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The US and Japanese overseas and defence ministers met in Tokyo last month of July to declare they would increase bilateral security assistance as Beijing looked on furiously.
The US government announced that it would improve its military control post in Japan to a combined force headquarters, improving connectivity between the two supporters ‘ militaries. A , shared statement , strongly criticized China over a wide variety of policies.
In response, the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) Ministry of Foreign Affairs , said,  ,” We call on the US and Japan to immediately stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, stop creating confrontation, ]and ] stop triggering a new Cold War”.
This is yet another example of the PRC’s long-term inability to tame its main Asian rival. In profound ways, China is n’t getting the Japan it wants, largely because of Beijing’s own counterproductive behavior.
What does the Chinese authorities want Japan to get?
- Second, Beijing wants Tokyo, along with all other institutions, to refrain from criticizing China or its laws.
- Next, the PRC wants the global community to acquire Japan continually unworthy of regional administration because of Japan’s crimes during the 20th , millennium.
- Third, Beijing wants Tokyo to accept all Chinese says that it is the owner of the disputed country, including those involving Japan and Taiwan as well.
- Third, the Chinese government wants a Japan that is neither physically strong nor aligned with the US, leaving China as the region’s uncontested strategic great power.
- China wants Japan to provide high-tech and experience to China, thereby enabling it to advance up the value-added ladder and later become a global leader in crucial emerging systems, as stated in Beijing’s ambitious blueprint,” Made in China 2025.”
In each of these conditions, but, Tokyo is moving in the opposite direction of China’s choices.
Until lately, Tokyo was somewhat careful about calling out China. The US-Japan mutual declaration in late July, however, contained copious , accusations. China, it said,” seeks to restructure the global order for its own profit at the cost of others”, uses “political, financial, and military coercion”, and “represents the greatest geopolitical challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”.
The declaration mentions China’s “escalatory behaviour” around Japan’s southern islands, the “rapid” and non-transparent growth of China’s nuclear weapons products, “unlawful maritime claims” and “provocative activities” in the South China Sea, harmful harassment by PRC vessels and aircraft, threatening behavior toward Taiwan and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
It also criticizes Chinese domestic policies, including those that “disclose Hong Kong’s freedom and rights as well as the PRC’s human rights issues, including those in Xinjiang and Tibet.”
Despite PRC politics that denigrates Japan, Chinese leadership is exceedingly welcome , in the region. Japan is typically rehabilitated in the eyes of the international community despite the fact that many Chinese and Koreans harbor grievances.
PRC officers continue to , talk , about Japan needing to “gain the confidence of its Eastern relatives”, but the neighbors have moved on. In a 2024 , survey , of wealthy attitudes in South Asian nations conducted by Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, respondents named Japan the “most trusted” big country.
Notwithstanding escalating Chinese pressure since 2012, Japan has refused to acknowledge China’s claims to ownership of the Senkaku Islands ( called Diaoyu by Beijing ) as legitimate, insisting the issue is settled.
In recent years, Tokyo has become more vocal in its criticism of Chinese military intimidation, despite the fact that Japan has never rebuffed Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.
Tokyo , supports , the 2016 ruling by the intergovernmental Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea.
The US-Japan military alliance is still strong and growing. Japan is putting more of its military to the test, and it is loosing the restrictions on using force that were put in place after World War II. Both trends are fundamentally unfavorable to the PRC.
The Chinese government has publicly criticised every significant step as Japan slowly and gradually re-militarizes over the past few decades.
However, this did not stop the Japanese government from accelerating its re-militarization over the past two years, which saw the government designating a long-range strike capability, expand defense spending from 1 % to 2 % of the country’s GDP, operate small aircraft carriers, lift the export ban, and appoint a new unified command for the three branches of the Japanese military.
Instead of reliably supplying China with advanced technology, Japan supports economic , de-risking. In particular, Tokyo is , cooperating , with Washington’s campaign to restrict the transfer of advanced semiconductors to China.
All of this is occurring primarily as a result of Beijing’s aggressive actions, with additions from Russia and North Korea.
Japanese , think , China’s military buildup is excessive and worrisome. China’s burgeoning military capabilities and , intensifying , threats toward Taiwan seemingly increase the prospect of Beijing seizing control of the island, which would position the PRC to control sea lanes vital to Japan’s well-being.
Xi’s decision to build a complex of military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea beginning in 2013 jolted the region, including , Japan, into viewing Chinese foreign policy more pessimistically.
Beijing has been able to persuade Japan’s citizens that China is threatening to annex its own territory. Since 2012, China has increased the number of government vessels sailing close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, overreacting with the Japanese government’s decision to buy the islands from a Japanese family. The PRC releases occasional hints in , official media , and even from , Xi himself , that China rather than Japan is the rightful owner of the Ryukyu Islands including Okinawa.
Finally, Russia’s attempt to annex all of Ukraine starting in 2022 made Japan feel much less secure, mostly because of the , sense , that the Russian invasion makes a Chinese war of conquest in Asia more likely. The Russian war effort is supported by Beijing, but Beijing’s diplomatic and financial support does nothing to quell Japan’s concern.
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met just before the US-Japan meeting in July. PRC official media paraphrased Wang , telling , Kamikawa that” the China-Japan relationship is at a critical juncture where it would reverse if failing to advance”, the , same thing , Wang , said , over a year ago. However, if there ever was such a” critical juncture,” Japan is now well past it.
Denny Roy ( royd@eastwestcenter .org ) is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.