly influence the rapidly changing geopolitical environment. First, the PLA’s tactical thinking was generally theoretical, focusing on discord prevention.
RAND mentions that the PLA switched its place operations strategy in 2013 and put a focus on defense vs. military escalation in order to achieve social goals.
It outlines a four- move increase rope involving demonstrating area power, space martial exercises, disposition of space forces and space strikes. The goal of the plan is to entice competitors into obedience while avoiding full-fledged issue.
According to the report, the PLA’s perception of the US as a declining power probable to resort to military has a significant impact on the move toward higher threat tolerance in space. Additionally, it asserts that the PLA’s growing risk tolerance in place has been influenced by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s control.  ,
RAND advises that US officials may anticipate rapid decisions made in the face of communication gaps and refrain from requesting the PLA’s assistance in space crises. It advises the US Space Force ( USSF ) to get ready for hostile PLA operations in space, even during wartime.
China may make its space-power known by conducting low-intensity tests of superior space technology, usually during periods of peace or when there is a crisis, to demonstrate its ability and solve without engaging in conflict.
Asia Times reported that China’s small spacecraft spent 276 days in trajectory after its August 2022 release, and that in May 2023, it landed on an unknown airport in the Gobi Desert.
China’s spacecraft may have made an appearance at the Lop Nur nuclear test site, which has previously been used for spaceplane recovery, or at the Dingxin Test and Training Base, where the PLA-Air Force ( PLA-AF ) regularly conducts large-scale exercises.
The situation was hailed as a prominent achievement in the country’s space program by Chinese state media.
LeoLabs, a personal space services firm, reported the same month that China’s little spaceplane had carried out numerous maneuvers and docking missions while traveling in space with a different smaller object.
The Financial Times (FT ) reported in October 2021 that China launched a hypersonic missile with nuclear capability that circled the globe before heading its way.
The check, which was not publicly disclosed and apparently caught US intelligence off guard, demonstrated China’s major advancement in fast technology, according to FT. Studies indicated the weapon missed its mark by “only” 38 km.
According to the FT statement, hypersonic glide automobiles can evade US missile defense systems because of their flexibility and lower path.
The hypersonic missile test came at a time when conflicts between the US and China grew and China’s military operations were still continued close to Taiwan.
China portrayed the hypersonic missile test as a daily place car test for aircraft reuse, despite the US’s concerns about China’s growing defense capabilities, which it claims contribute to regional and global volatility.
China can likewise carefully position its area forces for possible offensive operations. This strategy includes launching and maneuvering storage assets to make people feel as though they are in immediate danger and urging adversaries to reevaluate their actions.
In a February 2023 Breaking Defense content, Sam Bresnick points out that China is now the second-largest area power behind the US thanks to its accelerated growth in the space industry, which included a significant increase in satellite launch over the past five years.
Bresnick information that the PLA has integrated these spacecraft into its military philosophy, enhancing transportation, security, communication and missile warning devices capabilities.
He adds that China’s focus on satellite resilience – through proliferation, orbital diversification and rapid launch ability – has established a robust space architecture, potentially more resilient than the US’s.
He also makes the point that China’s ability to launch space launches ( TRSL ) quickly surpasses that of the US, which must be done in order for the US to maintain its strategic advantage in space.
China’s space escalation strategy has the potential to launch sporadic, targeted strikes on crucial space assets like command and control nodes. By demonstrating the ability and willingness to escalate, such actions would coerce adversaries like the US into abandoning their goals.
In a June 2024 article for the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI), David Chen mentions that China’s Shenlong spaceplane is capable of extended orbital presence and quick redeployment, signaling strategic intent by maneuvering and deploying payloads like rendezvous and proximity operations ( RPO)-capable microsatellites.
Chen points out that China can perform offensive maneuvers against adversaries with the aid of its RPO missions from 2020 to 2023, which will enable it to disable or capture enemy satellites.
He adds that there is another crucial aspect of cyber-electronic warfare, with China developing systems to intercept and hack enemy communications and GPS satellites. China is a formidable adversary in space warfare, according to Chen as he goes on to say that these efforts, combined with the potential deployment of directed energy weapons, pose a number of threats to space-based command and control nodes.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank asserts in its Space Threat Assessment 2024 that China considers its space and counter-space capabilities to be essential to its national security strategy when evaluating China’s expanding space capabilities.
It points out that China’s desire to use counter-space systems to deter and counter foreign involvement in regional conflicts, such as the potential for a war with the US in the Taiwan Strait, is the driving force behind this emphasis.