China has developed a lightweight tool for cutting deep-sea cables, giving underground war a potential whole new dimension.
China has developed a deep-sea cable-cutting device that can cut through the world’s most defended undersea communication and power cables at depths of up to 4, 000 meters, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP ).
The device was created by the China Ship Scientific Research Center ( CSSRC ) in collaboration with the State Key Laboratory of Deep-Sea Manned Vehicles and is intended for use with China’s cutting-edge submersibles, such as the Fendouzhe and Haidou series.
Although it is formally described as a tool for ground mining and human salvage, it is obvious that it has a dual-purpose purpose. A diamond-coated crushing vehicle that is mounted on a submersible-compatible software and a 1-kilowatt machine is used to cut through steel-armored wires, which carry roughly 95 % of the country’s files, at 1, 600 revolutions per minute.
With robotic arms and low-visibility activity, its metal shell and pressure-resistant dolphins make it possible to operate in deepest places.
This is the first time a nation has publicly revealed quite a capability, according to the disclosure, which was published in the journal Mechanical Engineer in February. Analysts warn that the tool may covertly target corporate chokepoints like Guam, a crucial element of US Indo-Pacific protection.
China’s deep-sea ships development and its growing modern advantage over its older US and Japanese counterparts, which are raising global concerns about underwater security, are the subject of the announcement.
In a 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs content, Raghvendra Kumar mentions that sabotaging for network might serve as a precursor to dynamic warfare, underscoring the danger to undersea wire infrastructure. Along with cables, Kumar makes note that docking stations are also vulnerable targets for damage.
Underwater cables and landing points are high-value targets for espionage, according to Kumar, who frequently intercepts the information that travels through the system.
In keeping with that, Sam Dumesh mentions in an American Security Project ( ASP) article this month that a failure of cable landing stations could allow China to reroute internet traffic, including US-based services. Dumesh points out that if such information is routed to Chinese-owned system, exposure may already be assured.
He claims that while crypto can help protect compromised data, quantum computing technologies can be used to extract, store, and decrypt for data afterwards.
Anna Gross and other authors make reference to the US’s relative success in preventing China from participating in the majority of undersea cable projects in a June 2023 Financial Times (FT ) report despite the threat that US data may be routed through China-controlled undersea cable infrastructure.
But, Gross and people point out that China has responded by installing undersea cable in neighboring nations, raising questions about who controls and controls the world’s Internet facilities.
Given those threats, China’s use of a deep-sea cord cutting device may increase the vulnerability of the Taiwan and Guam undersea cables.
Taiwan’s online backbone is dependent on 15 underwater wires carrying more than 100 terabits per minute of speed, according to Charles Mok and Kenny Huang in a statement from the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator in July 2024. This critical infrastructure is also extremely susceptible to both organic and man-made disruptions.
Taiwan is surrounded by geologically active lakes and dependent on foreign fix boats, of which only 22 are specifically dedicated to repair, according to Mok and Huang.
They claim that Taiwan faces operational difficulties in recovering from harm. They point out that incidents like the numerous cables severing to Matsu Island, reportedly by Chinese vessels, raise the possibility of proper sabotage.
They add to the threat by pointing out that Taiwan’s local repair capacity and the international cable repair industry are overstretched, which makes its network resilience vulnerable in the midst of rising geopolitical tensions.
Teleguam Holdings points out that Guam is known as” The Big Switch in the Pacific” because of its connection to the US west coast in the Pacific, just like it does Taiwan. The island’s corporate place between the US and Asia, which lowers overhead and increases bandwidth, is highlighted by Teleguam Holdings.
According to Teleguam Holdings, Guam is home to 12 underwater cables, which provide strong connection and redundancy, establishing the island as a modern link.
In an August 2023 article for the Institute for National Defense and Security Research ( INDSR ), Yau-Chin Tsai points out that submarine cables remain the main means of communication between Taiwan and its frontline islands, such as Dongyin and Matsu, while also highlighting the potential military repercussions of significant cable breaks in Taiwan.
Tsai mentions that severing the supporting wires was sever Taiwan’s military might, making it unable to fully utilize its military might.
But, Elizabeth Braw points out in a February 2025 Foreign Policy content that line-of-sight micro distribution and satellite internet made sure that the majority of the latter’s 12, 000 residents remained intact during an underwater cable split between Matsu and Taiwan that month.
In an article from the August 2023 Proceedings, Andrew Niedbala and Ryan Berry mention a coordinated severing of undersea cables connecting Guam, Asia, Hawaii, and the US that could significantly affect US military command and control capabilities.
China’s announcement to launch a deep-sea cable-cutting device may be more propaganda than actual capability, though.
Cynthia Mehoob points out that China’s claims may conflict with technical realities in a Lowy Institute article this month. Undersea cables are neither armored nor notably fortified at deepest depths, like 4, 000 meters, according to Mahoob.
She points out that when the seabed terrain is exceptionally rugged, undersea cables can be used with armored cables, which are typically 17 to 21 millimeters thick at extreme depths. However, using such cables poses additional challenges. She explains that it is expensive to repair armored cables and that they are difficult to bend.
Additionally, Mehoob points out that anchoring and fishing activities are both commonplace in shallow waters up to 1,500 meters, where armoring cables are a common practice. She points out that armored cables could snap under their weight at extreme depths, making these protective measures counterproductive.
Mehoob claims that China’s announcement is a result of a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign, which includes being first published in a peer-reviewed journal, then being spread through a significant media outlet like SCMP, before being amplified by sensationalist global media coverage.
She claims that the goal is to assert deterrence capabilities, project power, and broaden its maritime reach without provoking actual conflict. China’s cable cutter, whether a real threat or a clever theater, opens a new era for information warfare to start 4, 000 meters below the sea.