China’s latest ships of special-purpose marine boats is rewriting the rulebook for a possible Taiwan war, raising the stakes in the cross-strait stalemate with striking new tactics and high-stakes challenges for the self-governing planet’s defenders.
This quarter, Naval News reported that China is fast constructing a ship of special-purpose boats, possible for marine attack on Taiwan. At Guangzhou Shipyard, according to the review, five of these vessels were observed with unusually long path bridges that propelled tanks and other large equipment straight onto Chinese roads.
These boats are intended to travel along coastal highways or hard surfaces beyond beaches, potentially making recently inadequate landing sites practical, according to Naval News. They are reminiscent of the Mulberry Harbors used during the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II. Building of the boats, which began with a design in 2022, has accelerated late, raising issues about China’s purposes.
Given their size and design, which considerably exceed human needs, Naval News suggests that these vessels were specifically designed for military use. The report says the barges ‘ ability to dock with China’s large fleet of roll-on/roll-off ( RoRo ) ferries, built to carry military vehicles, further underscores their potential role in a Taiwan invasion.
This growth, according to the report, makes Taiwan’s defense strategy more difficult, allowing China to choose new landing locations and bypass beaches and ports that are sparsely defended.
In October 2023, Asia Times mentioned that China’s marine sealift features face important restrictions, complicating a possible invasion of Taiwan. As of December 2024, China had four Type 075 landing helicopter assault ( LHA ) ships and nine landing platform docks ( LPD), with more Type 76 LHAs on the horizon.
While the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s ( PLAN ) amphibious assault ships could carry 21, 000 troops – the equivalent of one heavy brigade during its initial landing, where Taiwan may have as many as 1, 200 tanks waiting – the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has the capacity to put only half that number ashore.
But, using RoRo boats to assist an amphibious assault could boost China’s sealift power.
Following death strikes on Taiwan’s management, China may have to place 300, 000-400, 000 soldiers ashore to capture the island immediately. But, if those decapitation strikes fail, China may have to take 2 million soldiers, including police and military forces, across the Taiwan Strait to assure a three-to-one or five-to-one quantitative superiority against defending Chinese troops.
In the 2024 book” Foreign Marine Warfare: Hopes for a Cross-Strait Invasion”, Ian Easton highlights the importance of Taiwan’s ships in China’s plans for a potential war.
According to Easton, the PLA believes that Taiwan’s ports must be in place to support large-scale operations because they can support heavy equipment, reinforcements, and logistics that beachheads and airports cannot. Without capturing and utilizing these facilities, he claims PLA forces run the risk of being attacked and overwhelmed by Taiwanese counterattacks.
Conversely, Easton says Taiwan’s defense strategy prioritizes transforming its ports into fortified strongholds, incorporating interlocking firing networks, underground bunkers and coastal artillery.
He mentions Taiwan’s defensive strategies, including using anti-airborne and anti-tank missiles, mining waterways, and possibly sabotaging infrastructure to prevent access. He points out that PLA strategies recommend integrated port-seizure operations that include commando raids, air assaults, and amphibious landings to reduce the risk of damage to port facilities and ensure their use.
Additionally, Easton claims that Taichung is the most likely port target in a July 2021 Project 2049 report because of its extensive modern amenities, relatively light urban settings, and easy access to nearby beaches and river deltas.
However, he says Taichung would likely be well-defended. He also mentions that Kaohsiung, Zuoying, Taipei and Anping are likely targets because of their strategic importance, although their dense urban environments and surrounding defensive positions present challenges.
Easton mentions that Keelung, Suao, Hualien and Makung could be targeted but are lesser-priority targets due to unfavorable terrain and strong defenses.
While Easton lists 14 suitable landing spots for a Chinese invasion, including five in the south and nine in the north, according to a report from Newsweek in December 2023 that cautious Taiwanese defense planners had identified more than two dozen sites.
In such a case, Taiwan and the US face a defensive quandary. In a March 2022 article for the Global Taiwan Institute ( GTI), Charlemagne McHaffie stresses the need for Taiwan to develop a comprehensive, multi-layered strategy to repel a potential Chinese invasion, emphasizing mobile defense as an indispensable component. McHaffie emphasizes unified command, air, naval and ground forces coordination, and a robust doctrine tailored to resist amphibious operations.
However, he points out that naval and coastal defenses, while effective in delaying and attriting enemy forces, have historically failed to prevent landfall when the attacker holds naval superiority, as China does against Taiwan. He contends that shoreline defenses must be supported by mobile mechanized forces in order to prevent initial beachhead.
According to McHaffie, calls for Taiwan to adopt an asymmetric strategy that relies on guerrilla warfare and prolongs conflict to secure US intervention are based precariously on an ambiguous US commitment.
He claims that the current policy of strategic ambiguity raises significant risks because of this strategy’s reliance on external aid. Consequently, he says Taiwan’s defense strategy will likely prioritize capabilities for independent victory, including mechanized counterattacks to destroy Chinese beachheads.
Taiwan has the option to launch sporadic strikes on the Chinese mainland. Asia Times mentioned that Taiwan’s long-range missiles, including the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile, significantly advance the island’s defense strategy. They make precise long-range assaults on crucial Chinese military and infrastructure, such as as staging areas for an amphibious assault.
With ranges extending beyond 2, 000 kilometers, these missiles can target key sites such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports and nuclear power plants, potentially inflicting substantial damage.
In the midst of escalating tensions with China, Taiwan’s development of these advanced weapons highlights its strategic move toward more mobile and resilient defense systems.
However, the use of these missiles could have serious effects, including the possibility of more frequent conflicts and potential nuclear retaliation from China. International standards and alienating allies could be compromised by striking a nuclear-armed state’s home, which would impede international support.
Additionally, such strikes might be used by China’s leadership to rally domestic support for an invasion of Taiwan, potentially leading to a protracted conflict.
According to McHaffie, with this circumstance, the US has two options: funding Taiwan’s robust conventional defenses and securing the necessary time for US intervention.
He warns that if Taiwan is ignored, it could become vulnerable, and US counteroffensives against a China with nuclear weapons might be necessary, or Taiwan might completely abandon it.