In early December, China and Vietnam convened their first-ever” 3 3 strategic dialogue” —a mechanism unprecedented in both nations ‘ diplomacy.
Built on the three columns of defence, politics and public safety, the discourse was held at the vice-ministerial amount just before the , 16th , meeting , of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation.
In a significantly liquid global geostrategic landscape, the two neighbors ‘ shared concerns are vehemently tangled in regional and resource issues in the disputed Spratly and Paracel Island stores.
Vietnam is known to become concerned that , Trump’s tax war , may change focus from China to itself amid debate it often serves as a shipping site for what are truly Chinese-made products. Hanoi is also concerned about China’s growing confidence in the South China Sea.
China, for its part, is attempting to stop South China Sea disputes from becoming too much of a command and is aiming to proactively mitigate any prospective US exploitation of the scenario.
Contrary to popular belief that the new 3 3 speech represents Vietnam’s commitment to China, experienced observers see the process as a rational response to overlapping interests rather than a structured change in Vietnam’s international policy.
Vietnam analyst Carl Thayer, for one, has aptly , described , it as a “natural results” rather than a signal of Vietnam shifting into China’s circle.
Although the new 3 3 speech obviously aims to maintain diplomatic relations, the reality on the ground indicates that the South China Sea disputes will continue to be a significant area of diplomatic conflict that is unlikely to be resolved or tremendously cooled by the system.
For instance, on October 2, Vietnam , protested , a Chinese invasion on Vietnamese fishing near the Paracel Islands on September 29, which apparently left them severely injured. In a solid incident, Vietnam’s foreign ministry accused Chinese law officers of , looting , Asian catches and products.
China denied the claims, claiming the sailors illegally entered Taiwanese waters and that its functions were “professional and restricted” and caused no , accidents.
Significantly, this cooked political change occurred just weeks after To Lam, Vietnam’s recently installed Communist Party general minister,  , visited , China amid significant hype in August.
A bubbling geopolitical cauldron surrounds the South China Sea. China and the Philippines have recently been at odds with one another over the disputed Second Thomas Shoal and other contentious topics.  ,
Chinese attacks on Southeast Asian fishermen represent a subdued form of coercion, with limited escalation potential as they involve civilian, not military, actors.
China’s actions against Vietnamese fishing vessels are a direct result of its effort to stifle Vietnam to maintain a neutral foreign policy by balancing party affiliations with inter-party affiliations with the Communist Party of Vietnam. Although this approach has the intention to stifle US and Vietnamese relations, it has no direct impact on the wider conflicts.
The incidents are neither recent nor isolated. Since 2009, China has routinely , looted,  , rammed,  , sunk, and , fired flares , at Vietnamese fishing vessels, often to signal displeasure with Vietnam’s deepening ties with the US.
For instance, after the historic visit of Nguyen Phu Trong to the White House—the first by a Communist Party of Vietnam general secretary, China , sank , a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands. Similarly, the October attack followed General Secretary To Lam ‘s , meeting , with US President Biden on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.  ,
Among other things, these incidents also underscore China’s unease over Vietnam’s engagement with the US.  , The new 3 3 mechanism may thus indicate a reconciliatory approach on Vietnam’s part to placate and reassure China that its US relations will not come to Beijing’s detriment.
Vietnam’s diplomatic maneuvers have quietly fortified its position in the South China Sea. An Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative ( AMTI ) report , revealed that Vietnam’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands expanded by 2, 360 acres as of May 2024—a dramatic increase compared to its total expansion of 329 acres three years prior.
Despite the naval power disparity, Vietnam’s actions have not sparked significant Chinese retaliation. That’s because they are unrelated to the US-China conflict, as opposed to the Philippines ‘ recent actions involving contentious issues.
Indeed, Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” —a neutral, multi-dimensional foreign policy—allows it to deftly balance relations with China and other global powers, including the US.
Hanoi’s” ThreeNo’s” policy, expanded to” FourNo’s” in 2019, underscores its commitment to non-alignment and peaceful dispute resolution. Rooted in Cold War lessons, Vietnam continues to , diversify , its relations, adhering strictly to its multi-directional foreign policy.
Looking forward, China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea might lead to further conflicts with Vietnamese fishing vessels. However, such events are unlikely to cause a significant change or escalation in Vietnam’s position on the issues or its wider relationship with China.
Although Vietnam’s strategic choices will depend on how much of China’s influence will be affected, its policies should remain anchored in its neutral and pragmatic framework.
Thus, the newly introduced 3 3 dialogue mechanism will likely only contribute to a capparison of the two parties ‘ disputes over the South China Sea, while their respective views on who owns and controls what in the maritime area will remain unchangeable.
Dr Rahul Mishra is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a senior research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand. He can be reached at , rahul. [email protected]. Follow him on X at @rahulmishr_
Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He can be reached at , harshi55_is [email protected]. in , Follow him on X at @harshitp_47