Pakistan has recently launched its first Hangor-class submarine in a tit-for-tat Indian Ocean arms race, while India has tested a new-generation anti-submarine warfare ( ASW) weapon to target such vessels. China is prominently in the middle.
Pakistan’s fresh submarine, the solution of a job signed with China Shipbuilding &, Offshore International Company Ltd ( CSOC ) during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad in April 2015, will have state- of- the- arts weapons and sensors to employ goals at standoff runs, Naval News reported.
Hangor- group submarines are an trade version of the People’s Liberation Army- Navy’s ( PLA- N ) Type 039B Yuan- class submarines. In April 2015, Pakistan signed a contract for eight submarines from China, with four of them being built in Pakistan’s Karachi Shipyard &, Engineering Works Ltd ( KS&, EW), and the other four being produced in China. The first underwater was launched in 2024, despite the initial plan to deliver eight vessels between 2022 and 2028.
Details about the boats ‘ systems or particular weapon systems have not been provided by the Pakistani Navy. In terms of measurements, they will be 76 feet long and remove 2, 800 lots, making them significantly shorter but heavier than the initial S26 underwater, an export version of the Type 039B initially intended for Thailand.
When Germany resisted using the MTU 396 diesel engines for use on the canoes, Thailand abandoned its plans to purchase ships from China. Pakistan’s fresh ships perhaps use China’s CHD620 website.
Even though the boat’s weaponry systems have not yet been formally proved, Pakistan may acquire a major strong strike capability if the Hangor- class submarines were equipped with Babur- 3 submarine- launched cruise missiles ( SLC M).
Naval Technology, a long-time rival, did not forget that India’s Defense Research and Development Organization ( DRDO ) had successfully tested its Supersonic Missile-Assisted Release of Torpedo ( SMART ) system, despite having been outdone by it.
The Bay of Bengal island off the coast of Odisha, where the mobile ground launcher test was conducted, was Abdul Kalam Island. The test reportedly validated symmetric separation, ejection and velocity control mechanisms.
A lightweight torpedo serves as the payload for the medium-range, canister-based ASW missile system SMART. It can launch from ships or a coastal battery and has a range of 643 kilometers. The submarine detection and identification system is connected to a two-way data link through an airborne or ship-based data link.
Due to the disparity between India’s and Pakistan’s naval forces, it is necessary for Pakistan to make preparations for an asymmetric war at sea. India has two aircraft carriers, 12 destroyers, 12 frigates, 16 conventional attack submarines ( SSK) and two nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN), placing Pakistan at a significant numerical disadvantage.
That makes Pakistan reliant on asymmetric naval strategies and encourages the development of a sea-based nuclear arsenal to counteract India’s advantages.
Abhijnan Rej points out in a May 2018 article for the Observer Research Foundation that Pakistan’s strategy is centered on using tactical nuclear weapons to counteract India’s conventional military superiority.
Rej points out that the Babur- 3 SLCM is a survivable sea-based component of Pakistan’s “full spectrum deterrence” concept, which combines low- yield tactical nuclear weapons with strategic nuclear weapons like the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle ( MIRV ) capable Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile ( MRBM ).
The strategy aims to blunt India’s” Cold Start” doctrine, which seeks to seize Pakistani territory and forestall a possible Indian counterforce strike aimed at destroying Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan’s new Chinese- designed submarines may indicate an emerging” threshold alliance” between China and Pakistan, with the Indian Ocean as its focal point.
Sameer Lalwani notes that threshold alliances are less formal than traditional treaty alliances but more advanced than traditional defense cooperation agreements in a March 2023 United States Institute of Peace report.
According to Lalwani, threshold alliances are distinguished by significant investments in dormant military capabilities that can be used in the future following a crucial political decision.
Such a relationship, he says, often entails capability aggregation, burden- sharing, geographic access and power projection. He points out that threshold alliances have the potential to have the same impact as nuclear latency by allowing for, deter, or use leverage in crisis negotiations.
Lalwani points out that the military partnership between China and Pakistan has grown significantly over the past ten years, with China becoming Pakistan’s top supplier of conventional weapons, strategic platforms, and advanced offensive strike capabilities.
He mentions that China’s efforts to establish military installations overseas and strengthen its strategic cooperation with Pakistan are significant factors in China’s efforts to intensify its strategic cooperation with Pakistan, India and China border disputes in the Himalayas, and the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
Lalwani mentions that China and Pakistan have stepped up the pace and complexity of their military exercises, noting that the two countries ‘ increasingly compatible arms supply chains and networked communications systems have enabled them to combine their defense capabilities.
Significantly, that may be beneficial for combined China- Pakistan submarine operations in the Indian Ocean. In contrast to the Western Pacific, which the US and Japanese navies heavily patrol, the maritime region is more attractive for PLA-N operations in January 2023, according to Asia Times.
China’s naval base in Djibouti is aiding its regional operations, with Gwadar in Pakistan a potential base for Chinese submarine operations. In addition, it has increasingly found hydrographic and surveillance ships and underwater drones in the Indian Ocean.
China appears to be mapping the underwater environment and passageways for upcoming submarine operations based on these activities.
Additionally, China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean threatens India’s sphere of influence and could compromise India’s Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ ), as witnessed by China’s activities vis- à- vis rival claimants in the South China Sea. In the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, Indian naval assets and ships may be subject to surveillance as a result of these Indian Ocean deployments.
Given setbacks in its submarine program and a shortage of ASW-capable ships, India’s SMART missile test may represent a significant step in closing the gap in its ASW capabilities.
K G Ramkumar and Prakash Panneerselvam point out in a November 2023 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs that the Indian Navy’s conventional submarine fleet is aging, making it necessary to put a new emphasis on acquisition.
Ramkumar and Panneerselvam point out that India’s 30-year submarine-building plan has experienced delays, particularly with Projects 75 and 75I, which have had an impact on the ability to purchase new boats quickly. They also point out that despite having the capacity to create SSBNs with high indigenous content, India cannot design conventional submarines alone.
In addition, according to Naval News ‘ report from June 2023, India is working on 16 ASW Shallow Water Craft corvettes, but the project has experienced delays due to supply chain issues, particularly when importing engines from an unspecified European nation because some subcomponents have export-related issues.
Naval News also points out that delays in getting the imported low-frequency variable-depth towed array sonar and low-frequency variable-depth hull mounted sonar from European suppliers could render the ships unfit for their ASW missions, which were encountered when building the bigger Kamorta-class ASW corvettes.