China is signing foreign military base access agreements to expand the reach of its armed forces around the world, a move that counteracts America’s long-range deterrence plan for Taiwan and threatens India with encirclement.
RAND released a report this month outlining how China is negotiating base access agreements to expand its security footprint and allow People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) and People’s Armed Police ( PAP ) to conduct operations abroad.
RAND identifies specific locations including Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, the Solomon Islands, the UAE and Vanuatu. According to the review, China currently has a logistics center in Djibouti and a Tajikistan paramilitary base.
Apart from those places, Newsweek reported in March 2024 that China is likewise seeking basic accessibility in Cuba, Pakistan, Tanzania, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
Although these bases help peace operations like non-combatant evacuations and intelligence meeting, the Rand report claims that their prospective use during a wartime conflict is unsure. Through 2030, the PLA’s main kinetic task will likely be to protect sea lines of communication ( SLOC).
By 2030, China’s military writings suggest a lack of programs or the ability to use foreign bases for offensive operations against US forces, according to the Rand review. According to the statement, China prioritizes the defense of coastal trade roads and the defense against potential US barricades.
The statement also makes a point of highlighting the major difficulties the PLA faces in creating and maintaining these bases, including the social dependability of the host countries, operational assistance issues, and base security. It raises questions about the efficiency and endurance of the PLA’s strategy in the face of war because it notes that the PLA relies heavily on recruited human resources for shipping.
The PLA’s capability for higher-end combat operations from these locations is constrained despite efforts to create a network of corporate emplacements and logistics support foundations, including in professional ports.
According to the Rand report, increased PLA naval and air defense activities in international bases might show a shift to an aggressive stance, but administrative and political issues make it improbable that PLA bases will pose a major threat to US defense interests over the next ten years.
However, this examination may overlook the fast development of Chinese strategic planning and technology.
In a June 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Brandon Weichert points out that China has the largest fleet of aircraft carriers worldwide, underscoring its significant shipbuilding advantage in comparison to the US.
Weichert claims that the People’s Liberation Army-N will use these resources to assert local supremacy by preventing US troops from entering the Indo-Pacific.
He claims that the PLA- N views its carriers as floating demand facilities in any eventual conflict, such as an invasion or Taiwan blockade. He also contends that the US must conform to the arrival of new geographical waters and Chinese naval installations in the Northern Hemisphere.
By leveraging the risk of a clear attack on the US island, China may seek starting exposure in the Western Hemisphere to challenge the US’s prolonged punishment in a Taiwan issue.
Robert Ellis cites base access in Cuba in a 2023 article for the Peruvian Army Center for Strategic Studies as evidence that China could launch special operations, retaliate against the US military, and attack the US mainland to sever key defense supply chains in a conflict scenario.
In addition, Gordon Chang warns in a Gatestone Institute article from June 2023 that China might launch long-range missiles against Cuba to attack US Navy installations in Florida, obstruct US vessels ‘ movements, and shoot down planes over the southeast of the country.
India worries that China will use its economic leverage to expand its lone overseas military base in Djibouti by expanding its base there. This circumstance would put an end to India’s rule over the Indian Ocean and stoke encirclement fears.
Although China’s base in Djibouti can support its naval operations in the Indian Ocean, it is located at the end of fragile supply lines, according to Isaac Kardon in a February 2023 Foreign Policy at Brookings briefing.
Kardon contends that China’s Djibouti facility is isolated and only effective because it does n’t cooperate with other Indian Ocean Chinese military installations. Kardon points out that China’s dual-use commercial facilities at Gwadar and Hambantota have still functioned as significant nodes for its naval operations.
In regards to Gwadar, Kardon and other authors mention it in a report from the China Maritime Studies Institute in August 2020, citing its location, military significance, and Chinese port operator.
According to Kardon and others, some PLA circles consider that Chinese base access to Gwadar to be as good as new, quoting a PLA official who said,” The food is already on the plate, we’ll eat it whenever we want,”
In line with the South China Morning Post’s (SCMP )’s (SCMP ) report from July 2023 that Hambantota will most likely be China’s next military base in the Indian Ocean, pointing out that China has direct control of the facility and represents its single largest port investment.
In terms of military support, Gwadar and Hambantota can back a more pervasive Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could ultimately endanger India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.
The Bay of Bengal’s deep waters offer better cover than the crowded waters of the Arabian Sea, according to Asia Times, who reported this month that India may be planning to convert it into a base for its nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN).
India’s SSBNs would patrol the Bay of Bengal from a massive submarine base in Rambilli, with the area being protected by surface assets like aircraft carriers and destroyers. Such a plan would allow India to launch launch-bombs ( SLBMs) at Pakistan and China without being detected by nuclear-tipped submarines.
However, nuclear tensions between China and India are most likely to be the result of their mutually advantageous penetrations of one another’s bastions using conventional weapons. In that scenario, Chinese warships operating out of Gwadar and Hambantota may monitor the movements of India’s SSBNs.
India is also considering expanding its presence in the South China Sea, where China intends to establish a base for its SSBNs, in line with India’s intentions in the Bay of Bengal.