The Philippines and the United States ‘ annual Balikatan joint military exercises this year ( April 22 through May 10 ) broke new ground. Thus did China’s answer to it. The South China Sea and Taiwan Strait spots were demonstrated by the practice areas and the weapons deployed. Beijing’s rebellion amid the group’s show of force is exposed by a rise in Chinese vessel presence in Manila’s eastern exclusive economic zone and another harsh maritime incident over a disputed reef.
The display of strength and the response to it heightened tensions in the turbulent waters and posed concerns about the drill’s warning price. The parties are allowing more hazard while reducing the scope for politics, according to the symbolism and messages.
expanded and developed display of supporters ‘ power
The 39th Balikatan training was billed as the “most powerful, most ambitious and most complicated” however. It expanded on improvements made in more new drills, which had turned into a field testing facility for new defence ideas and arms.
In Cagayan, one of the Philippines ‘ northern provinces opposite Taiwan, US-made Patriot weapons were amphibiously inserted by land and sea in 2022.
In Zambales, a southern province facing the West Philippine Sea, live-fire demonstrations of Patriot and Avenger weapons took place last year. For the first time, a sinking exercise ( SINKEX ) was also conducted with a decommissioned corvette as a mock target hit by volleys from land, air, and sea platforms. The occasion was likewise held off Zambales, 235 km from Scarborough Shoal, a contested have between Manila and Beijing.
This time, it was the change of the Typhon floor- based weapon, with a range of 1600 kilometers, to appear in a mutual military exercise preceding Balikatan. Patriot missile missiles were likewise deployed for the first time at Clark, a former US airport in northern Luzon.
It’s interesting to watch whether these weapons will eventually be prepositioned in agreed locations under the Philippino-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ( EDCA ). The Mod missiles have been stationed in unknown locations for a long time following the training, which has fueled speculation that they are now stationed in the nation. The number of EDCA foundations increased from five to nine next year, adding three new locations in southern Palawan and northern Luzon.
Will China react the same way it did when South Korea approved the installation of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD ) missiles on its soil if they ever get fixed in these locations? If so, Manila’s waning relationships with its big cousin and largest business partner perhaps more crumble. Beijing condemned the weapon deployment. Wu Qian, a spokesperson for the PRC Defence Ministry, stated that the region was “heard a lot of risk of war” and that “intermediate-range missiles are proper and offensive weapons with a powerful Cold War colour.”
New Balikatan rounds have sharpened the additional defense and multi-domain orientation. Island security and conquering, air and missile protection, as well as security and information operations were included in this year’s iteration. The Philippine Coast Guard, an organization that is leading the charge against China in challenging circumstances, participated for the first time.
In Palawan, a crucial state facing the South China Sea, US HIMARS missiles were even fired.
In the state of Ilocos Norte, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s official residence, a SINKEX was held, which is also in northeastern Luzon. Despite claims that the incident was accidental, a Chinese-made original naval tanker became the target.
Most notably, for the first time, sea activities went beyond the government’s 12 navigational- mile regional seas. France, which hopes to provide Manila with boats, dispatched a ship to visit their Filipino and American peers, who sailed from the Sulu Sea to the South China Sea. Paris’s entrance was its first. Fourteen states, including brother South China Sea littoral states Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, even sent spectators.
China: angry and unaffected
Manila’s extraordinary movements were met by Beijing’s strong measures. Near Spanish military installations in the South China Sea, Chinese government and army vessels were spotted. Three Chinese sea study vessels were among them when they were discovered in the Second Thomas Shoal, a new collision between the two companions. Another was seen off Catanduanes and Samar, manner off in the country’s south facing the Pacific Ocean.
Four Chinese PLA Navy vessels tipped off the allied fleet of four ships, two from the Philippines, one from America, and one from France, who were conducting international maritime drills in the South China Sea.
While Balikatan was afoot, a fresh event happened in Scarborough Shoal. Three Chin Coast Guard ships rammed and used water cannons to harm two Asian state arteries. That incident followed a March March incident in which two Chinese coast guard ships blew up a Philippine human vessel while also being impacted by high-pressure water blasting.
The assumption that Balikatan would urge China to behave politely and restrain from acting assertively sprang up, especially given the presence of foreign fleets. The most recent sea event was denounced by a number of nations. But beyond flouting international law and social costs, China’s rebellion made a strong statement: The upgraded exercising no longer deters Beijing, nor does Manila’s clarity travel in the contested water.
Will this cause the alliance to adjust its response? Despite suffering injuries to sailors and property damage, Chinese actions continue to fall short of the definition of an “armed attack” required to stoke the much-detested US pledges of ironclad commitment to its junior ally. China may be encouraged by the Scarborough Shoal water-blasting scandal. More untoward instances, in turn, may erode trust in the alliance’s ability to push back beyond rhetorical denunciations.
In order to ward off China, the Philippines has deepened defense relations with the US and other partners. This includes creating a more expansive and evolved Balikatan. A failure to obtain satisfactory outcomes may necessitate a new analysis. This may serve as a catalyst for China’s desire to lessen Manila’s strong ties with its former colonist and long-standing ally and to obliterate non-regional powers from the intractable sea dispute.
Yet, close calls and all, disputants still tolerate further risk. With its vigorous coverage of Chinese activities in tense situations and its involvement in coordinated activities with allies and partners, Manila continues to stand strong. No anticipated high-level discussion with Beijing has been sparked by diplomatic protests.
The first defense chiefs to meet on the sidelines of the this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore since 2022, marked a stark contrast. As the US approaches elections in the late summer, it is one of a number of high-level official contacts to try to bolster ties between the two rivals.
Last April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of State Janet Yellen made quick trips to China. Blinken’s trip coincided with the early days of Balikatan.
The South China Sea is only one of the many contentious thorny issues that divide the two biggest powers, and it might not even be the most pressing one. Beijing, on the other hand, is not backtracking and exerts pressure on its smaller neighbor despite having a major ally nearby.
If China’s response to this year’s Balikatan shows the limits of deterrence, the South China Sea may be in for more turbulence.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, a research fellow at Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, is the president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies.